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With advances in technology over many decades, copyright law’s allocation
of rights in our society and even its underlying assumptions have been called
into question, particularly with respect to software. In times of technological
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change,1 there usually are such claims from one extreme, for example, that
copyright affords inadequate protection,2 to another, that copyright law is
operating as a hindrance to the creation of creative works.3 This presents both a

See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995)
(Boudin, J., concurring) (“Congress has arguably recognized the tension and left it for the
courts to resolve through the development of case law. And case law development is
adaptive: it allows new problems to be solved with help of earlier doctrine, but it does not
preclude new doctrines to meet new situations.”) (emphasis in original); Comput. Assocs.
Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992) (“In this respect, our conclusion is
informed by Justice Stewart’s concise discussion of the principles that correctly govern the
adaptation of the copyright law to new circumstances. In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v.
Aiken, he wrote: ‘The limited scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the
limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing
claims upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts.’”).
Adapting copyright law in light of new technology is an age-old problem. For example, in
discussing the introduction of photography as a technology, Nimmer on Copyright
(hereinafter, ‘NIMMER’) notes the following:
And so copyright law had to confront questions of how to treat function-based productions.
At the same time, the realistic portrayal of nature captured by a camera lens posed the
related question of and how to treat fact-based productions. Those dilemmas regarding
photography represent the beginning of the problems faced by copyright law in adjusting to
new technology—but scarcely the end. Today’s world, dominated by the Internet and with
its profusion of software everywhere, poses unceasing pressure in defining the boundaries of
where copyright law does and does not reach. In some sense, all the chapters of this treatise
have been dragooned into those considerations.
1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.03 (2021).
2
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 711 (“At bottom, they claim that if
programmers are not guaranteed broad copyright protection for their work, they will not
invest the extensive time, energy and funds required to design and improve program
structures.”); Eileen McDermott, Justices Look for Reassurance That the Sky Won’t Fall
When They Rule in Google v. Oracle, IPWATCHDOG (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/10/07/justices-look-reassurance-sky-wont-fall-google-voracle/id=126052/ (“We’ve heard dire predictions from Google about the future of software
innovation, but two different administrations would not be supporting us if our position
were a threat to innovation.”); Bill Donahue, Justices Wary of ‘Sky Falling’ in GoogleOracle Case, LAW360 (Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1317786/justiceswary-of-sky-falling-in-google-oracle-software-case.
3
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 712 (“[S]erious students of the industry
have been highly critical of the sweeping scope of copyright protection engendered by the
Whelan rule, in that it ‘enables first comers to ‘lock up’ basic programming techniques as
implemented in programs to perform particular tasks.’”); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1238 (3d Cir. 1986) (“As a consequence, this
commentator argues, giving computer programs too much copyright protection will retard
progress in the field. We are not convinced that progress in computer technology or
technique is qualitatively different from progress in other areas of science or the arts. In
balancing protection and dissemination . . . the copyright law has always recognized and
tried to accommodate the fact that all intellectual pioneers build on the work of their
1
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philosophical and a practical problem. Specifically, how copyright law should
and/or how copyright law has accommodated the latest developments in
technology.4 Long ago, when computer technology and software first appeared
on the scene, it was decided to provide some protection for software within the
doctrines of copyright law.5 Since then, questions about the challenges and/or
desirability of affording meaningful protection for software and related
technology under copyright law have continued to be debated by many. 6
predecessors.”); McDermott, supra note 2 (“Oracle has a copyright to the computer code,
not a patent. That means the public, not Oracle, has the right to these functions.”); Donahue,
supra note 2.
4
Adapting copyright law in light of new technology is an age-old problem. For
example, in discussing the introduction of photography as a technology, Nimmer notes the
following:
And so copyright law had to confront questions of how to treat function-based productions.
At the same time, the realistic portrayal of nature captured by a camera lens posed the
related question of and how to treat fact-based productions. Those dilemmas regarding
photography represent the beginning of the problems faced by copyright law in adjusting to
new technology—but scarcely the end. Today’s world, dominated by the Internet and with
its profusion of software everywhere, poses unceasing pressure in defining the boundaries of
where copyright law does and does not reach. In some sense, all the chapters of this treatise
have been dragooned into those considerations.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.03, supra note 1.
5
See infra notes 87–112 and accompanying text.
6
Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining
the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1215, 1219 (2016)
[hereinafter Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for
Software Copyright Infringement]; See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Staking the Boundaries of
Software Copyrights in the Shadows of Patents, 71 FLA. L. REV. 243, 243–49 (2019)
[hereinafter Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of Patents]; Peter
S. Menell, Rise of the API Copyright Dead?: An Updated Epitaph for Copyright Protection
of Network and Functional Features of Computer Software, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
(SPECIAL ISSUE) 305, 307–13 (2018); Timothy K. Armstrong, Symbols, Systems and
Software as Intellectual Property: Time for CONTU, Part II?, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 131, 131–37 (2019); Daria Vasilescu-Palmero, APIs and Copyright
Protection: The Potential Impact on Software Compatibility in the Programming Industry,
16 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 153, 154–56 (2016); Pamela Samuelson, The
Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1746, 1746–48
(2011) [hereinafter The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited]; Peter Menell,
Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1329–32 (1987)
[hereinafter Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software]; Jane C. Ginsburg, Four
Reasons and a Paradox: The Manifest Superiority of Copyright over Sui Generis Protection
of Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2559, 2559–60 (1994); Dennis S. Karjala,
Copyright, Computer Software, and the New Protectionism, 28 JURIMETRICS 33, 33–36
(1987); Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application
Programs, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1045, 1045–49 (1989) [hereinafter An Analysis of the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Application Programs]; see, e.g, J.H. Reichman, Computer
Programs as Applied Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for
Commercialized University Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639, 641–42 (1989); Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1149, 1149–52 (1998);
Steven R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of
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However, as is well-known, copyright law itself came into existence as a
response to a new technology, the printing press.7 Therefore, in some larger
sense, perhaps it is only destiny of a sort that an intellectual property law, born
of new technology, becomes reinvented as technology continues to evolve and
change.8

Copyright Protection of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L. REV. 866, 866–
67 (1990); see generally Arthur Miller, Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,
Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 977 (1993) (offering competing arguments about the scope of copyright protection
for software); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) [hereinafter A Manifesto Concerning
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs]; David Nimmer et al., A Structured Approach
to Analyzing Substantial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases,
20 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 625, 625–27 (1988) (acknowledging the complexity of litigating high-tech
copyright infringement cases and advocating for a simplifying test inquiring whether the
two programs are substantially similar); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER
ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F) (2021); JONATHAN B AND & MASANOBU KATOH, INTERFACES ON
TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE
INDUSTRY (1995) (weighing the scope of intellectual property protections within the context
of technology and industry); JONATHAN BAND & MASANOBU KATOH, I NTERFACES ON TRIAL
2.0 (Laura DeNardis & Michael Zimmer eds., 2011) (analyzing debates relating to
interoperability, U.S. copyright cases, and contractual limitations on reverse engineering);
Special Issue: Software Interface Copyright, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 303
(2018) [hereinafter Special Issue: Software Interface Copyright] (devoting its Spring Issue
to the topic of Copyright and Software Interfaces with 9 articles by well-known intellectual
property law experts including: Pamela Samuelson, Peter Menell, and Mark Lemley).
7
BEATRICE WARDE & S.H. STEINBERG, FIVE HUNDRED YEARS OF PRINTING 95 (Dover,
1st ed. 2017).
8
See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir.
1995) (Boudin, J., concurrence) (“Congress has arguably recognized the tension and left it
for the courts to resolve through the development of case law. And case law development is
adaptive: it allows new problems to be solved with help of earlier doctrine, but it does not
preclude new doctrines to meet new situations” (emphasis in original)); Comput. Assocs.
Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d 711 (“In this respect, our conclusion is informed by Justice Stewart’s
concise discussion of the principles that correctly govern the adaptation of the copyright law
to new circumstances. In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, he wrote: ‘The limited
scope of the copyright holder’s statutory monopoly, like the limited copyright duration
required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other
arts.’”).
Adapting copyright law in light of new technology is an age-old problem. For example, in
discussing the introduction of photography as a technology, NIMMER notes the following:
And so copyright law had to confront questions of how to treat function-based productions.
At the same time, the realistic portrayal of nature captured by a camera lens posed the
related question of and how to treat fact-based productions. Those dilemmas regarding
photography represent the beginning of the problems faced by copyright law in adjusting to
new technology—but scarcely the end. Today’s world, dominated by the Internet and with
its profusion of software everywhere, poses unceasing pressure in defining the boundaries of
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Legal scholars have spent decades debating the appropriate scope of copyright
law protection for computer programs. In this debate, some advocate that the
traditional bedrock principles of copyright law either should not change and/or
have not changed to appropriately and suitably accommodate software.9 This
article will demonstrate, however, that the current state of copyright law reflects
a clear shift (referred to here as a “paradigm shift”) of some fundamental
copyright law principles to suitably handle the rights to be afforded software
under copyright law. This shift came about to address the unique problems that
come from the nature of software as a form of copyrightable expression.
Rather, as many others have already observed, software represents a form of
expression, unique in that it is both expressive and useful.10 This aspect of
where copyright law does and does not reach. In some sense, all the chapters of this treatise
have been dragooned into those considerations.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.03, supra note 1.
9
See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 706 (“This approach breaks no new
ground; rather, it draws on such familiar copyright doctrines as merger, scène à faire, and
public domain.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F), supra note 6 (“Applying the
‘successive filtering’ test set form above merely involves examining the works in
controversy in light of each of the doctrines canvassed in the preceding subsections.”); see,
e.g., Samuelson, supra note 6; Menell, supra note 6; Functionality and Expression in
Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6,
at 1215, 1217–19; Armstrong, supra note 6, at 134–36; Vasilescu-Palmero, supra note 6, at
155–56; The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, supra note 6, at 1748;
Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 6, at 1331–32; Ginsburg,
supra note at 6, at 2560–62; Karjala, supra note 6, at 33–35; An Analysis of the Scope of
Copyright Protection for Application Programs, supra note 6, at 1046–50; Reichman, supra
note 6, at 641–42; A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
supra note 6, at 2310–14; Weinreb, supra note 6, at 1150–54; Englund, supra note 6, at
866–67; Nimmer, supra note 6; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F), supra note 6; see
generally Miller, supra note 6, at 1072 (arguing that no evidence suggests that CONTU or
Congress was wrong in bringing copyright protection to “computer programs, databases,
and computer-assisted works.”); INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 6 (weighing the scope
of intellectual property protections within the context of technology and industry);
INTERFACES ON TRIAL 2.0, supra note 6 (analyzing debates relating to interoperability, U.S.
copyright cases, and contractual limitations on reverse engineering); see also Special Issue:
Software Interface Copyright, supra note 6 (devoting its Spring Issue to the topic of
Copyright and Software Interfaces with 9 articles by well-known intellectual property law
experts including: Pamela Samuelson, Peter Menell, and Mark Lemley).
10 See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 819 (concurrence) (“The problem presented by
computer programs is fundamentally different in one respect. The computer program is a
means for causing something to happen; it has a mechanical utility, an instrumental role, in
accomplishing the world’s work. Granting protection, in other words, can have some of the
consequences of patent protection in limiting other people’s ability to perform a task in the
most efficient manner. Utility does not bar copyright (dictionaries may be copyrighted), but
it alters the calculus.” (emphasis in original)); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 712
(“This results from the hybrid nature of a computer program, which, while it is literary
expression, is also a highly functional, utilitarian component in the larger process of
computing.”).
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software makes it problematic in terms of traditional concepts of copyright law
and, more specifically, the scope of protection to be afforded to software by
copyright law.11 In this article, we refer to the protection of features under
copyright law that are both expressive and useful as hybrid intellectual property
rights.12 Traditional copyright law, in general, does not provide protection for

11 Nimmer observes:
Wherever we look closely, the functional impinges on the artistic . . . Literary works are the
oldest form of protectable compositions—but, defined to include any text composed in
alphanumeric characters, that category currently embraces computer software. Software
itself can be conceptualized as “a part of a machine,” namely the component that instructs a
computer how to operate . . . An inquiry into copyright protection for computer software
generates limitless questions of what should be protected and where to draw the line for
infringing similarity of competing codes.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2A.03(a), supra note 1.
12 Likewise, without drifting too far from the main topic, it is observed that a more
general problem may be considered to emanate from an intersection between utility (or
functionality) and form (or appearance). That is, across a variety of types of intellectual
property, a general problem may occur in situations in which protection is sought for a
“res,” so to speak, of which software is but one example, that exhibits features in which the
utility of those features and the form of those features are intertwined sufficiently closely
that a clear separation of utility and form may not be possible. Ostensibly, this may create a
problem in these other areas of intellectual property because concerns around utility in
intellectual property law generally are relegated to patent law, with its high standards of
novelty and non-obviousness. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–03 (1880) (“The
novelty of the art or thing described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of the
copyright. To give to the author of the book an exclusive property in the art described
therein, when no examination of its novelty has ever been officially made, would be a
surprise and a fraud upon the public. That is the province of letters-patent, not of
copyright.”); Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against Copyright
Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable Form, 1984 DUKE L.J. 663, 732–
35 (1984) (explaining reasons why utilitarian works have conventionally been excluded
from copyright protection). Examples beyond copyright have arisen, for example, in the
areas of design patents and trademark/trade dress protection. See Afori Fischman Orit, The
Role of the Non-Functionality Requirement in Design Law, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 847, 849–50 (2010); Robert G. Bone, Trademark Functionality
Reexamined, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 183, 184 (2015). Many key differences, however, exist
between the scope of protection provided by a patent versus a copyright, which, of course,
necessarily includes software. For a patent – the scope of protection is defined by the
claims, which are prepared by the applicant. See, e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptonic, Inc.,
90 F.3d 1576, 1582–83 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For a copyright, the scope of protection is
determined by substantial similarity of the expression of a copyrightable work to an accused
work. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1541, 1543–44 (11th Cir.
1995). It would be extremely difficult for the scope of protection available for a computer
program via copyright, including with respect to non-literal protection, to approach the
scope of protection able to be garnered via patent protection. Thus, it is believed that
concerns about overlap may be overstated and/or misplaced. A patent typically covers
making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing tangible apparatuses (or processes), for
example, that fall within the scope of the patent claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2021). A
copyright covers copying (used in the broad, non-literal sense) – albeit, even considering
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subject matter that is both expressive and useful.13 In this regard the words of
the court in Computer Associates v. Altai (hereinafter, Altai) are apropos: “To
be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for non-literal program
structure are not completely clear . . . . This results from the hybrid nature
of a computer program, which, while it is literary expression, is also a highly
functional, utilitarian component in the larger process of computing.” 14
This article will demonstrate that software, because of this overlap or
intersection between utility and form, is handled differently in fundamental ways
from other more traditional forms of copyrightable expression (e.g., literary
works, photographs, music, movies, etc.). It is for this reason that in this article
the treatment of software under copyright law is referred to as hybrid intellectual
property rights, mimicking the previous quote from Altai observing the hybrid
nature of software.15
This article will show that copyright law may be approached as having two
regimes of protection – first, a traditional copyright law regime and, second, a
hybrid protection regime, the latter regime provided specifically for software.
The rights are hybrid rights in part because the expression is protected although
the expressive features and the useful features are not capable of being

non-literal scope, this at most relates to ‘use’ only to the extent that copying of a program
indirectly includes use – and this applies only where there are a myriad of ways to
accomplish the same task (e.g., absent merger). See, e.g., discussion infra Section II.B.1.
We also observe that the intellectual property clause of the Constitution, Article 1, Section
8, Clause 8, gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful
arts, by securing, for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries,” and on its face has few clear limits imposed regarding
this particular Congressional power other than that the protection be “for limited times” and
be with respect to “writings” and “discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Several
Supreme Court cases have sought to construe various terms of this provision, such as the
term “writings.” See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206 n.5 (1954); Feist Publ’ns, Inc
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–46 (1991). Granting that there may be limits on
the exercise of this Congressional power, either by logical construction and/or court
decisions, it should be noted that what Congress may be unable to do under one of its
powers, it may still be able to do under another power, such as under the interstate
commerce power, for example. Cf. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879). In this
latter case, the Supreme Court held a federal trademark statute unconstitutional; however,
afterwards, Congress re-enacted another federal trademark statute and made it clear it was
relying on the interstate commerce power and the statute since then appears to have been
accepted as constitutional. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 206–08.
13 See, e.g., Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that the conceptually separable artistic elements of belt buckles are
copyrightable); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147–48 (2d
Cir. 1987) (finding the ribbon design for a bicycle rack could not be protected by copyright
law as a useful article lacking separable expression).
14 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 712 (emphasis added).
15 Id.
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separately delineated or disaggregated.16 A point that has tripped up various
courts, for example, as discussed infra.17
Significantly, the scope of protection that is employed to handle the balance
of competition and protection is quite different for software.18 However, rather
than suggest that software should be approached more traditionally, as some
have implied or even stated,19 a thesis of this article is that this treatment for
16 As we shall see, another reason for referring to these rights as hybrid is that the rights
share some considerations that make them seem a bit “patent-like,” while also clearly
having considerations that makes them “copyright-like.” See infra notes 341–52 and
accompanying text. Some commentators have taken note about the potential overlap
between protection provided via a software copyright and protection afforded through patent
protection. See Samuelson, supra note 6, at 283–85; Functionality and Expression in
Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6,
at 1287–88; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07(B)
(2021). Many key differences, however, exist between the scope of protection provided by a
patent versus a copyright, which, of course, necessarily includes software. For a patent –
the scope of protection is defined by the claims, which are prepared by the applicant. See,
e.g., Vitronics Corp., 90 F.3d at 1582; For a copyright, the scope of protection is determined
by substantial similarity to the expression of a copyrightable work to an accused work. See,
e.g., Bateman, 79 F.3d at 1545. It would be extremely difficult for the scope of protection
available for a computer program via copyright, including with respect to non-literal
protection, to approach the scope of protection able to be garnered via patent protection.
Thus, it is believed that concerns about overlap may be overstated and/or misplaced. A
patent typically covers making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing tangible
apparatuses (or processes), for example, that fall within the scope of the patent claims. See
§ 271(a). A copyright covers copying (used in the broad, non-literal sense)—albeit, even
considering non-literal scope, this at most relates to “use” only to the extent that copying of
a program indirectly includes use—and this applies only where there are a myriad of ways
to accomplish the same task (e.g., absent merger). See, e.g., infra notes 52–87 and
accompanying text. It also observed that the intellectual property clause of the Constitution,
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and Useful arts, by securing, for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” and on its face has few clear
limits imposed regarding this particular Congressional power other than that the protection
be “for limited times” and be with respect to “writings” and “discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8. Several Supreme Court cases have sought to construe various terms of this
provision, such as the term “writings.” See, e.g., Mazer, 347 U.S. at 206 n.5; Feist Publ’ns,
Inc., 499 U.S. at 345; Granting that there may be limits on the exercise of this Congressional
power, either by logical construction and/or court decisions, it should be noted that what
Congress may be unable to do under one of its powers, it may still be able to do under
another power, such as under the interstate commerce power, for example. Cf. Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. at 95–97. In this latter case, the Supreme Court held a federal trademark
statute unconstitutional; however, afterwards, Congress re-enacted another federal
trademark statute and made it clear it was relying on the interstate commerce power and the
statute since then appears to have been accepted as constitutional. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at
206–07.
17 See infra notes 113–265 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 65–93 and accompanying text.
19 See, e.g., Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadows of Patents,
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software is appropriate and should be continued, at least based on the legal
analysis presented.20 The recently decided Supreme Court case, Google LLC v.
Oracle America, Inc.21 at least indirectly also supports this view. 22 Furthermore,
as a matter of policy, discussion is provided to suggest that perhaps such
treatment may also be appropriate for other examples of copyrightable
expression that exhibit similarly hybrid characteristics (e.g., hybrid-like
characteristics).
Some, if not many, of the considerations raised in this article are not
necessarily new.23 Rather, the various considerations are organized and
presented in this article in a manner so that a more consistent and simpler
analytical framework is emergent to explain the major court decisions and the
various policy considerations for an otherwise relatively complex and
potentially uncertain area of law. Such a presentation is provided to correct
some discrepancies that may have crept into the discourse and, therefore, permit
appropriate evaluation of the current direction of copyright law in the area of
software protection.
In the first section, the traditional legal principles •of copyright law, the
statutory developments that took place to deal with software, and the seminal
cases in which courts interpreted the consequences of these developments
regarding software for the law of copyright will be reviewed. 24 In the second
section, the resulting legal landscape will be discussed to demonstrate that, if
properly interpreted, a shift took place in which some traditional principles of
supra note 6, at 256; Menell, supra note 6, at 438; Functionality and Expression in
Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6,
at 1215; Armstrong, supra note 6, at 180; Vasilescu-Palmero, supra note 6, at 169; The
Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, supra note 6, at 1781–82; Tailoring Legal
Protection for Computer Software, supra note 6, at 1369–71; Ginsburg, supra note at 6, at
2572; Karjala, supra note 6, at 95–96; An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, supra note 6, at 1103–04; Miller, supra note 6, at 978; Reichman,
supra note 6, at 642; A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,
supra note 6, at 2429–30; Weinreb, supra note 6, at 1150; Englund, supra note 6, at 867;
Nimmer, supra note 6, at 651; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03, supra note 6; INTERFACES ON
TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL SOFTWARE
INDUSTRY, supra note 6, at 46–47; INTERFACES ON TRIAL 2.0, supra note 6, at 1–2; See
generally Special Issue: Software Interface Copyright, supra note 6 (in which the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology devoted its Spring Issue to the topic of Copyright and
Software Interfaces with 9 articles by well-known intellectual property law experts
including: Pamela Samuelson, Peter Menell, and Mark Lemley).
20 However, in the discussion, infra., procedural mechanisms may address underlying
assumptions regarding copying and the public domain. See infra notes 284–340 and
accompanying text.
21 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1195 (2021).
22 See infra notes 409–47 and accompanying text.
23 To the extent a consideration raised in this article has been known to have been raised
elsewhere, a source citation is, of course, provided.
24 See infra Section I.

10

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.1

copyright law are not applicable to software. An interpretation of this shift
relative to traditional copyright law will also be discussed. 25 Finally,26 in the
third and final section, the nature of hybrid intellectual property rights in
copyright law with respect to software will be discussed to consider other
potential examples of hybrid-like situations and whether the approach taken in
software would be workable for other forms of expression that may be hybridlike, such as application programing interfaces (APIs) and graphical user
interfaces (GUIs). APIs are discussed in more detail, infra. GUIs are a type of
user interface in which users interact with a computer program or an electronic
device using visual indicators on a display.
I. COPYRIGHT LAW BEFORE AND AFTER THE PARADIGM
SHIFT
A. Traditional Principles
Copyright Law includes several basic principles or doctrines. Many
sources for these principles are available. Therefore, the principles will be
discussed only to the extent appropriate to appreciate how software has been
handled differently than other types of copyrightable works. Copyright law
protects the original expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves. 27 Section
102(a) of Title 17 defines copyrightable subject matter: “copyright
protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression . . . “ 28 Therefore, the copyright statute establishes that
copyrightability requires originality 29 and fixation. 30
The notion that copyright law protects the original expression of ideas and
not the ideas themselves is referred to as the idea/expression dichotomy. 31

See infra Section II.
See infra Section III.
27 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2021); see, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
28 § 102(a).
29 Id.; see Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir.
1983); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 351 (1991) (stating that
originality is a constitutional requirement).
30 § 102(a); See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1247; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int’l,
Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999, 1007–08 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (concluding that the changing display of a
video game nonetheless met the fixation requirement).
31 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 350 (“This principle, known as the
idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship.”); cf.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954) (“They must be original, that is, the author’s
25
26
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Judge Learned Hand is credited with providing the most articulate
description of how this works. 32 In the Nichols v. Universal Picture Corp. case,
he stated:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than
the most general statement of what the play is about, and at times
might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series of
abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the
playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to which, apart from
their expression, his property is never extended . . . . Nobody has ever
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can.33
Likewise, in another famous case, Peter Pan Fabrics v. Martin Weiner
Corp., the esteemed judge observed:
The test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague. In the
case of verbal “works” it is well settled that although the
“proprietor’s” monopoly extends beyond an exact reproduction of
the words, there can be no copyright in the “ideas” disclosed but only
in their “expression.” Obviously, no principle can be stated as to
when an imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,” and has
borrowed its “expression.” Decisions must therefore inevitably be ad
hoc.34
This latter point, stating that decisions are inevitable ad hoc, pervades all of
copyright law. It also indirectly plays a role in understanding software
protection relative to the protection provided to other types of copyrightable
works.
Thus, in general, it is helpful to appreciate that under traditional and
fundamental copyright law principles, some amount of copying of a
copyrightable work is legally permissible. In particular, the ideas from any
copyrightable work may, at least in theory, be copied with impunity. 35 To be
more specific, if a copyrightable work is published, the ideas of the
copyrightable work enter the public domain to be available for anyone to
freely copy.36 In a real sense, this is a part of the quid pro quo between the
author of the work and the government (or society, in general) for providing
tangible expression of his ideas.”).
32 Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 902 (1931).
33 Id.
34 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
35 The text says “in theory” primarily because identifying the ideas, as opposed to the
expression, in any given work may be a challenge.
36 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F)(4), supra note 6.

12

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.1

copyright protection for the work. The ideas are available for others to build
upon and, it is hoped, create additional creative and expressive works for the
enjoyment of others. Without such a bargain, the goal of copyright law, to
increase the available number of copyrightable works by creating
appropriate incentives, might not be realized. 37 In particular, in connection
with copyright law, it has been stated: “If I have seen further, it is by standing
on the shoulders of giants,” suggesting that most new creations are based on
something that has been created in the past.38 One aspect of these past creations
is the ideas from such works that enter the public domain immediately.39
However, per Learned Hand’s observation, what guides the determination
of the boundary between ideas and expression? One job for a court faced
with determining the scope of protection for a work is to identify the
appropriate idea/expression boundary. 40 In this manner, over time, for
particular categories of works, guidance will exist as to roughly where that
boundary is located. 41 This then makes it possible for individuals to conduct
their affairs and transact business taking this into account. 42 This was
possibly best articulated in a Ninth Circuit case, Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian (hereinafter Herbert Rosenthal), which also cited to the
Judge Learned Hand’s helpful observations quoted above:
The critical distinction between “idea” and “expression” is difficult
to draw. As Judge Hand candidly wrote, ‘Obviously, no principle can
37 See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“[C]opyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it affords
protection to authors as an incentive to create, and, on the other, it must appropriately limit
the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation. In
applying the federal act to new types of cases, courts must always keep this symmetry in
mind.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.03(B), supra note 1 (“[W]e must approach the field
wearing bifocals—artistic creativity deserves protection at the same time that the evils of
monopolizing functional activities must be avoided. Decisions must therefore be reached
with sensitivity to both sides of the ledger: If according protection to a given form of
expression threatens to forestall competition in a given field of endeavor, that consideration
alone might counsel the opposite resolution.”).
38 See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 n.33 (3d
Cir. 1986) (“Long before the first computer, Sir Isaac Newton humbly explained that ‘if [he]
had seen farther than other men, it was because [he] had stood on the shoulders of giants.’”);
Michael D. Birnhack, The Idea of Progress in Copyright Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 3,
42 (2001); see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(2)(a), supra note 6 (“[A] court
posited long ago that copyright protection is granted for the very reason that it may persuade
authors to make their ideas freely accessible to the public so that they may be used for the
intellectual advancement of mankind.”).
39 Another aspect is that the works becomes available for copying after the copyright of
the work expires.
40 Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
41 Id.
42 Id.

2021]

Understanding Copyright's Paradigm Shift

13

be stated as to when an imitator has gone beyond copying the “idea,”
and has borrowed its “expression”‘. . . At least in close cases, one
may suspect, the classification the court selects may simply state the
result reached rather than the reason for it. In our view, the difference
is really one of degree as Judge Hand suggested in his striking
“abstraction” formulation. . . . . The guiding consideration in drawing
the line is the preservation of the balance between competition and
protection reflected in the patent and copyright laws.43
Thus, the guiding consideration for a court seeking to identify an
appropriate boundary between the ideas and the expression of a work is to
strike a balance between competition and protection. 44 Furthermore, if it is
not readily apparent, it stands to reason that the idea/expression line falls in
a different place for a novel than it does for a photograph, for example. That
is, the nature of a particular category of works suggests that this boundary
be located differently for different categories of copyrightable works. In
general, a court should seek to strike a balance so that incentives are
structured to lead to the greatest number of works in the sense that the
boundary should be located so that it is neither overprotective nor under
protective. 45 It then follows that because different categories of works entail
different forms of expression, this boundary should be placed differently for
works in different categories, such as a novel in comparison to music or a
novel in comparison to a movie, as simple examples.
In addition to originality and fixation, copyrightability requires some
“minimal level of creativity.” 46 Although time and effort may be involved in

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
45 See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“[C]opyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it affords
protection to authors as an incentive to create, and, on the other, it must appropriately limit
the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation. In
applying the federal act to new types of cases, courts must always keep this symmetry in
mind.”); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1235 (3d Cir.
1986) (“In this regard, we must remember that the purpose of the copyright law is to create
the most efficient and productive balance between protection (incentive) and dissemination
of information, to promote learning, culture and development.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2A.03(B), supra note 1 (“[W]e must approach the field wearing bifocals—artistic creativity
deserves protection at the same time that the evils of monopolizing functional activities
must be avoided. Decisions must therefore be reached with sensitivity to both sides of the
ledger: If according protection to a given form of expression threatens to forestall
competition in a given field of endeavor, that consideration alone might counsel the opposite
resolution.”).
46 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 358 (1991) (“Originality
requires only that the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e., without
copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and that it display some minimal
level of creativity.”).
43
44
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developing an idea into a creative form, it is not the time and effort that
provide the copyrightable elements or expression. Rather, it is the creativity
of the form.
How much creativity is enough? That is a lot like asking, “how much
consideration does it take to form a contract?” Therefore, in the Supreme
Court case, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., (hereinafter
Feist) alphabetical listings of a white pages directory were held not to be
sufficiently creative to justify copyright protection. 47 Nonetheless, in most
cases, the amount of creativity it takes for a work to be eligible for copyright
is relatively low, so that judges are not called upon to evaluate the quality of
the creativity, much like in contract law, where judges are not called upon to
evaluate the quality of a particular bargain once a threshold is met. 48
Feist rejected the so-called “sweat of the brow” doctrine, a notion that
somehow, time and effort may transform a non-creative work into a
copyrightable work simply through expending sufficient effort.49 Feist
also determined that this is not simply a fanciful whim of Congress
embedded in the statute. 50 This requirement goes to the constitutional
core of copyrightability. 51
While it may take countless hours to compile an alphabetical list of names,
addresses and phone numbers for a white pages’ compilation, that work is
not copyrightable. Despite a major amount of effort put forth to create it, the
work may be freely copied. 52 In contrast, the taking of a photo takes but a
fraction of a second, and yet receives protection under the copyright act
against unauthorized copying, to the point, even, that transfer of the
copyright in the photo will prevent the original photographer from producing
substantially similar photos that would constitute an infringement of the
copyright transferred. 53
Another important principle of copyright law is that the rights covered by
a copyright do not include use rights. 54 This fundamental concept is
attributed to a foundational Supreme Court case, Baker v. Selden (hereinafter
Baker v. Seldon or Baker). 55 Rights over use, as it turns out, are relegated to

Id. at 363.
Id. at 349.
49 Id. at 352, 360.
50 Id. at 359–60.
51 See id. at 362 (stating that creativity is a constitutional requirement).
52 Assuming it has not been otherwise protected in another manner, such as, for
example, via contractual restrictions and/or trade secret law.
53 See, e.g., Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930, 931 (2d Cir. 1914).
54 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880).
55 See generally id. (holding that the rights covered by a copyright do not include use).
47
48
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patent law, rather than copyright law.56 Again, this is a more than whimsical
aspect of copyright law. Instead, it is a carefully orchestrated balancing of
different intellectual property schemes that operate in conjunction to benefit
society. 57 It appears that this was intended by the Framers of the Constitution
from the way the relevant clauses of the Constitution are written and was
intended by Congress when it exercised powers granted under the
Constitution to create legislation to encourage such “writings.” 58
The Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden, does an excellent job of

Id. at 102–03.
Some commentators have taken note about the potential overlap between protection
provided via a software copyright and protection afforded through patent protection. See
Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of Patents, supra note 6, at
289; Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software
Copyright Infringement, supra note 6, at 57; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07(D)(1), supra
note 16. Many key differences, however, exist between the scope of protection provided by
a patent versus a copyright, which, of course, necessarily includes software. For a patent –
the scope of protection is defined by the claims, which are prepared by the applicant. See,
e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For a
copyright, the scope of protection is determined by substantial similarity to the expression of
a copyrightable work to an accused work. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d
1532, 1544 n.25 (11th Cir. 1995). It would be extremely difficult for the scope of protection
available for a computer program via copyright, including with respect to non-literal
protection, to approach the scope of protection able to be garnered via patent protection.
Thus, it is believed that concerns about overlap may be overstated and/or misplaced. A
patent typically covers making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing tangible
apparatuses (or processes), for example, that fall within the scope of the patent claims. See
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2021). A copyright covers copying (used in the broad, non-literal
sense) – albeit, even considering non-literal scope, this at most relates to ‘use’ only to the
extent that copying of a program indirectly includes use – and this applies only where there
are a myriad of ways to accomplish the same task (e.g., absent merger). See, e.g., supra text
accompanying notes 50–57; infra text accompanying note 58–86. We also observe that the
intellectual property clause of the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, gives
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and Useful arts, by securing, for
limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries,” and on its face has few clear limits imposed regarding this particular
Congressional power other than that the protection be “for limited times” and be with
respect to “writings” and “discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Several Supreme
Court cases have sought to construe various terms of this provision, such as the term
“writings.” See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 206–08 (1954); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). Granting that there may be limits on the
exercise of this Congressional power, either by logical construction and/or court decisions, it
should be noted that what Congress may be unable to do under one of its powers, it may still
be able to do under another power, such as under the interstate commerce power, for
example. Cf. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97–98 (1879). In this latter case, the Supreme
Court held a federal trademark statute unconstitutional; however, afterwards, Congress reenacted another federal trademark statute and made it clear it was relying on the interstate
commerce power and the statute since then appears to have been accepted as constitutional.
See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 206 n.5.
58 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102–103; Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219.
56
57

16

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.1

articulating the difference between rights afforded by copyright protection
and rights related to use. 59 The copyrightable work at issue was a book
explaining accounting, titled Selden’s Condensed Ledger, or Book-keeping
Simplified. 60 The alleged infringement revolved around copying the
condensed ledger or sample tables within the book. 61 In concluding that
copying the ledgers or using a similar ledger did not amount to copyright
infringement, the Supreme Court stated:
Now whilst no one has the right to print or publish his [i.e.,
Selden’s] book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended
to convey instruction in the art, any person may practice and use
the art itself which he has described and illustrated therein. The
use of the art is a totally different thing from a publication of the
book explaining it. The copyright of a book on book-keeping
cannot secure the exclusive right to make, sell, and use accountbooks prepared upon the plan set forth in such book. Whether the
art might or might not have been patented, is a question which is
not before us. It was not patented and is open and free to the use
of the public. 62
Thus, under Baker v. Selden where exclusive rights against copying of some
otherwise copyrightable subject matter would, by providing protection under
copyright, encompass or ensnare exclusive rights over use, then copyright
protection must fail, as exceeding the scope of rights that are intended to be
conveyed under copyright law. 63 Here, this doctrine is termed the “formfunction doctrine,” meaning that the scope of protection afforded by
copyright may be limited where copyrightable form overlaps with
uncopyrightable (e.g., utilitarian) function, although others may refer to this
as the useful article(s) doctrine. 64 As discussed later, the exception afforded
to software from this principle has been a source of confusion and
consternation for courts charged with the task of determining the scope of
protection for software in copyright law. 65
Although seemingly easy to state, even before the advent of computers
and software, this principle was not so easy to apply. The potential conflict
between use rights and copyrightable subject matter with respect to the formBaker, 101 U.S. at 103.
Id. at 100.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
63 Id. at 107.
64 See Mark McKenna & Christopher Springman, What’s in, and What’s out: How IP’s
Boundary Rules Shape Innovation, 30 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 491, 535–39 (2017) (referring to
the “useful articles” doctrine).
65 See infra notes 113–329 accompanying text.
59
60
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function doctrine, thus, was again taken up by the Supreme Court in Mazer
v. Stein. 66 (hereinafter Mazer or Mazer v. Stein) This case involved the
copyrightability of a lamp base, although, in this case, the lamp base had the
shape of a Balinese Dancer. 67 Therefore, in one sense, what was sought to
be copyrighted was what the law viewed as a useful article, that is, a lamp. 68
However, when viewed as a work of art, the dancer that was part of the lamp
appeared to meet the usual indicia of copyrightability. 69 Ultimately, the
Court upheld the copyrightability of works of art that had been incorporated
into useful articles, so long as certain conditions are met. 70
After Mazer, the Copyright Office addressed this issue with detailed
regulations, that have largely been codified into the 1976 Copyright Act
(hereinafter, ‘the Act’ or the ‘‘76 Act’). 71 Relevant sections include the
definitions of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” and “useful article”
in section 101, and section 113, which provides the scope of exclusive rights
in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. 72 The Act appears to recognize
protectable copyrightable expression in a useful article only if, and only to
the extent that, such an article incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
features that can be identified separately from, and are capable of existing
independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article. 73 Thus, these
provisions clarify in a reasonably precise manner how the form-function
doctrine may interact with copyrightable expression to affect the scope of
protection with respect to traditional works subject to copyright, such as
pictorial, graphic and sculptural works. 74 That is, the codification that
followed Mazer, captures the form-function doctrine in connection with
pictorial, graphical and sculptural works. Nonetheless, the doctrine that
originated in Baker is not necessarily limited to the details of these particular
provisions. More importantly, this codified approach is remarkably different
than the approach employed regarding software protection.
Again, this latter point may at least partially be the source of confusion
around software. That is, Baker is recognized primarily for the merger
doctrine, 75 as discussed immediately below; whereas, issues around useful

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 205 (1954).
Id. at 202.
68 Id. at 206.
69 Id. at 218.
70 Id. at 218.
71 17 U.S.C. § 101–1511 (2020); see § 101 (definition of “pictorial, graphical and
structural works”; definition of “useful article”); § 113(c).
72 §§ 101, 113.
73 See § 101 (defining “pictorial, graphical and structural works”).
74 See § 102 (including “pictorial, graphical and structural works”).
75 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880).
66
67
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articles are generally analyzed under Mazer and its progeny. 76 Software is
not typically comprehended in connection with useful articles. 77 Courts do
not appear to appreciate the significance that software is excepted from a
fundamental copyright law doctrine perhaps because useful articles are
usually viewed as tangible items.
A careful review of these provisions of the Act reveals a dichotomy
between copyrightable expression and rights related to use. 78 Where the
utilitarian aspects of the work (e.g., a useful article) and its copyrightable
elements cannot be sufficiently separated and are not sufficiently distinct,
rights of the author related to such otherwise copyrightable expression fail,
as exceeding the scope of the rights that were intended to be made available
through copyright law. 79 A possible question to consider is whether for
software, such a division between the copyrightable expression of program
code (e.g., software) is able to be identified in a manner so that it is
conceptually separable or conceptual distinguishable from the usefulness or
the utility of that code. 80
The Supreme Court case, Baker v. Seldon is also held to have established
another important copyright law doctrine – “the doctrine of merger.” 81

Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 212–13 (1954).
See § 102 (“Copyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression . . .”).
78 See §§ 101, 113.
79 Clearly, software is not the only area in which the form-function doctrine may
operate and raise challenging questions. Another area of concern is generally referred to as
“applied art.” See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1980) (finding that the conceptually separable artistic elements of belt buckles are
copyrightable); Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d
Cir. 1987) (ribbon design for bicycle rack held unprotectible by copyright law as useful
article lacking separable expression). See, e.g., Star Athletica, LLC v. Varsity Brands, Inc.,
137 S. Ct. 1002, 1016 (2017); Jane C. Ginsburg, Courts Have Twisted Themselves into
Knots: US Copyright Protection for Applied Art, 40 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 6 (2016);
Christopher Buccafusco & Jeanne C. Fromer, Fashion’s Function in Intellectual Property
Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51, 83 (2017).
80 See infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
81 It does not appear to be universally recognized that the merger doctrine and the formfunction doctrine (sometimes referred to as the useful article doctrine) are separate
doctrines. Compare McKenna, supra note 64, at 531, 533, 535 (distinguishing between the
idea-expression dichotomy and the useful articles doctrine), with Kevin J. Hickey,
Reframing Similarity Analysis in Copyright, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 696 (2016) (citing
Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708–10 (2d Cir. 1992)) (treating
merger and functionality as essentially the same doctrine). For example, Nimmer instead
characterizes Baker v. Selden as drawing a distinction between copying for use and copying
for explanation – referred to as the “ends/means” distinction. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2A.03, supra note 1; 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2A.04 (2021).
76
77
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Although the ledgers of that case 82 otherwise met the appropriate
qualifications for copyright protection (e.g., original, fixed in a tangible
medium of expression, etc.), the Supreme Court determined that the ledgers
were not eligible for copyright protection. 83
According to the Court in Baker, accounting ledgers that were included in
a book on accounting and asserted to have been copied themselves were a
necessary element of an expression of the idea underlying the accounting
ledgers. 84 That is, the ledgers were necessary to any expression of the
underlying idea. 85 The idea and expression in this case had “merged” or were
sufficiently close so that to entitle the author to copyright protection over the
expression would provide control over the idea. 86 Since ideas are free and
unprotectable, where the idea and the expression merge, copyright protection
is not available. 87
To be even more specific, the text of the book is copyrightable and within
the scope of protection of copyright. 88 The ledgers may be viewed as
uncopyrightable or as not within the scope of protection of copyright. 89 This
latter distinction between copyrightability and scope of protection in some
cases may be one without a difference, such as where the entire work might
be subject to merger. 90 Examples might be titles or short phrases, which are
generally not considered to be copyrightable, 91 except in unusual
circumstances. 92 However, for software, as a contrast, to have merger apply
to an entire program of code that is large and complex seems to be an
unlikely scenario. 93
82 As discussed earlier in this article, the case involved a book on accounting that
included ledgers. The defendant had copied the ledgers from the book and began selling the
copies and the author of the book sued based on copyright infringement.
83 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 107 (1880).
84 See id. at 103.
85 Id. at 103–04.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 105.
88 Id. at 101–02.
89 Id. at 102.
90 Id. at 101–02.
91 See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 33: WORKS NOT PROTECTED BY
COPYRIGHT 2 (last revised March 2021) (“Words and short phrases, such as names, titles,
and slogans, are uncopyrightable because they contain an insufficient amount of authorship.
The Office will not register individual words or brief combinations of words, even if the
word or short phrase is novel, distinctive, or lends itself to a play on words.”); Ferman v.
Jenlis, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 791, 802 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (stating there is no protection for
“No Trespassing” sign showing surveillance camera).
92 Mary Minow, Copyright Protection for Short Phrases – Rich Stim, STAN. LIBRARIES
(Sept. 9, 2003), https://fairuse.stanford.edu/2003/09/09/copyright_protection_for_short/.
93 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.10(B)(2)
(2021) (stating, in connection with merger, that “a given routine or component of the
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Likewise, in reviewing these basic copyright law principles, some
conceptual distinctions are helpful to aid the later discussion. First, there is
a distinction between determining whether a work is subject to protection,
i.e., copyrightable, and determining the scope of protection available for the
work, assuming that it is subject to protection. 94 Some take the view that
this follows from the statute itself in which section 102(a) 95 clarifies what is
copyrightable and section 102(b) 96 clarifies the scope of protection.
However, regardless of whether one subscribes to this statutory
interpretation, these are two separate legal questions and courts sometimes
confuse them or disagree about which question is the appropriate question
to address. 97
If a work is copyrightable, to make out a case of infringement, in addition
to proving access to the work by the defendant, a plaintiff must prove that
the copyrightable work and the accused work are substantially similar. 98
software may properly fall within the scope of merger.”); See infra notes 318–46 and
accompanying text.
94 See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2A.05(A)(2)(b) (2021) (“This approach treats the merger principle as one relating to the
boundaries of permissible copying, rather than solely as a rule of copyrightability.”);
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.10(B)(4), supra note 93 (describing the view that merger is a
defense to infringement as “[t]he better view.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(B)(3)(e),
supra note 6 (“Confusion has arisen in the case law whether the merger doctrine should
serve as a bar to copyright protection itself (element one) or, alternatively, as a negation of
infringement via absence of actionable similarity (element two).”).
95 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2021) (“Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this
title, in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”).
96 § 102(b) (2020) (“In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept,
principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.”).
97 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.05(A)(2)(b), supra note 94 (“This approach treats
the merger principle as one relating to the boundaries of permissible copying, rather than
solely as a rule of copyrightability.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.10(B)(4), supra note 93
(describing the view that merger is a defense to infringement as “[t]he better view.”); Oracle
Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“In the Ninth Circuit, while
questions regarding originality are considered questions of copyrightability, concepts of
merger and scenes a faire are affirmative defenses to claims of infringement.”). But see
Sandra Ocasio, Pruning Paracopyright Protections: Why Courts Should Apply the Merger
and Scènes à Faire Doctrines at the Copyrightability Stage of the Copyright Infringement
Analysis, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 303, 304 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, The Story of Baker
v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction between Authorship and Invention, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY STORIES 159, 192 (Jane Ginsburg & Rochelle Dreyfuss, eds., 2005).
98 See, e.g., Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689 F.3d 29,
49 (1st Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1167 (2013); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1231–32 (3d Cir. 1986); Alan Latman, “Probative
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This is how the scope of protection for a copyrightable work comes into play.
Substantial similarity is a legal term used by courts to describe an amount of
copying that is qualitatively and quantitatively sufficient for the court to
conclude the defendant wrongfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protected
expression from the plaintiff’s copyrightable work.99 In some cases, copying
may be literal copying (e.g., copying verbatim); while in other cases,
although literal copying has not occurred, enough so called non-literal
copying may have taken place so that the works are considered substantially
similar. 100 Thus, substantial similarity refers to having copied a quantum of
expression from a work to be legally liable, which is a legal analysis
performed once some amount of factual copying has been shown to have
taken place. 101
In the software arena, as in essentially all other areas of copyright, what
constitutes the non-literal scope of a copyrightable work is not always clear.
A reason for this relates to the so-called levels of abstraction and the role of
a court to seek a balance between competition and protection. 102 The
protectible non-literal scope of a work lies somewhere between the literal
work itself, which is protectible from literal copying, and the unprotectible
ideas of the work.
However, some additional confusion regarding non-literal scope
potentially may exist for software works than for other types of
copyrightable works. For example, in an important 2014 Federal Circuit
decision, Oracle America, Inc. v. Google, Inc. the Federal Circuit stated:
“The non-literal components of a computer program include, among other
things, the program’s sequence, structure, and organization, as well as the
program’s user interface.” 103 This case, discussed in more detail, infra., is a
Similarity” As Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some Myths in Copyright
Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (1990).
99 Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 268
(2014).
100 Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Copyright Infringement of Computer Software and
the ‘Altai’ Test, 235 N.Y. L. J. 1, 1 (May 9, 2006), http://euro.ecom.cmu
.edu/program/law/08732/Copyright/CopyrightInfringementOfSoftware.pdf.
101 See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1232; Latman, supra note 98, at 1190, 1198;
Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement, 107 NW.
U. L. REV. 1821, 1840 (2013); Hickey, supra note 81, at 690; Gabriel Godoy-Dalmau,
Substantial Similarity: Kohus Got it Right, 6 MICH. BUS. L. REV. 231, 232 (2017);
Christopher Jon Sprigman & Samantha Fink Hedrick, The Filtration Problem in
Copyright’s “Substantial Similarity” Infringement Test, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 571,
576–77 (2019); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F)(1)(a), supra note 6.
102 See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971);
see supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
103 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing
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leading case on the question of the copyrightability and scope of protection
for software under copyright law. 104 However, such a statement is not
without controversy. It is true that execution of software may create a
graphical user interface (“GUI”); however, the conventional view is that the
GUI is a separate work from the software, separately registerable and
separately protectible. 105 For example, in the Second Circuit case, Altai, cited
previously and discussed at length infra., that court goes out of its way to
distinguish generated screen displays from the software.106 The Second Circuit
specifically states: “As a caveat, we note that our decision here does not control
infringement actions regarding categorically distinct works, such as certain types
of screen displays.”107 Likewise, in the First Circuit decision, Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., (hereinafter Lotus or Lotus v.
Borland) also later discussed in some detail, the First Circuit makes a similar
qualification, stating in no uncertain terms: “In the instant appeal, we are not
confronted with alleged nonliteral copying of computer code.”108 The Third
Circuit also recognizes this distinction, such as in the case Whelan Associates,
Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., (hereinafter Whelan or Whelan v. Jaslow)
discussed in more detail infra.,109 not simply between software and a screen
display or user interface, but also between software and the file structures for

Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1980))
(emphasis added).
104 After this decision, there was another Federal Circuit decision involving this dispute
in 2018. Ultimately, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to both cases, discussed in more
detail, infra notes 409–16 and accompanying text.
105 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703 (2d Cir. 1992); Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814–15 (1st Cir. 1995). See infra notes 111,
501–502 and accompanying text. See discussion, infra, Section III.A.
106 Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 703.
107 Id.
108 See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 814.
109 Interestingly, the Whelan court recognizes the possibility that while these other types
of works have separate copyrights, still any similarity might be indirect evidence of copying
as to the software code, stating, for example:
It is true that screen outputs are considered audio-visual works under the copyright code . . .
and are thus covered by a different copyright than are programs, which are literary works . .
. It is also true that Whelan Associates asserts no claim of copyright infringement with
respect to the screen outputs. But the conclusion to be drawn from this is not, as defendants
would have it, that screen outputs are completely irrelevant to the question whether the
copyright in the program has been infringed. Rather, the only conclusion to be drawn from
the fact of the different copyrights is that the screen output cannot be direct evidence of
copyright infringement. There is no reason, however, why material falling under one
copyright category could not be indirect, inferential evidence of the nature of material
covered by another copyright.
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1244 (3d Cir. 1986).
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that software.110
Conventionally, a GUI is not typically considered to be within the nonliteral scope of protection for the software. However, with that said, a GUI
might be considered “software-like” (e.g., sufficiently hybrid-like in which
expressive and useful elements intersect) that it should, perhaps, fall within
the regime that applies to software, the regime we refer to here as hybrid
intellectual property rights. A question, however, may be whether
Congressional action is required to effectuate such a result, in light of the
present language of the Act. 111
Finally, another distinction that is often confused, as previously alluded,
is the difference between the doctrine of merger and the form-function
doctrine. 112 Confusion exists most likely because both doctrines originated
in Baker v. Selden, mentioned previously. Part of the confusion may be
because the ledgers at issue in the case were an example of both merger of
idea and expression, since there are only a few ways to express the ledgers,
and an example of expression that is useful or utilitarian. 113 However, it is
believed that Mazer v. Stein, rather than Baker v. Selden, more clearly gave
independent life, so to speak, to the form-function doctrine apart from the
principle of merger. 114
Yet another basis for confusion in this area may be related to the various
interpretations that have been given to 17 U.S.C. section 102(b) as possibly
a codification of one or more of these doctrines. 115 There does not appear to
be uniform agreement on the interpretation of section 102(b). 116 More
See id. at 1242–43.
See infra notes 361–67 and accompanying text.
112 Compare McKenna, supra note 64, at 530–39 (distinguishing between the ideaexpression dichotomy and the useful articles doctrine), with Hickey, supra note 81, at 696
(2016) (citing Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708–10 (2nd Cir.
1992)) (treating merger and functionality as essentially the same doctrine). For example,
Nimmer & Nimmer instead characterizes Baker v. Selden as drawing a distinction between
copying for use and copying for explanation – referred to as the “means/ends” distinction.
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.03, supra note 1; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.04, supra
note 81. See supra note 81 and accompany text (explaining this distinction may not be
universally recognized). See supra text accompanying note 58.
113 See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 99–100 (1880).
114 See supra notes 66–77 and accompanying text. Cf. Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin
Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
218 (1954)) (“We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the
intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or invalidates its
registration. We do not read such a limitation into the copyright law.”).
115 17 U.S.C. §102(b) (2021); see Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1252; Whelan
Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1242–43, 1243 n.41; Oracle Am., Inc., v. Google, Inc., 750 F.3d
1339, 1354–55 (Fed. Cir. 2014); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 2A.06 (2021).
116 For example, it is notable that Nimmer changed its view on this question around
110
111
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traditionally, several courts view section 102(b) as primarily a codification
of the idea/expression dichotomy 117 and that is largely the approach taken in
this article. For example, the House Report of the ‘76 Act states:
Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of copyright
protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the
context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic
dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged. 118
However, it also states:
Copyright does not preclude others from using the ideas or
information revealed by the author’s work. It pertains to the literary
musical, graphic, or artistic form in which the author expressed
intellectual concepts. Section 102(b) makes clear that copyright
protection does not extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.
Some concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer
programs should extend protection to the methodology or processes
adopted by the programmer, rather than merely to the ‘writing’
expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is intended, among other things,
to make clear that the expression adopted by the programmer is the
copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual
processes or methods embodied in the program are not within the
scope of the copyright law. 119
Section 102(b) expressly states that, “in no case does copyright protection for
an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery” much like the
idea/expression dichotomy.120 Regardless, however, the two doctrines, merger
2016. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.04, supra note 81; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.06,
supra note 115. The current view in Nimmer appears consistent with this article. See
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.04(A)(2), supra note 81 (“[T]he revised discussion emphasizes
that Section 102(b) of the current Act independently bars copyright protection not only for
ideas but also for methods, procedures, and other enumerated categories.”).
117 See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1252–53; Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at,
1234, 1237, 1243 n.41; Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1367. But see Functionality and
Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement,
supra note 6, at 1237 (discussing “the proper role of § 102(b) in computer program
copyright cases”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.06, supra note 115.
118 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 57 (1976).
119 Id. at 56–57.
120 § 102(b). An alternate view of section 102(b) is that it is a codification of the merger
doctrine. See Toro Co. v. R & R Prod. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th Cir. 1986) (“Appellee
urges that we uphold the court’s ruling by assuming that under the rubric of § 102(b) the
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and form-function, while seemingly close in some respects, and originating
from one set of facts in Baker v. Selden, address entirely different policy
concerns. 121
The merger doctrine addresses the concern that arises in situations where
there are a limited number of ways to express an idea. 122 In such a situation,
but for the merger doctrine, an author of expression that merges with its
underlying idea would, in effect, have control over the idea; however, ideas
are meant to be free and part of the public domain. 123 Thus, the merger
doctrine operates to keep such ideas freely available to others. 124
In contrast, the form-function doctrine addresses the concern that arises in
a situation in which functionality and expressive content overlap or
coincide. 125 In this situation, control over expression would provide rights
over use, as in the case of a useful article whose form (e.g., shape,
appearance, etc.) contains expressive content; however, patent law, rather
than copyright law, with its much higher standards of patentability, is the
appropriate domain for such subject matter. 126 The Act provides some
helpful guidance on conditions under which expressive content does not run
afoul of this doctrine for “pictorial, graphic and sculptural works,” such as if
the expressive elements of a useful article “can be identified separately from,
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects” of the
article. 127 However, more generally, it appears that, for a given work
court actually was applying the doctrine of merger.”); cf. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.06,
supra note 115 (“[T]he phrase cannot be taken to suggest that, merely because a work
embodies subject matter that is excluded from protection in some way or form, it follows
that the work as a whole is categorically to be denied protection.”). In many ways, it
appears to be a distinction without a difference which principal section 102(b) is
interpreted to codify since both doctrines exist due to case law precedent and the statute
itself does not suggest otherwise. However, in addition to the excerpts provided from
legislative history, which support the view taken in this article, a reason for preferring
the interpretation provided here is that the language of section 102(b) has some
imprecision about it. See, e.g., NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.06, supra note 115 (stating
that there is “a good degree of overlap” in the enumerated categories and that Congress gave
no direction as to their meaning or scope). Thus, rather than refer to the language of 102(b)
as a source of law for doctrines that clearly are established by case precedent, such as
merger and/or form-function, and invite a consequential linguistic dissection of section
102(b), it is more intellectually appealing to see it as largely a codification of the
idea/expression dichotomy.
121 See generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 99–107 (1880).
122 See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1253; CCC Info. Servs., Inc. v. Maclean
Hunter Market Reports Inc., 44 F.3d 61, 69 (2d Cir. 1994); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp., v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971).
123 CCC Info. Servs., Inc., 44 F.3d at 68.
124 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03, supra note 6.
125 See McKenna, supra note 64, at 535 (referring to the useful articles doctrine).
126 See Baker, 101 U.S. at 102–03.
127 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2020).
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containing copyrightable, expressive elements, where those expressive
elements cannot be identified separately and are not capable of existing
independently of utilitarian or useful features of the work, then those
elements, though expressive, receive no protection under copyright law.
B. The 1976 Copyright Act and the 1980 Amendments
Issues involving the copyrightability of computer software preceded the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act (again, ‘the Act’ or the ‘‘76 Act’). 128 As
computers developed and evolved, the Copyright Office was faced with the
question in the ‘60s of whether to permit registration of these works. 129 In
1964, the Office determined to register such works under its “rule of doubt,”
but required deposit of a human-readable form of the program if the program
had been published in only machine-readable form. 130 Of course, this did not
really resolve any important questions about copyright law and software, but
it did provide an easy to implement administrative approach to an otherwise
thorny legal question. 131
An important and unresolved question, for example, was whether using
copyrighted materials in computers amounted to copyright infringement. 132
Therefore, Congress established a National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works to study the problem. 133 This has
become known as “CONTU.” Likewise, to prevent this issue from holding
up passage of the ‘76 Act, a provision was included in the bill, referred to as
old section 117. 134 This section carried forward the law in effect on

128 See 17 U.S.C. § 101–1511 (2020); Ralph Oman, Computer Software as
Copyrightable Subject Matter: Oracle v. Google, Legislative Intent, and the Scope of Rights
in Digital Works, 31 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 639, 639 (2018).
129 Jule L. Sigall, Copyright Infringement Was Never this Easy: Ram Copies and Their
Impact on the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
181, 186 (1995).
130 See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, CIRCULAR NO. 61: COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION OF
COMPUTER PROGRAMS 6 (March 2021) (“The Copyright Office strongly prefers that you
submit your copyright application using a source code deposit. You can submit a deposit
using the object code of the computer program; however, your claim will be subject to the
Copyright Office’s Rule of Doubt. The rule notifies interested parties that although the
Office has accepted the claim submitted, it is unwilling to grant a presumption of validity to
certain aspects of the claim. For more information about the Rule of Doubt, see chapter 600,
section 607, of the Compendium.”).
131 See id.
132 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 48 (1976).
133 Richard H. Stern, Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of the Software Users’
Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459, 459 (1985).
134 Sigall, supra note 129, at 187–88; see 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2021).
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December 31, 1977 135, as to rights with respect to computer usage of
copyrighted works. 136 Most commentators would likely say that the ‘76 Act
intended that computer programs be protected under section 102 of the new
Act, but a mostly academic question remains as to what rights did authors of
such works necessarily receive?
It is well-known today what then transpired. The Commission
recommended that old section 117 be repealed and replaced with a new
section 117.137 .Furthermore, the Commission recommended that section 101
be amended to include a definition of “computer program.”138 That definition
states: “A ‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”139
In 1980, Congress amended the Copyright Act and implemented CONTU’s
recommendations in their entirety, except that Congress used the word
“owner” in place of “rightful possessor” in the recommended version of new
section 117. 140 This sequence of events created a basis for believing that the
CONTU report reflects the intent of Congress.141
Before launching into how courts have dealt with these significant
statutory changes, a few points that might be lost on the casual observer are
worth discussing. First, although the 1980 amendments made it clear that
software was copyrightable, even if one did not agree that it was already
clear under section 102 of the ‘76 Act, the statute did not clarify the
appropriate category of copyrightable works in which to place computer
programs. 142 This issue has some importance in that frequently the category
affects the rights available under the statute. 143
135 The ‘76 Act became effective on January 1, 1978. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 19
(noting, the ‘76 Act became effective on January 1, 1978).
136 See Stern, supra note 133, at 460 n.7.
137 See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir.
1983); see Stern, supra note 133, at 460 n.7; Nat’l Comm’n on New Tech. Uses of
Copyrighted Works (CONTU), Final Rep. on the Nat’l Comm’n on New Tech. Uses of
Copyrighted Works, 3 COMPUT. L.J. 53 (1981).
138 See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1247–48; See Stern, supra note 133, at 460 n.7;
Nat’l Comm’n on New Tech. Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), supra note 137.
139 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2020) (emphasis added).
140 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2021).
141 See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1247; Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F.
Supp. 741, 750 n.6 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
142 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2020).
143 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2020):
Subject to sections 107 through 122, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive
rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
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The legislative history of the ‘76 Act implies that computer programs
qualify as literary works and several cases have followed that approach. 144
This is a helpful but imperfect model of how computer programs fit within
the categories of protectible works enumerated by the Act.
Another unusual and important aspect of this attempt to bring computer
programs within the regime of copyright law is the precise text of new
section 117, at least considering traditional copyright law doctrines. 145
Specifically, the text of section 117 contemplates use in connection with a
computer program by expressly referring to “utilization.” 146 The statute
expressly states it is not an infringement to copy or make an adaptation of a
computer program provided that “such new copy or adaption is created as
an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction
with a machine . . . “ 147 This provision likewise necessarily lines up with the
definition of a computer program, previously cited, which states: “ A
‘computer program’ is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.”148
These provisions, particularly the new section 117, are significant and
unique for copyright law. 149 These provisions recognize something
previously thought outside the scope of copyright law. 150 The general
principle is that if use rights somehow become entangled with copying
rights, the right to copy gives way to the right to use, as a matter of legal

(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture
or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a
digital audio transmission.
144 See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1247; Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1240 (3d Cir. 1986).
145 See supra notes 137–41 and accompanying text.
146 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1) (2021).
147 § 117(a) (emphasis added) (“Making of Additional Copy or Adaptation by Owner of
Copy.— Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for the
owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or
adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for
archival purposes only and that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued
possession of the computer program should cease to be rightful.”).
148 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2020) (emphasis added).
149 See § 117.
150 See id.
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policy. 151 That is, copyright protection is not provided in that situation. Here,
however, the right to copy remains despite its intersection with the right to
use.
It is almost an understatement to observe that for software the traditional
approach is not the current approach of the law. While it appears that for
computer programs the use rights and the copyrightable expression are
entangled in a complex and inseparable way, this does not render the
expression uncopyrightable. Recall the Supreme Court’s statement in Baker
that “[t]he use of the art is a totally different thing . . .” 152 Yet, here, the
statute, by its very language, recognizes that copying (or modifying) a
program may, in fact, be essential to use of the program, and, yet, this does
not denigrate the copyrightability of the program, specifically per
Congressional intent. 153 For example, in Baker, copying the ledgers was
essential to their use. 154 To be even more pointed, current section 117 states
that it is not an infringement to copy or modify the program if doing so is
essential to using the program. 155 This provision, therefore, presupposes that
doing so would otherwise be an infringement; however, where doing so is
essential to using the program, then there is no infringement for this
particular situation. 156 Instead, with respect to this particular type of
copyrightable work, section 117 provides leeway to copy the program, and
even modify it, without traditional infringement liability attaching regarding
such acts. 157
This statutory language is implicit, if not explicit, support to show that
Congress intended for computer programs to be copyrightable without the
condition that such programs are copyrightable only “if, and only to the
extent that” the copyrightable elements “can be identified separately from,
and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects.” 158
Congress clearly intended this result, based on the language of sections 101
and 117 (as well as legislative history 159), realizing that computer programs

See supra notes 54–70 and accompanying text.
See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1880).
153 § 117(a)(1).
154 Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
155 § 117(a)(1).
156 See id.
157 See Lateef Mtima, So Dark the CON(TU) of Man: The Quest for a Software
Derivative Work Right in Section 117, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 26–27 (2007); Stern, supra note
133, at 463.
158 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2021).
159 See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1252–53
(3d Cir. 1983); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995);
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
151
152
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are used and, therefore, are useful. 160
The history of this provision and its language also make it clear that its
scope is limited to software. 161 Nimmer refers to section 117 as providing a
use privilege. 162 The section specifically immunizes copying that takes place
“as an essential step” in the use of the computer program. 163 A legal question
arises as to the scope of the language “essential step.” Regardless, however,
this provides Congressional recognition that it is necessary to copy software
to use it. 164
This statutory recognition makes software unique from other forms of
copyrightable subject matter. As stated previously, it provides, either
expressly or implicitly, an exemption for software from the form-function
doctrine by making it clear that software, in general, cannot be used without
being copied. 165 Notably, section 117 only applies to the owner of a copy of
a computer program, and not to the owner of the copyright for the
program. 166 This is consistent with the interpretation advanced here, that the
160 See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1248 n.6 (“[t]he parties agree that this section is
not implicated in the instant lawsuit. The language of the provision, however, by carving out
an exception to the normal proscriptions against copying, clearly indicates that programs are
copyrightable and are otherwise afforded copyright protection.”); id. (citing H.R. REP. NO.
1476, at 116, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5731) (“Section 117 applied only to the
scope of protection to be accorded copyrighted works when used in conjunction with a
computer and not to the copyrightability of programs.”).
161 See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08(B)(1)
(2021) (“The current exemption applies solely to software.”).
162 See id. (“It comes into being by according a privilege to copy software when the
owner of a copy in which the relevant program is embodied copies the software as an
essential step in utilizing the program. The various criteria are canvassed in the subsections
below.”) (emphasis added).
163 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1)(2021).
164 That you copy a computer program to use it is simply a technological fact. In
general, the term “software” distinguishes computer code from “hardware.” The term
“firmware” is also used and firmware has been held to be copyrightable. The distinction
for firmware is that it is loaded, like software, but then “burned in” the device, making
it more like hardware due to its permanency. In a typical computer system, software, is
stored within relatively long-term memory and then, to be executed, the software is
loaded from storage in long term memory into storage in short term (and faster)
memory that is capable of being accessed by digital circuitry. The digital circuitry,
such as a central processing unit (“CPU”) or a microprocessor, is then able to execute
the recently loaded software instructions. The faster, shorter-term memory may be part
of the CPU or microprocessor, or it may be separate from the CPU or microprocessor. It
is this loading into memory for execution, however, that constitutes copying so that the
software can be used.
165 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.08(B)(1), supra note 161 (“The current exemption applies
solely to software.”).
166 See id. § 8.08(B)(1)(a); id. § 8.8(B)(1)(c)(i) (citing Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d
119 (2d Cir. 2005)) (determining who qualifies as the owner of the copy, did not consider
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owner of a copy would be unable to use the computer program with a legal
restriction on copying, since to use the computer program requires that the
computer program be “copied” into memory.
Likewise, assuming the foregoing interpretation is correct, it is also logical
to conclude that to the extent section 102(b) might perhaps be implicated,
then that provision is also implicitly amended to be consistent. 167 That is,
without an implicit carve out for software, as we shall see, courts have the
potential to vitiate the purpose of the 1980 amendments depending on how
one might construe that provision. 168 However, this article interprets section
102(b) in a manner so such a carve out is superfluous. 169
It may be worthwhile to consider how a computer program, as defined in
the Act after the 1980 amendments, might be implicated by the definition of
“useful article.” 170 It could at least be argued that a computer program, once
fixed in a tangible medium of expression, such as a semiconductor chip or
another type of digital storage device, which would typically be as object
code, rather than as source code, meets the definition of a useful article. 171
While the program itself may be separated from the article, it is not true that
the utility of the code can be separated from the expression within the code,
conceptually or otherwise. 172 Yet, as seems clear, copyrightable expression
integrated with or within a useful article is entitled to no rights or protection
other than for computer programs unless the copyrightable elements are
capable of being identified separately from and capable of existing
independently of the utilitarian aspects. 173
Consequently, it appears that the copyright statute at least implicitly
creates two regimes of protection. 174 One regime is the traditional regime of
Baker v. Selden and Mazer v. Stein, which has been at least partially
codified. 175 The other regime, however, is the regime regarding computer
title under state law and, instead, considered factors, such as who had the right to possess
and destroy the copies, etc., and calling it “the better view.”).
167 See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2021).
168 See generally Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 872 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2012)
(discussing definitions of terms used in Section 117 provisions and the adoption of those
provisions in 1980); Infra text accompanying note 191–195. See also supra text
accompanying notes 82–83 (discussing the house report associated with the 1980
amendments.)
169 See supra notes 115–20 and accompanying text; infra notes 355–70 and
accompanying text.
170 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2021).
171 See §§ 101–102.
172 See § 101.
173 See id.
174 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1401 (2021).
175 See § 102(b); see generally Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (discussing the
traditional form-function regime); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (discussing the
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programs, which are useful and yet are also subject to protection despite lack
of compliance with the now codified test of Mazer or the form-function
doctrine articulated by Baker. 176 It may very well be the case that CONTU
and Congress did not fully comprehend how the changes made to the
copyright statute in 1980 would strike at some fundamental copyright law
principles and ultimately produce a shift in how courts deciding copyright
law matters related to software approach the question of scope of protection.
C. Court Decisions Dealing with the Statutory Changes
An early case that recognized complex issues regarding the
copyrightability and copyright infringement of software is Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp..177 (hereinafter Apple or Apple v. Franklin) In
the case, the evidence was pretty clear that Franklin had copied Apple’s
operating system;178 however, despite this, the district court denied granting a
preliminary injunction to Apple, largely because the district court was not
entirely sure that “an operating system program in ‘binary code or one
represented either in a ROM or by micro-switches’ was an ‘expression,’ which
could be copyrighted as distinguished from an ‘idea,’ which could not be.” 179
Franklin advanced a number of arguments to support the district court’s
decision, including that an operating system (OS) is not copyrightable
essentially because the code is written strictly for computers not for humans. 180
Franklin also argued that object code is not copyrightable, that code embedded
in read-only memory (ROM) is not copyrightable, and that, regardless, the OS
needed to copy the code for compatibility reasons. 181
The Third Circuit rejected the first argument that object code is not
copyrightable. 182 This argument was laid to rest by an earlier Third Circuit
decision, Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l. 183 The Third Circuit in
Apple traced the history of the statutory changes around the 1980
amendments, which supports the notion that computer programs need not
traditional form-function regime and concept of separability).
176 See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218; see Baker, 101 U.S. at 99–101, 103–04.
177 See Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1242, 1246–50
(3d Cir. 1983).
178 See id. at 1242–45.
179 See id. at 1246 (quoting Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 545 F. Supp.
812, 821 (E.D. Pa. 1982)).
180 See id. at 1250–55.
181 See id.
182 Id. at 1246–47, 1249.
183 Id. at 1247; Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir.
1982).
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necessarily be readable by a human to be copyrightable. 184
The Third Circuit also rejected the argument that object code embedded
in ROM is never copyrightable. 185 This was, in some sense, merely an
argument about the useful or utilitarian nature of the ROM, similar to what
was mentioned previously in connection with Mazer. 186 In other words, a
ROM is a useful article. However, computer programs are copyrightable
expressions by statute. Even where a program is not embedded in a ROM, the
program is no more able to qualify as capable of being “identified separately
from . . . the utilitarian aspects.”187 In other words, the form, being embedded in
a ROM, appears to not be germane to the question of copyrightability since it
does not change the fact that a program is unable to qualify under such a test. 188
In this regard, this early decision correctly handled an issue that appears to, on
occasion, still confuse courts when, instead, addressing the scope of protection
for software.
The next two arguments were not so easily dealt with, although the Third
Circuit goes on to resolve them. 189 Franklin argued, in essence, that the
operating system is more like a part or extension of a machine, i.e., a
computer, and, therefore, is uncopyrightable. 190 In Apple, the Third Circuit
also addressed arguments regarding whether OS qualified as a “process,”
“system,” or “method of operation” under Section 102(b); this continues to
draw scrutiny from courts today.191 The Third Circuit stated:
Franklin’s attack on operating system programs as ‘methods’ or
‘processes’ seems inconsistent with its concession that application
programs are an appropriate subject of copyright. Both types of
programs instruct the computer to do something. Therefore, it should
make no difference for purposes of section 102(b) whether these
instructions tell the computer to help prepare an income tax return
(the task of an application program) or to translate a high level
language program from source code into its binary language object
184 See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1247–48 (“[I]t is clear from the language of the
1976 Act and its legislative history that it was intended to obliterate distinctions engendered
by White-Smith . . . . We reiterate the statement we made in Williams when we rejected
that argument: ‘the answer to the defendant’s contention is in the words of the statute
itself.’”).
185 See id. at 1249 (“[W]e reaffirm that a computer program in object code embedded in
a ROM chip is an appropriate subject of copyright.”).
186 See supra notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
187 Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 481–82 (6th Cir. 2015)
(quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2021)).
188 See id.
189 See Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1251 (finding CONTU more persuasive than
Franklin).
190 Id.
191 Id. at 1250–51.
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code form (the task of an operating system program such as
“Applesoft” . . . Since it is only the instructions which are protected,
a “process” is no more involved because the instructions in an
operating system program may be used to activate the operation of
the computer than it would be if instructions were written in ordinary
English in a manual which described the necessary steps to activate
an intricate complicated machine. There is, therefore, no reason to
afford any less copyright protection to the instructions in an
operating system program than to the instructions in an application
program. 192
Furthermore, the Third Circuit also relied on CONTU, which indicated that
programs are not considered machine parts, stating “we can consider the
CONTU report as accepted by Congress since Congress wrote into the law the
majority’s recommendations almost verbatim.”193
Franklin, thus, had argued that the purpose of the program is strictly
utilitarian in that it runs a computer. 194 The appellate court correctly rejected
Franklin’s argument by relying on the statute itself.195 As the appellate court
points out, there is no distinction in the statute between application
programs, which Franklin accepts as copyrightable, and operating system
(“OS”) programs, which Franklin does not accept as copyrightable. 196 Both
meet the language of the statute and are, therefore, copyrightable.197
Franklin’s argument here is similar in some ways to arguments about being
object code and about being embedded in ROM, but perhaps, the argument could
be read to raise a deeper question. Franklin argued, in effect, that the code was
more utilitarian in terms of what it is designed to do than the typical computer
program, not unlike the position recently taken by the US Supreme Court in
Google v. Oracle, which relied instead on the fair use doctrine in that case.
198 Therefore, while an OS 199 is copyrightable by application of the words of
the statute, this does not entirely address the role of utility, which
conceivably might affect the scope of protection for computer programs.
To reformulate the issue to highlight its significance, let us consider: do
computer programs contain expression? Clearly. Thus, under copyright law,
expressive elements are usually worthy of copyright protection; however,
Id. at 1251.
Id. at 1252.
194 Id. at 1249, 1251.
195 Id. at 1248–49.
196 Id. at 1252.
197 Id. at 1249, 1252, 1253.
198 Id. at 1249–53, 1255; Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2021).
199 It is worth noting, as a factual matter, that the operating system of the case is much
different than the operating systems we are familiar with today.
192
193
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under traditional copyright law principles, where protection of the
expression would also ensnare rights over use, copyright law gives way and
leaves the expressive elements unprotected. 200 Computer programs appear to
be an exception to that principle considering the historic amendments made
to the Act to accommodate software. 201 It is the nature (or more precisely the
nature and the scope) of this exception that has created havoc for copyright
law ever since.
The final aspect of this case relates to compatibility, another tricky issue
introduced into copyright law by computers and technology. Franklin
cleverly attempted to frame the compatibility issue as one regarding the
idea/expression dichotomy and the merger doctrine. 202
In responding to this, the Third Circuit in Apple made a reasonably
insightful observation: “Franklin may wish to achieve total compatibility
with independently developed application programs written for the Apple II,
but that is a commercial and competitive objective which does not enter into
the somewhat metaphysical issue of whether particular ideas and expressions
have merged.”203 What makes this statement insightful is that the court was
not mislead. It is true that copyright law does strike a balance between
competition and protection, which may relate to the desirability of
compatibility. In fact, earlier in the case, the appellate court cited the famous
statement from Herbert Rosenthal that the line between ideas and expression
is a pragmatic one which takes into consideration “the preservation of the
balance between competition and protection reflected in the patent and
copyright laws.” 204 However, striking this balance does not necessarily
implicate merger. Whether merger is implicated depends on the expressions
themselves. 205 As the court states: “In essence, this inquiry is no different
than that made to determine whether the expression and idea have merged,
which has been stated to occur when there are no or few other ways of
expressing a particular idea.” 206

Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1247–49, 1252–54.
See id.
202 See id. at 1254 (“Franklin claims that whether or not the programs can be rewritten,
there are a limited ‘number of ways to arrange operating systems to enable a computer to
run the vast body of Apple-compatible software’ . . . This claim has no pertinence to either
the idea/expression dichotomy or merger.”). But see Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1197, 1202
(recognizing that, as Google argued, declaring code can be treated differently from
implementing code under fair use). See supra notes 177–201 and accompanying text; infra
notes 203–12 and text accompanying.
203 Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1253 (emphasis added).
204 Id. (citing Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry v. Kalpakain, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971)).
205 See id. at 1253.
206 Id.
200
201
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The Third Circuit, here, was not confused about the difference between
merger, which does apply to computer programs, and the form-function
doctrine, which does not apply, an issue that seems to confuse later courts.
Rather, Franklin tried to argue that an OS is so utilitarian that it should not
be subject to protection. 207 Some courts have viewed this consideration like
merger and/or form-function or have relied on section 102(b). 208 However,
the Third Circuit was not convinced by Franklin’s argument. 209
Several additional points may be made here. As suggested, the balance of
competition and protection factor into the appropriate boundary for the
idea/expression dichotomy in general. If this principle is accepted, then it
follows that, for software, this balance is different due to the utilitarian nature
of software. 210 Of course, the Third Circuit, in Apple, does not attempt to
address that question. 211 This is likely because it was not properly raised or
more likely because it did not appreciate its significance, in general, for the
scope of protection that copyright law should provide to software (as
distinguished from the question of software copyrightability). However, as
to the question of merger, it does not seem particularly plausible that merger
should have applied to the entire program that was allegedly copied. 212
Id. at 1249, 1251.
See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703–04 (2d Cir.
1992); Hickey, supra note 81, at 696 (citing Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982
F.2d 693, 708–10 (2d Cir. 1992) (treating merger and functionality as essentially the same
doctrine); cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995), aff’d,
516 U.S. 233 (1996) (holding “the Lotus menu command hierarchy is an uncopyrightable
‘method of operation’” under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)). See also infra note 318–46 and
accompanying text.
209 Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1242.
210 See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 819 (Boudin, J., concurring) (“Utility does not bar
copyright (dictionaries may be copyrighted), but it alters the calculus.”); Comput. Assocs.
Int’l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 704 (quoting Peter G. Spivack, Comment, Does Form Follow
Function? The Idea/Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Protection of Computer Software,
35 UCLA L. REV. 723, 755 (1988)) (“The essentially utilitarian nature of a computer
program further complicates the task of distilling its idea from its expression . . . In order to
describe both computational processes and abstract ideas, its content ‘combines creative and
technical expression.’ . . . The variations of expression found in purely creative
compositions, as opposed to those contained in utilitarian works, are not directed towards
practical application.”).
211 See, e.g., Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1255.
212 Cf. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.10(B)(2) n.44, supra note 93 (stating, in connection
with merger, that “a given routine or component of the software may properly fall within the
scope of merger”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(e)(2)(b), supra note 6 (discussing
computer searching and sorting algorithms as potentially good examples of merger); Note,
however, that the appellate court did remand regarding merger. See Apple Comput., Inc.,
714 F.2d at 1253 (“Although there seems to be a concession by Franklin that at least some
of the programs can be rewritten, we do not believe that the record on that issue is so clear
that it can be decided at the appellate level. Therefore, if the issue is pressed on remand, the
207
208
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While Apple v. Franklin dealt with the question of copyrightability of
software and literal infringement, a later case, Whelan v. Jaslow, dealt with a
more esoteric and, in some sense, more metaphysical subject: non-literal
infringement of a copyright in computer software. 213
The facts of the case are relatively straight-forward. Elaine Whelan had
written a program for Jaslow Laboratory that assisted in running a dental
lab. 214 The computer program, referred to as the “Dentalab” program, ran on
an IBM mainframe computer. 215 However, Rand Jaslow, an officer and
shareholder in Jaslow Lab, later developed his own program, referred to as
the “Dentcom” program, to assist in running a dental lab. 216 This latter
program, however, ran on a personal computer. 217 Jaslow Lab then ended its
business relationship with Whelan. 218
Whelan is a difficult or troubling case in many respects. Jaslow clearly had
access to Whelan’s program and it might even be argued that it was clear
that, in a high-level sense, because Jaslow modeled his own program after
Whelan’s, some copying took place. 219
The hard question for the court was: did enough copying take place to
create liability under copyright law? 220 More specifically, since Jaslow did
not literally copy Whelan’s program, the question presented was whether
copyright law provides protection when a computer program is non-literally
copied. 221 In other areas of copyright law, non-literal protection had been
established. 222 Partly for this reason, therefore, the Third Circuit decided that
computer programs are also entitled to non-literal protection. 223 The appellate
necessary finding can be made at that time.”).
213 Compare Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1246, with Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1241 (3d Cir. 1986).
214 Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1226.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 1226–27.
218 Id. at 1226.
219 Id. at 1228 (“Dr. Moore testified that although the Dentcom program was not a
translation of the Dentalab system, the programs were similar in three significant respects.
He testified that most of the file structures, and the screen outputs, of the programs were
virtually identical . . . He also testified that five particularly important ‘subroutines’ within
both programs—order entry, invoicing, accounts receivable, end of day procedure, and end
of month procedure—performed almost identically in both programs.”).
220 Id. at 1225.
221 Id. at 1224–25.
222 Id. at 1234.
223 Id. at 1234, 1238 (“By analogy to other literary works, it would thus appear that the
copyrights of computer programs can be infringed even absent copying of the literal
elements of the program . . . Thus, copyright principles derived from other areas are
applicable in the field of computer programs.”). Other courts, notable, the Fifth Circuit,
declined to follow Whelan and initially rejected the notion of non-literal protection for
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court also needed to decide, however, whether, under the facts of this case,
non-literal copyright infringement had occurred. 224 The district court
determined that it had. 225
Unlike the Third Circuit in Apple which dealt with copyrightability and literal
infringement, this Third Circuit case was one of the first cases to address the
scope of non-literal protection available for software under copyright law.226 The
issue, its complexity, and its legal significance might be easier to understand if
the question for the court is framed from another perspective.
The question for the court might be stated as follows: is the similarity
between Whelan’s and Jaslow’s programs due to the similarity of
copyrightable expression appearing in Jaslow’s program and originating
from Whelan’s program or is it due to the similarity of noncopyrightable
elements appearing in Jaslow’s program and originating from Whelan’s
program (e.g., the ideas therein)? 227 That is, the court needed to address a
fundamental question about the scope of protection that copyright law should afford
to computer programs, apart from the more basic question, already answered,
regarding whether or not computer programs are copyrightable at all.228
Unfortunately, possibly due to an unsophisticated understanding of
computers and computer programming, it is now generally recognized while
the Third Circuit in Whelan may have reached the right outcome the appellate
court’s reasoning had some logical flaws. 229 Experts in the field have heavily
criticized the opinion, and very few circuits have adopted the Third Circuit’s
approach. 230 Nonetheless, the Whelan court appears to be one of the first to
refer to the structure, sequence and organization (“SSO”) of a computer

computer programs. See Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Goodpasture Comput. Serv., Inc.,
807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987). However, in a later decision, the Fifth Circuit changed
its position regarding non-literal protection for computer programs. See Eng’g Dynamics,
Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1342 (5th Cir. 1994) (adopting the
abstraction-filtration-comparison test from Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai).
224 Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1248.
225 Id.
226 Compare Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1242 (3d
Cir. 1983), with Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1224–25.
227 See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1224–25.
228 See id. at 1224.
229 See, e.g., Englund, supra note 6, at 879–82.
230 See generally Englund, supra note 6; An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, supra note 6, at 1082–83; Mark Kretschmer,
Copyright Protection For Software Architecture: Just Say No!, 1988 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
823 (1988); Peter G. Spivack, Comment, Does Form Follow Function? The Idea/Expression
Dichotomy In Copyright Protection of Computer Software, 35 UCLA L. REV. 723, 747–65
(1988); Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v. Goodpasture Comput. Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262
(5th Cir. 1987) (declining to follow Whelan).
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program, 231 a construct still used by courts in connection with assessing nonliteral infringement of software. One, for example that is later employed by
the Federal Circuit in its 2014 decision in Oracle v. Google discussed in more
detail, infra. 232
In addressing the question above, the Whelan court ultimately needed to
apply Learned Hand’s levels of abstractions233 to determine the line between
ideas and expression. However, most likely, in a misguided attempt to
provide sufficient protection for computer programs, the appellate court
drew the line too far in favor of overprotection, stating “the purpose or
function of a utilitarian work would be the work’s idea, and everything that is not
necessary that purpose or function would be part of the expression of the
idea.” 234
Part of Whelan’s misstep appears to be conflating the merger doctrine with
the form-function doctrine, an issue that often confuses courts because, under
the facts of Baker, both principles emerged.235 In discussing Baker, the Whelan
court stated:
In deciding this point, the [Baker] Court distinguished what was
protectable from what was not protectable as follows:
“Where the art [i.e., the method of accounting] it teaches cannot be
used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate
the book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams
are to be considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given to
the public.” . . . Applying this test, the Court held that the blank forms
were necessary incidents to Selden’s method of accounting, and
hence were not entitled to any copyright protection . . . . The Court’s
test in Baker v. Selden suggests a way to distinguish idea from
expression. 236
The statement from Baker appears to be more a statement about use rather
than idea/expression,237 but the Whelan court purports to derive a rule about idea

231 See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1224 (“[I]n this case of first impression in the
courts of appeals, we must determine whether the structure (or sequence and organization)
of a computer program is protectable by copyright, or whether the protection of the
copyright law extends only as far as the literal computer code.”).
232 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1191 (2021). See also supra text
accompanying notes 183–232; infra notes 330–57 and accompanying text.
233 See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see also supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
234 Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1236.
235 See supra notes 66–77 and accompanying text.
236 Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1236 (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103
(1880)).
237 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880).
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versus expression, suggesting some confusion.238 Likewise, Whelan recognizes
the wisdom from Learned Hand that the line between idea and expression is
“inevitably ad hoc,” but does not take it to heart, stating: “Although we
acknowledge the wisdom of Judge Hand’s remark, we feel that a review of
relevant copyright precedent will enable us to formulate a rule applicable in this
case.”239 Thus, leading to the statement quoted above, which has been criticized
by others.240
Despite the Whelan court’s overly general statement, when it comes to
analyzing the work at issue, it was able to appropriately distinguish an idea from
an expression.241 For example, the Third Circuit states: “Because that idea could
be accomplished in a number of different ways with a number of different
structures, the structure of the Dentalab program is part of the program’s
expression, not its idea.”242 Later, the court also states: “The conclusion is thus
inescapable that the detailed structure of the Dentalab program is part of the
expression, not the idea, of that program.”243 Furthermore, the Whelan court
draws an insightful analogy between computer code, compilations, and other
pre-existing works, an analogy discussed in more detail later:
The Copyright Act of 1976 provides further support, for it indicates
that Congress intended that the structure and organization of a
literary work could be part of its expression protectable by copyright.
Title 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982) specifically extends copyright
protection to compilations and derivative works. Title 17 U.S.C. §
101, defines “compilation” as “a work formed by the collection and
assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship,” and it defines
“derivative work,” as one “based upon one or more preexisting
works, such as . . . abridgement, condensation, or any other form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” [] Although
the Code does not use the terms “sequence,” “order” or “structure,”
it is clear from the definition of compilations and derivative works,
and the protection afforded them, that Congress was aware of the fact

Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1235.
See id.
240 See Englund, supra note 6, at 867–73; An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright
Protection for Application Programs, supra note 6, at 1051–57; Kretschmer, supra note
230, at 824–27; Spivack, supra note 230, at 729–31; see also Plains Cotton Coop. Ass’n v.
Goodpasture Comput. Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 (5th Cir. 1987) (declining to follow
Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986)).
241 Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1236.
242 See id. at 1236 n.28.
243 See id. at 1239.
238
239
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that the sequencing and ordering of materials could be copyrighted,
i.e., that the sequence and order could be parts of the expression, not
the idea, of a work.244
Also, in deliberating about the idea/expression dichotomy, the Whelan court
considers a copyright law doctrine: scène à faire.245 The appellate court does
little with this doctrine in terms of applying it to the situation at hand, however,
it becomes important for the next case, Computer Associates v. Altai,246 with
respect to the scope of protection of computer software, in general. Therefore,
this doctrine is worth considering here, by way of introduction.
The concept behind this latter doctrine is that some forms of expression
have become so commonplace as a means to express a particular idea that to
allow such expressions to be copyrightable would provide a party claiming
ownership of the expression an unwarranted amount of control over the
underlying idea. 247 That is, permitting protection would provide more rights
than is intended to be conveyed via copyright. Therefore, although in these
situations, a merger has not occurred, nonetheless, similar to a merger, the
interest of having certain underlying ideas freely available trumps the
interest of otherwise providing protection for this particular expression.
To illustrate this point, consider a western movie that includes a town
drunk. A town drunk portrayed in a movie might be sufficiently specific or
concrete that it amounts to expression. However, a town drunk in a western
is also sufficiently commonplace that if a particular western movie is
accused to be a copyright infringement of another western, the mere fact that
both westerns include a town drunk is generally not sufficiently probative
evidence to show that one was a copy of the other. Rather, if the similarity
of the works that flows from including a town drunk were considered
probative of copying, that might discourage legitimate incorporation of a
town drunk as a “stock” or “commonplace” feature of a western.
That both westerns may include a town drunk is generally not probative
of copying given the commonplace nature of the expression. In this way, the
scène à faire doctrine may be employed to limit the scope of non-literal
protection for a copyrightable work. Today, scène à faire, as well as the
doctrine of merger, have taken on significance in evaluating the scope of
non-literal protection available for computer software. 248
It might, perhaps, in 20-20 hindsight be slightly unfair at this point to
Id. (emphasis in original). See also supra note 128–56 and accompanying text.
See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1236.
246 See generally Comput. Assocs., Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
247 See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Books, 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986); Atari, Inc. v. N.
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982); See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983).
248 see infra note 511; See infra notes 575–82 and accompanying text.
244
245
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observe that the Third Circuit in Whelan greatly simplified its job.
Deciding the case became quite simple using the court’s previously cited
distinction between the idea and expression of the program at issue.
Virtually everything in Whelan’s program was protectable expression,
both literally and non-literally. 249 Therefore, while the facts of this case
raised potentially challenging legal and factual questions regarding the
scope of protection for software (e.g., how much copying might be legally
permissible), these issues ultimately were not fully resolved.
The rationale for non-literal protection in this context, of course, is that,
without it, unscrupulous copyists potentially could make small changes to a
literal work and avoid infringement. 250 Likewise, in terms of creating the
proper incentives for authors, there could be an undersupply of software if
those who might have had the incentive to create software do not expend the
effort because their creations can be quite easily “ripped off.” 251 In this vein,
to credit the Third Circuit in Whelan somewhat, evidence of the amount of
work that it takes or took to create a program may have influenced its
decision. 252 We now know, of course, that the amount of effort expended is
not relevant to copyrightability, and, likewise, it is irrelevant to the scope of
protection provided. 253 However, at the time this case was decided, the
“sweat of the brow doctrine” was alive and well because this decision pre dates the Feist decision of the Supreme Court. 254
Nonetheless, even considering
,
that factor, the Whelan court, though
appreciating its role in striking a balance, 255 struck the balance too far in
favor of overprotection. Whereas, providing no non-literal protection would
likely produce an under supply of software, likewise, overprotecting the nonliteral aspects of the work may produce a similar under supply. Instead of
foregoing producing software for lack of protection, in the face of an overly
protective approach, some that would otherwise produce or create software
may opt to not create software due to the potential risks associated with
inadvertently non-literally infringing the work of another. In a very real
sense, then, as was previously indicated, the job of a court in resolving the
idea/expression dichotomy is to provide a balance between protection on

Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1243.
See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
251 Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1237.
252 See Comput. Assocs., Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 711 (2d Cir. 1992).
253 Id.
254 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991).
255 See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1235 n.27 (“Achieving the proper incentive has
been a longstanding task of courts.”).
249
250
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one hand and competition on the other. 256 It is in this respect that the
Whelan court mis-stepped.
The job of a court, when faced with a copyright law situation involving
the scope of protection, is to determine the appropriate idea/expression
boundary. 257 So, too, then, it is for courts to resolve where the line should fall
for computer programs to provide the best outcome for society, while also being
true to the purpose of Congress in providing copyright protection.258 By the very
nature of copyright law, then, the line for computer programs will be placed
differently than for other forms of expression that also receive copyright
protection. 259 However, it was left for later courts, coming after Whelan, to
attempt to resolve the appropriate balance regarding scope of protection with
respect to software. Furthermore, the calculus of where such a line should
be drawn, as difficult as such calculus may be, is made that much more
difficult due to how the form-function doctrine and its exemption regarding
software comes into the calculation, so to speak.
Computer Associates v. Altai (hereinafter Altai), illustrates the enormous
complexities facing courts seeking to determine an appropriate scope of non-

256 See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 696 (“[C]opyright law seeks to
establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it affords protection to authors as an
incentive to create, and, on the other, it must appropriately limit the extent of that protection
so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation. In applying the federal act to new types
of cases, courts must always keep this symmetry in mind.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2A.03(B), supra note 37 (“[W]e must approach the field wearing bifocals—artistic
creativity deserves protection at the same time that the evils of monopolizing functional
activities must be avoided. Decisions must therefore be reached with sensitivity to both
sides of the ledger: If according protection to a given form of expression threatens to
forestall competition in a given field of endeavor, that consideration alone might counsel the
opposite resolution.”).
257 See Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1233 (determining the scope of copyright
protection for a computer program).
258 See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 696 (“[C]opyright law seeks to
establish a delicate equilibrium. On the one hand, it affords protection to authors as an
incentive to create, and, on the other, it must appropriately limit the extent of that protection
so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stagnation. In applying the federal act to new types
of cases, courts must always keep this symmetry in mind.”); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1971) (“The guiding consideration in
drawing the line is the preservation of the balance between competition and protection
reflected in the patent and copyright laws.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.03(B), supra
note 37 (“[W]e must approach the field wearing bifocals—artistic creativity deserves
protection at the same time that the evils of monopolizing functional activities must be
avoided. Decisions must therefore be reached with sensitivity to both sides of the ledger: If
according protection to a given form of expression threatens to forestall competition in a
given field of endeavor, that consideration alone might counsel the opposite resolution.”).
See also supra notes 235–57 and accompanying text; infra notes 259–65 and text
accompanying.
259 See supra notes 31–39 and accompanying text.
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literal copyright protection for software. 260 It would not in any sense be an
exaggeration to observe that this Second Circuit case is not only the most
important case discussed so far, but also, that it may be, in terms of its influence,
the most important decision in the area of non-literal copyright protection for
computer software. Since the decision, every circuit that has considered the issue
has essentially adopted this approach.261
The case involved an appeal by Computer Associates’ (“CA”) of a decision
of non-infringement regarding a program written by Altai, called OSCAR 3.5.262
At the trial level, Altai’s program OSCAR 3.4 was held to infringe Computer
Associates’ copyright in its program, CA-SCHEDULER, but Altai did not
appeal that holding.263 Computer programs that schedule jobs for execution on
IBM mainframe computers were the subject of the litigation. 264 The main
function of such software is to create a schedule to specify when certain tasks
are to be executed by a computer, and then to control the computer as those tasks
are executed.265
Computer Associates had a program, referred to as CA-SCHEDULER, that
performed this function.266 CA-SCHEDULER included a sub-program, referred
to as ADAPTER, that translated from one programming language to another.267
ADAPTER essentially provided operating system compatibility. 268 Thus,
ADAPTER ensured that CA-SCHEDULER may be executed on several
different computers that have a number of different operating systems.269 When
it was necessary to engage the operating system, ADAPTER executed the
appropriate operating system function call for the particular function being
performed.270
Altai had its own scheduling program, called ZEKE. 271 Before the facts
that led to the litigation, Altai, due to consumer demand, decided that it
needed to rewrite ZEKE so that it could run on another operating system. 272
It had been written to run only with a VSE operating system. 273

260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273

See generally Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. , 982 F.2d at 693.
See infra notes 287–301 and accompanying text.
Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 696.
Id. at 696–97.
Id. at 698.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 698–99.
Id. at 699.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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A high-level executive of Altai then convinced a CA employee, Arney, to
come work for Altai. 274 Arney, unknown to Altai and to the executive that
recruited him, was familiar with CA’s ADAPTER program and, in fact, took
source code versions of that program with him when he left CA. 275 Arney
then convinced Altai to use a common system interface, that is, the
functional approach that ADAPTER implemented, but Arney never told
Altai about his familiarity with ADAPTER and the source code copies he
had in his possession. 276 Arney then developed a program called OSCAR 3.4
to perform the interface function. 277 About 30% of OSCAR 3.4’s code was
copied from ADAPTER. 278 CA ultimately suspected what had transpired and
sued Altai for copyright infringement and trade secret misappropriation. 279
After being sued, Altai learned of Arney’s copying. 280
Upon advice of counsel, Altai rewrote OSCAR. 281 Arney was excluded
from the process. 282 The code for ADAPTER was locked away and
programmers unfamiliar with OSCAR 3.4 were used. 283 This produced
OSCAR 3.5. 284
The district court had held that OSCAR 3.5 and ADAPTER were not
substantially similar, and CA appealed that decision, arguing the district
court failed to protect the non-literal elements of the copyright in
ADAPTER. 285
The Second Circuit determined that the district court below was correct to
reject the approach employed in the Whelan case. 286 The appellate court
adopted, instead, a successive filtering approach, referred to as abstractionfiltration-comparison (“AFC”). 287
Under this approach, a court applies the levels of abstraction approach to

Id.
Id. at 699–700.
276 Id. at 700.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 CA asserted that Altai had constructive knowledge of the misappropriation. One of
the issues in the case was whether copyright law pre-empted the state law trade secret
misappropriation claim. Not infrequently, a copyright infringement case for software begins
as a trade secret misappropriation case or vice-versa. See, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v.
Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1227 (3d Cir. 1986) (noting the case started as a
trade secret misappropriation suit).
280 Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 700.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
285 Id. at 701.
286 Id. at 702.
287 Id. at 706.
274
275
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copyrighted code (abstraction).288 At each so-called abstraction level, certain
elements deemed unprotectable are filtered out (filtration).289 Then, at each
level, what is left after filtration is compared with the accused product
(comparison).290 If there is substantial similarity between the accused work and
the copyrighted work at any level determined to include expression, then
copyright infringement has occurred.291
The filtration step, again, referred to as successive filtering, is a crucial step
in the analysis and has proven to be the most controversial step.292 According to
the Second Circuit, per the Altai decision, a court is to filter out (1) elements
attributable to or dictated by efficiency, (2) elements attributable to or dictated
by external factors, and (3) elements attributable to or taken from the public
domain.293 The rationale for filtering out these elements is that they are not
protectable under copyright law. For example, the merger doctrine is
considered to prevent elements under category (1) from being treating as
protected expression, and the scène à faire doctrine is considered to prevent
elements under category (2) from being treated as protected expression.294
An important aspect of the opinion is a so-called “clean” room that Altai
employed. 295 This refers to the process CA employed to rewrite OSCAR. 296
CA excluded Arney, used programmers not familiar with OSCAR 3.4, and
prevented anyone from having access to the source code versions that Arney
took from CA.297 One reason why CA employed this approach was to break the

Id. at 707.
Id.
290 See id. at 710. It was noted by the appellate court in Altai that the district court
filtered out unprotectible elements from OSCAR 3.5, rather than from ADAPTER. This
may show the challenge presented to courts by the complexity of this type of analysis in that
the lower court got confused regarding which program is to be filtered. See also infra note
478 and accompanying text.
291 Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., 982 F.2d at 706.
292 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Note also,
that this step as a practical matter may be viewed as the most important step in terms of
determining the scope of protection. See Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc., Inc., 982 F.2d at 707
(quoting Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475 (9th Cir)) (“Strictly
speaking, this filtration serves ‘the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiff’s copyright.’”)
(endorsing ‘analytic dissection’ of computer programs in order to isolate protectable
expression); see also Andrew B. Hebl, A Heavy Burden: Proper Application of Copyright’s
Merger and Scènes à Faire Doctrines, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 128, 137 (2008);
Ocasio, supra note 97, at 315.
293 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 708, 710.
294 See id. at 709.
295 See Evan Finkel, Update to: Copyright Protection for Computer Software in the
Nineties, 8 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 99, 105 (1992).
296 See id.
297 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 700.
288
289
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connection often made between factual similarity and legal or substantial
similarity for the purpose of determining copyright infringement. 298 Altai
had access to CA’s ADAPTER program and legally could not rebut that
element of the case against it. 299 However, the clean room approach provided
a basis for Altai to assert that similarities between its “clean” program, here
OSCAR 3.5, and CA’s program, were not from having had access to
ADAPTER. 300 Thus, while not dispositive, a clean room process provides a
powerful evidentiary tool available to a defendant in such cases. 301
Another important aspect of the case relates to the issue of software
compatibility.302 Recall that this issue came up previously in connection with the
Apple case before the Third Circuit.303 Compatibility of software had become an
increasingly significant issue with the proliferation of software technology. For
example, as software produced by different venders becomes layered in complex
systems and networks that interact, interoperability becomes an important
feature that consumers desire.
However, whether copyright infringement occurs when one vender without
obtaining authority writes software to interoperate with software from another
vender remains unclear.304 In other words, is compatibility a consideration not
unlike the hardware platform on which the code will execute, such that, those
aspects of the code included as a result of the particular hardware platform are
not subject to copyright protection or, instead, is compatibility without first
obtaining appropriate permission attempting to leverage the popularity of

298
299
300
301
302
303

See id. at 701.
See id.
See id. at 702.
See id.
See id. at 698.
See Apple Comput. Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d Cir.

1983).
304 See Samuelson, supra note 6, at 263; Vasilescu-Palmero, supra note 6, at 171; An
Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, supra note 6, at
1047; see also Menell, supra note 6, at 459; Functionality and Expression in Computer
Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6, at 64–65;
Armstrong, supra note 6, at 131; The Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, supra
note 6, at 1747; Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software, supra note 6, at 1330;
Ginsburg, supra note at 6, at 2559; Dennis, supra note 6, at 33; Miller, supra note 6, at 978;
Reichman, supra note 6, at 641; A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, supra note 6, at 2310; Weinreb, supra note 6, at 1150; Englund, supra note 6, at
866; Nimmer, supra note 6, at 626; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F), supra note 6;
INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 6; INTERFACES ON TRIAL 2.0, supra note 6. See generally
Special Issue: Software Interface Copyright, supra note 6 (devoting Harvard Journal of Law
and Technology’s Spring Issue to the topic of Copyright and Software Interfaces with 9
articles by well-known intellectual property law experts including: Pamela Samuelson, Peter
Menell, and Mark Lemley).
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someone else’s creative endeavor?
This is no simple question and, aside from the complexity of this question as
a matter of policy, the answer may likewise vary depending on the details of a
given situation. Two important cases after Altai, the 2014 Federal Circuit
decision in Oracle v. Google and the First Circuit decision in Lotus v. Borland,
attempt to grapple with this question and reach different conclusions employing
different approaches.305
However, one should understand the position taken by the Second Circuit in
Altai. The court is not necessarily saying that it is acceptable to copy expression
for purposes of compatibility and, thus it is an external factor to be filtered.306
Rather, in determining the scope of protection, the court is seeking to discern
those elements that, while potentially leading to similarity, would not be
probative of illegal or illicit copying.307 For example, suppose that to encourage
others to write applications that will execute on its iPhone device, Apple makes
freely available to programmers certain routines to execute some relatively basic
functions, such as time keeping, location determining, orientation of the phone
in three dimensions, etc. In that case, if one application program that executed
on an Apple iPhone device is accused of being an infringement of another
application program that also executes on the Apple iPhone device, it may be
that such expression within the code relating to those aspects would not be
probative of copying and should appropriately be filtered out under the AFC
approach.308
On one hand, the Altai court asserts that it “breaks no new ground” 309 and,
instead, draws on “familiar copyright doctrines.” 310 On the other hand, the
Second Circuit in Altai recognizes that its approach will result in “narrowing
the scope of protection” for computer programs.311 These assertions are not
easily reconciled. If the court simply applies well-known or well-established
copyright law principles, why should it expect that to result in narrowing the
scope of protection for computer programs?
There are at least two plausible reasons why the Second Circuit concluded
that narrowing protection for computer programs would result, even assuming
305 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding
copyright protects the expression of a process or method); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l,
Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the menu command hierarchy was
uncopyrightable because it was a method of operation). See supra notes 330–357, 367 and
accompanying text; see infra notes 459–467 and accompanying text.
306 See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 818.
307 See id.
308 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
309 See id.
310 See id.
311 See id. at 712.
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that it was merely drawing on familiar copyright law doctrines.312 The first
reason may relate to the court’s desire to balance competition and protection. 313
That is, less protection is probably appropriate for software because the market
incentives that exist do a reasonably good job of encouraging the creation of
such works. In other words, without protection, some amount of code would
still be written even with the knowledge that others would be free to copy it.
However, it may be that this amount of code would still be less than might result
if some protection is afforded. Since the goal of protection is to encourage the
creation of works ultimately, less protection may be more desirable here than is
provided in other areas, such as for books, as an example. More to the point, if
too much protection is provided,314 it may very well undermine the incentive to
generate such works. This point appears consistent with the general
understanding regarding how much protection to afford software.315 Potentially,
due to a reasonably well-functioning market, software appears to be generated
even if accorded less protection than other types of copyrightable works. Some
appear to believe, for example, that software should receive no copyright
protection (or at least significantly less protection) precisely because such
protection undermines appropriate incentives by being overprotective. 316
Another reason the court might have expected a narrowing of protection for
computer programs, as the Second Circuit states in Altai, relates to the utilitarian
nature of software.317 The court may have seen the utilitarian nature of software
as operating as a sort of bound on the creative form that might otherwise be
expressed. In other areas, using literary works as a typical example, practical
considerations of workability, effectiveness, allocation of resources, etc.,
generally do not restrict the creative endeavors of an author. However, because
software is useful and ultimately seeks to perform a given task, such
considerations may limit or bound the universe of creative expressions that
might otherwise result. The Altai court may have expected some similarity in
approaches to result even in the context of totally independent development of
creative expressions.318 In attempting to arrive at a goldilocks-like balance
See id.
See id. at 696.
314 See supra notes 31–39, 156–60 and accompanying text; See infra notes 409–13 and
accompanying text (regarding the Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle).
315 See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1196 (2021).
316 See supra notes 4, 156–60 and accompanying text. See infra notes 409–13 and
accompanying text (regarding the Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle).
317 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l. Inc., 982 F.2d at 708.
318 See id. at 709 (“[I]t is quite possible that multiple programmers, working
independently will design the identical method employed in the allegedly infringing work . .
. . Under these circumstances, the fact that two programs contain the same efficient structure
may as likely lead to an inference of independent creation as it does to one of copying.”);
see also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F), supra note 6 (“[E]ven two programs that have
312
313
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between competition and protection, this understanding might lead a court to
conclude a narrower scope of protection would be appropriate so as to not
inadvertently establish hurdles for advancing further creative endeavors.
The Second Circuit was correct that its approach did narrow the scope of nonliteral protection for programs.319 However, the court did more than simply
apply well-known principles.320 To the contrary, the decision produced a shift
(termed here a “paradigm shift”) in the approach applied by courts to determine
the scope of non-literal protection afforded computer programs under copyright
law.321 The opinion itself is well-reasoned and clear in most places. It is also a
watershed case in that it largely sets the standard to be applied for resolving the
scope of non-literal copyright protection for software, at least until the Supreme
Court chooses to address the issue.322
Nonetheless, there is an important point on which the Altai court was
confused, and it strikes at the heart of the confusion that many courts appear to
have in this particular area. In this instance, the Altai court stated incorrectly:
“we conclude that those elements of a computer program that are necessarily
incidental to its function are similarly unprotectable.”323 Here, the court has
confused the restriction on use rights, the doctrine referred to herein as the formfunction doctrine, with the merger doctrine.324
Under the merger doctrine, expression “necessarily incidental” to an idea
being expressed is unprotectable (e.g., there are only a few ways to express it),
as the court later correctly observes.325 However, the merger doctrine is not
consistent with the previous statement made by the court, which instead relates
to utility or functionality.326 Thus, while later in the decision, the court applies
the merger doctrine correctly, it nonetheless has some confusion about how
merger differs from the notion, applicable to traditional works under copyright
law, that where the scope of protection is necessarily entangled with use of the
work, then no protection is provided under copyright law.327 This distinction is
important because, for software, the latter principle does not apply. Rather,
been created independently may appear similar in many respects.”).
319 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 712.
320 See id.
321 See id. at 703.
322 See generally Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021). See infra
notes 409–13 and accompanying text.
323 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 705 (emphasis added); cf. Hickey, supra note
81, at 696 (treating merger and functionality as essentially the same doctrine and citing
Altai).
324 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l. Inc., 982 F.2d at 708.
325 See id. at 708–09.
326 See id.
327 See id.
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section 117, for example, makes it clear that copying is an essential step in the
utilization of a software program. 328 Given clear Congressional intent that
software be protectable by copyright and recognition by statute, it cannot
logically be the case that the form-function doctrine applies to computer
programs.329 For example, copying the ledgers in Baker would be an essential
step in their use. When courts confuse these two doctrines, the results have the
potential to limit the scope of protection for software more than is appropriate.
The next case we consider is the 2014 Federal Circuit opinion in Oracle v.
Google (hereinafter, Google (2014)) which was handed down by the Federal
Circuit.330 This case is complex, and the Federal Circuit attempted to address
most, if not all, of the challenging issues previously mentioned. Not unlike Altai,
the case is reasonably clear and well-reasoned, but still manages to confuse a
few issues in its discussion explaining its decision.
Essentially, Google, having purchased Android, wanted to develop a Java
platform for Android phones.331 Java had been developed by Sun and Sun had
been purchased by Oracle.332 Although Google and Oracle attempted to
negotiate a deal, the negotiations failed apparently because Oracle wanted
Google’s implementation to be interoperable with Oracle’s Java Virtual
Machine, which is central to the Java platform.333 In general, the basic idea
behind Java was to enable programmers to write code that would execute on
different types of computer platforms without a developer rewriting the code.334
Compatibility with the Java Virtual Machine makes this possible.335 Oracle did
not want to grant Google a license because Google wanted to implement Java
on Android phones in a way that would not satisfy Java’s goal of “write once,

See supra notes 149–66 and accompanying text.
See id.
330 See generally Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2014). The
Supreme Court denied certiorari for this case, which primarily dealt with copyrightability
and copyright infringement; however, a later decision by the Federal Circuit in the same
case was handed down in 2018, in which the Federal Circuit had to address a fair use
question. That later decision was ultimately granted certiorari so that the Supreme Court
appeared to be headed to resolving issues from the 2014 case and issues from the 2018 case.
Oral argument in the case took place on October 7, 2020, and an opinion deciding the case
based only on fair use was issued on April 5, 2021. See infra notes 409–13 and
accompanying text (regarding the Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle).
331 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1348.
332 See id.
333 See id. at 1350; See also Samuel J.M. Hartiens, Note, The Battle of Big Tech:
Distinguishing Fair Use and Copyright Infringement with APIs, 21 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1
(2021) (Noting this is worthy of mention because Oracle’s goals might be viewed as more
pro-interoperability than Google’s and, yet, the Supreme Court apparently saw things
differently in its ultimate fair use analysis). Cf. supra text accompanying notes 250–52.
334 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1348–49.
335 See id. at 1348.
328
329
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run anywhere.”336
Java had 166 so-called “API packages” (application programming interface
packages) with 6000 methods making up more than 600 classes. 337 37 of the
166 packages were at issue in the case, three of which were considered “core”
Java packages.338 It is noted that these 37 packages were part of Google’s
implementation of Java called Dalvik, which included 168 API packages. 339
Understanding the nature of these so-called API packages is important to
appreciate the issues in the case. The case provides a helpful description, as
follows:
Sun wrote a number of ready-to-use Java programs to perform
common computer functions and organized those programs into
groups it called ‘packages.’ These packages, which are the
application programming interfaces at issue in this appeal, allow
programmers to use the prewritten code to build certain functions
into their own programs, rather than write their own code to perform
those functions from scratch. They are shortcuts. Sun called the code
for a specific operation (function) a ‘method.’ It defined ‘classes’ so
that each class consists of specified methods plus variables and other
elements on which the methods operate. To organize the classes for
users, then, it grouped classes (along with certain related ‘interfaces’)
into ‘packages.’. . . The parties have not disputed the district court’s
analogy: Oracle’s collection of API packages is like a library, each
package is like a bookshelf in the library, each class is like a book on
the shelf, and each method is like a how-to chapter in a book.340
Furthermore,
Every package consists of two types of source code— what the
parties call (1) declaring code; and (2) implementing code. Declaring
code is the expression that identifies the prewritten function and is
sometimes referred to as the ‘declaration’ or ‘header.’ As the district
court explained, the ‘main point is that this header line of code
introduces the method body and specifies very precisely the inputs,
name and other functionality.’ . . . The expressions used by the
programmer from the declaring code command the computer to
execute the associated implementing code, which gives the computer
the step-by-step instructions for carrying out the declared function.341
See id. at 1350.
Id. at 1349.
338 Id.
339 Id. at 1350.
340 Id. at 1349.
341 Id. One might suspect that this distinction originates from the creative endeavors of
Google’s counsel rather than from engineering considerations.
336
337
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Finally,
To use the district court’s example, one of the Java API packages at
issue is “java.lang.” Within that package is a class called “math,” and
within “math” there are several methods, including one that is
designed to find the larger of two numbers: “max.” The declaration
for the ‘max’ method, as defined for integers, is: “public static int
max(int x, int y),” where the word “public” means that the method is
generally accessible, “static” means that no specific instance of the
class is needed to call the method, the first “int” indicates that the
method returns an integer, and “int x” and “int y” are the two
numbers (inputs) being compared . . . A programmer calls the “max”
method by typing the name of the method stated in the declaring code
and providing unique inputs for the variables “x” and “y.” The
expressions used command the computer to execute the
implementing code that carries out the operation of returning the
larger number.342
Thus, for the 37 packages at issue, Google copied the declaration portion of
the code verbatim and conceded as much.343 However, Google wrote its own
implementing code.344 Apparently, Google expected that programmers would
want to use the same names with the same associated functions as used in
Java.345 It was Google’s contention, and the district court ultimately agreed, that
this declaring code was not copyrightable.346
Oracle, on the other hand, contended that the declaring code was
copyrightable and that, therefore, Google’s verbatim copying was copyright
infringement. 347 Oracle further contended that Google, in effect, by copying the
declaring code with the purpose of providing the same names and functions as
Java had also “copied the elaborately organized taxonomy within its code of
names, methods, classes, interfaces, and packages.”348 In other words, Oracle
contended that Google had copied the overall sequence, structure and
organization (SSO) of Oracle’s code.349 As to this latter contention, the district
court ruled in favor of Google as well, finding that it was, in essence, a command

Id.
Id. at 1350–1351.
344 Id. at 1351.
345 Id. at 1350.
346 Id. at 1348.
347 Id. at 1353.
348 Id. at 1350–51.
349 See id. at 1364–66; cf. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d
1222, 1224 (3d Cir. 1986) (“[I]n this case of first impression in the courts of appeals, we
must determine whether the structure (or sequence and organization) of a computer program
is protectible by copyright, or whether the protection of the copyright law extends only as
far as the literal computer code.”).
342
343
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structure, a system or method of operation and, thus, was not entitled to
copyright protection under section 102(b) much like had been ruled by the First
Circuit in Lotus v. Borland.350
Ultimately, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court decision regarding
copyrightability of the declaring code and found that Google did infringe
Oracle’s copyright by its verbatim copying.351 It also found that Google had
copied the SSO of Oracle’s code which also constituted copyright
infringement.352 It distinguished Lotus v. Borland, but also found that the Ninth
Circuit, whose law it was required to apply, had rejected the approach in
Lotus.353 The Federal Circuit ultimately remanded the case for retrial on the issue
of fair use, which produced yet another appellate decision in 2018 and that
decision was ultimately granted certiorari by the Supreme Court and resulted in
a Supreme Court decision.354
A few statements or analysis may be confusing and imply the Federal Circuit
was confused on a few subtle points in this 2014 decision; however, for the sake
of clarity, in an extremely complex and challenging case, the appellate court
correctly resolves the issues. That is, the Federal Circuit rejects the merger
analysis applied to the declaring code and rejects the reliance on section 102(b)
to suggest the SSO of Oracle’s code is uncopyrightable.355 The Federal Circuit
correctly resolves some issues in part ostensibly by relying on Ninth Circuit
precedent.356 However, one important aspect of the opinion is that the Federal
Circuit is able to distinguish the merger doctrine from the form-function
doctrine, a subtle and important point to understand when determining the
correct scope of protection for a software copyright.357
Early in its opinion, the Federal Circuit makes several helpful analytic
observations. First, the Federal Circuit correctly distinguishes the question of
copyrightability from the question of scope of protection, particularly in
connection with doctrines such as merger and scène à faire.358 Here, however,

350 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1364; Lotus v. Borland precedes Oracle v. Google–
however, cases are discussed in reverse order of their chronology because Lotus v. Borland
did not deal specifically with software. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807,
818 (1st Cir. 1995).
351 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1359–60.
352 See id.
353 See id. at 1365–68.
354 See id. at 1376–77; see supra notes 330–52 and accompanying text; See infra notes
409–13 and accompanying text (regarding the Supreme Court decision in Google v. Oracle).
355 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1361–62.
356 See id. at 1365–66.
357 Compare id. at 1367–68 (rejecting functionality argument), with id. at 1359–60
(analyzing merger).
358 See id. at 1358 (relying on 9th circuit law).
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the Federal Circuit says it is simply following Ninth Circuit law.359 The Federal
Circuit also early on recognizes the decisional controversy around section 102(b)
and points out that this is a source of dispute between the parties.360
Section 102(b) expressly states: “In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system,
method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in
which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”361 It is
a statement regarding the scope of copyright protection. Section 102(a)
expressly states:
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device. . . .362
It is a statement regarding what is copyrightable subject matter.
The first statement of section 102 clarifies that original works of authorship
fixed in a tangible medium of expression are eligible for copyright protection
and the second statement of section 102 clarifies that such protection “for an
original work of authorship [does not] extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
form. . .”363 For example, in conjunction with an “idea,” an original work of
authorship contains ideas, but those are not subject to copyright protection.
Likewise, a similar observation, to the extent it may be applicable, might be
made regarding other items mentioned in section 102(b).364 For example,
software could potentially relate in some way to a “procedure,” a “system,” or
perhaps a “method of operation.” Thus, while a particular work may be
copyrightable as an original work of authorship, copyright protection for the
particular work does not extend to the “system” or to the “method of operation,”
which, on the other hand, may be subject to patent protection in appropriate
circumstances.365
However, some take the view that section 102(b) is a statement regarding the
merger doctrine and/or the form-function doctrine.366 For example, the First
Circuit decision, Lotus v. Borland, based its ruling that Lotus’ menu command
See id.
See id. at 1355–56.
361 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2021).
362 § 102(a).
363 § 102(b).
364 Id.
365 Id.; see, e.g., ROBERT C. FABER, LANDIS ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING
(4th ed. 1997).
366 See supra notes 115–27, 208–12 and accompanying text.
359
360
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hierarchy in Lotus 1-2-3 is uncopyrightable on its understanding that section
102(b) is a statement that “methods of operation” are not copyrightable and that
Lotus’ menu command hierarchy constituted a method of operation.367
The Federal Circuit in Google (2014) does not shy away from this controversy
stating up front that: “Courts routinely cite Baker as the source of several
principles incorporated into Section 102(b) that relate to this appeal, including
that: (1) copyright protection extends only to expression, not to ideas, systems,
or processes; and (2) ‘those elements of a computer program that are necessarily
incidental to its function are . . . unprotectable.’”368
Likewise, the Google (2014) court clearly maps out the positions regarding
section 102(b) and concludes that Google’s position on this question is not the
correct interpretation.369 It states:
Although the parties agree that Oracle’s API packages meet the
originality requirement under Section 102(a), they disagree as to the
proper interpretation and application of Section 102(b). For its part,
Google suggests that there is a two-step copyrightability analysis,
wherein Section 102(a) grants copyright protection to original works,
while Section 102(b) takes it away if the work has a functional
component. To the contrary, however, Congress emphasized that
Section 102(b) “in no way enlarges or contracts the scope of
copyright protection” and that its “purpose is to restate . . . that the
basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged.”.
. . “Section 102(b) does not extinguish the protection accorded a
particular expression of an idea merely because that expression is
embodied in a method of operation.” . . . Section 102(a) and 102(b)
are to be considered collectively so that certain expressions are
subject to greater scrutiny . . . In assessing copyrightability, the
district court is required to ferret out apparent expressive aspects of
a work and then separate protectable expression from “unprotectable
ideas, facts, processes, and methods of operation.”370
However, while the Federal Circuit gets these fundamentals correct, it ultimately
is confused about the difference between software and other types of works that,
367 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995). See supra
notes 208–12 and accompanying text.
368 In Google (2014), the Federal Circuit cites to the precise statement in Altai that we
pointed out earlier is not correct and that the Second Circuit itself did not apply in the Altai
decision. Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see
Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–08 (2d Cir. 1992). See also
supra notes 330–52 and accompanying text.
369 See § 102(b); see Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1356 (Fed. Cir.
2014).
370 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1356–57.
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while seeming like software in that they may be considered hybrid-like, are not
software and, thus, are not clearly excluded from the form-function doctrine.371
In particular, the Federal Circuit states:
When assessing whether the non-literal elements of a computer
program constitute protectable expression, the Ninth Circuit has
endorsed an “abstraction-filtration-comparison” test formulated by
the Second Circuit and expressly adopted by several other circuits . .
. This test rejects the notion that anything that performs a function is
necessarily uncopyrightable . . . And it also rejects as flawed the
Whelan assumption that, once any separable idea can be identified in
a computer program everything else must be protectable expression,
on grounds that more than one idea may be embodied in any
particular program.372
Thus, the Federal Circuit believes that by adopting the Altai approach, the
Ninth Circuit has necessarily rejected the approach of Lotus v. Borland.373 The
Federal Circuit specifically states, in this regard: “This test rejects the notion that
anything that performs a function is necessarily uncopyrightable.”374 However,
that is not the complete story.
Both Altai and Lotus appreciate that AFC is restricted to computer
software.375 That is not the same as rejecting the notion that anything that
performs a function is necessarily uncopyrightable. Rather, the form-function
doctrine is rejected for software based on Congressional intent.376 This seems
to be where courts get tripped up the most. Here, even the Google (2014) court
is confused, as its explanation shows. This confusion becomes even more
apparent when the appellate court addresses the SSO of Oracle’s code, but
ultimately, like in Altai, though making some confusing statements, the Federal
Circuit in Google (2014) still applies the law correctly in the situation before
it.377
Having rejected section 102(b) and concluded that merger and scène à faire
affect the scope of protection rather than copyrightability, the Federal Circuit
moves on to resolve the district court ruling about the declaring code.378
See supra notes 13, 92–112, 345 and accompanying text.
Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1357–58.
373 See id. at 1357.
374 Id. (citing Mitel. v. Iqtel, 124 F.3d 1366 (10th Cir. 1997)). Mitel is not a software
case, as such, possibly explaining at least partly the basis for its confusion. Rather, Mitel
concerns copyright protection for a selection of particular four-digit numbers that activate
and manipulate the functions of a Smart-1 call controller.
375 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 714 (2d Cir. 1992); see Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995).
376 See supra notes 92–112 and accompanying text.
377 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1356.
378 Id. at 1358–59.
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372

58

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.1

Importantly, the Federal Circuit can correctly separate merger from the formfunction doctrine and analyze the district court’s position regarding merger.379
Likewise, here, the Federal Circuit’s analysis is spot on. It works through
several analogies with the declaring code, first comparing it to the introduction
for A Tale of Two Cities and then, even more appropriately, to a compilation.380
Thus, the Federal Circuit concludes there is creativity in the arrangement and
selection of the declaring code.381 Furthermore, since there are a variety of
possible arrangements, merger does not apply.382
As to scène à faire, the record was not developed below and the lower court
held that doctrine inapplicable.383 Here, the appellate court agrees.384 However,
the appellate court suggests that merger and scène à faire are not as relevant to
interoperability where, as here, interoperability was not a concern facing the
author of the allegedly infringed code.385 While the appellate court applies
appropriate legal reasoning, it may still overstate its position ever so slightly.
The appellate court’s logic is impeccable; however, it nonetheless fails to
consider the atypical,386 but possible situation. Suffice it to say that such a
situation was not before the Federal Circuit. Unfortunately, its statement
regarding interoperability, taken out of context, has the potential to be
interpreted overly broadly.387
The Federal Circuit’s confusion about the appropriate legal analysis becomes
even more apparent when it tackles the question regarding copyrightability and
scope of protection for the SSO of Oracle’s overall naming taxonomy.388 With
that said, the issues here are complex and the differences quite subtle, perhaps
even more subtle than courts such as Lotus and Altai appreciated. Although
those courts correctly recognized that software, audiovisual displays, and

Id. at 1359.
See also supra note 317–18 and accompanying text (discussing this helpful analogy
in more detail with respect to software).
381 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1359–62.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 1363.
384 See id.
385 See id. at 1368–72.
386 See supra note 318–46 and accompanying text (discussing a situation the court may
have overlooked).
387 Some may interpret the Google (2014) court to suggest that, with respect to merger
and scène à faire, interoperability could never be relevant to the scope of protection for
code and/or that interoperability could never be relevant to the scope of protection “after the
fact,” so to speak, as opposed to interoperability considerations facing a programmer at the
time of creation of a program. See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1370–71. See also supra
notes 330–60 and accompanying text (discussing this situation in more detail).
388 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1361–62.
379
380
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command hierarchies constitute separate categories of copyrightable works. 389
With that said, perhaps, another perspective might be that these different
works are related.390 For example, code/software may relate to a command
structure or to an audiovisual display. Various works that are not technically
software, such as screen displays, file structures, and/or menu command
hierarchies, for example, might be related to software by being described as
hybrid-like in the sense that this article has been using this term. For example,
these works potentially include copyrightable expression in a manner so that the
expressive elements may not be separable from the utilitarian elements, much
like software.391
Regardless, the Federal Circuit’s discussion seems completely numb to such
subtle distinctions and, hence, evidences some amount of confusion, at least as
to the salient legal considerations. In particular, the court’s stated basis for
distinguishing Lotus, while not entirely incorrect, could have been much
stronger. The appellate court distinguishes Lotus on two bases. First, on the facts
and, second, as bring rejected under Ninth Circuit law.392 Thus, regarding the
facts, the appellate court states:
On appeal, Oracle argues that the district court’s reliance on Lotus is
misplaced because it is distinguishable on its facts and is inconsistent
with Ninth Circuit law. We agree. First, while the defendant in Lotus
did not copy any of the underlying code, Google concedes that it
copied portions of Oracle’s declaring source code verbatim. Second,
the Lotus court found that the commands at issue there (copy, print,
etc.) were not creative, but it is undisputed here that the declaring
code and the structure and organization of the API packages are both
creative and original. Finally, while the court in Lotus found the
commands at issue were “essential to operating” the system, it is
undisputed that—other than perhaps as to the three core packages—
Google did not need to copy the structure, sequence, and
organization of the Java API packages to write programs in the Java
language. 393
The distinction made by the Federal Circuit in its 2014 Google decision that the
commands in Lotus were not creative, while the structure and organization of
See supra notes 70–77 and accompanying text.
The text of the article provides a great oversimplification but is offered to at least
help in articulating an intuition, which appears implicit in several decisions, that these
separate works are related in some way intellectually. Unfortunately, this intuition may
have done more to confuse courts than to aid them. In the third section of this article, we
attempt to articulate, albeit imperfectly, how these works may be thought of as being related
and “hybrid.” See supra Section III.
391 Id.
392 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1365–66.
393 Id. at 1365.
389
390

60

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.1

the API packages were creative, is questionable.394 However, it is correct that
the cases are factually distinguishable. In Google (2014), code was copied, both
literally and arguably non-literally.395 In Lotus, however, a command hierarchy,
rather than code, was copied.396 The Google (2014) court also treats the finding
in Lotus that the commands at issue were “essential to operating” the system as
a factual distinction.397
Thus, the Federal Circuit overlooks that the two cases, while raising highly
analogous factual situations in one sense, nonetheless, more formally raise
significantly different legal issues because one case involved copying software
and the other did not. Notably, however, despite this, the Federal Circuit
correctly concludes that the form-function doctrine does not apply to computer
programs stating quite clearly:
[T]he court concluded that, although the SSO is expressive, it is not
copyrightable because it is also functional. The problem with the
district court’s approach is that computer programs are by definition
functional—they are all designed to accomplish some task. Indeed,
the statutory definition of “computer program” acknowledges that
they function “to bring about a certain result.” . . . If we were to
accept the district court’s suggestion that a computer program is
uncopyrightable simply because it “carr[ies] out pre-assigned
functions,” no computer program is protectable. That result
contradicts Congress’s express intent to provide copyright protection
to computer programs, as well as binding Ninth Circuit case law
finding computer programs copyrightable, despite their utilitarian or
functional purpose.398
However, the Federal Circuit fails to appreciate the legal significance of that
distinction with respect to Lotus. Google (2014) is about copying software, not
about copying a command hierarchy.399 More specifically, the form-function
doctrine applies to a command structure, in the absence of Congressional action
or a clear legal basis for extending the exemption of the form-function doctrine
from software to a command structure.400
Failing to appreciate that distinction from Lotus, the Federal Circuit, instead,
concludes that Ninth Circuit law rejected Lotus.401 The Federal Circuit offers

394
395
396
397
398
399
400
401

Id. at 1364–65.
Id. at 1356.
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814 (1st Cir. 1995).
Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1365.
Id. at 1367.
Id.
See supra notes 70–77, 208–12, 347–55 and accompanying text.
Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1365.
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no clear rejection by the Ninth Circuit of Lotus itself and, rather, acknowledges
that the Ninth circuit really has not spoken much about Lotus. 402 However, it
concludes that Ninth Circuit law must be inconsistent with Lotus since Ninth
Circuit law recognizes that the SSO of a program may be copyrightable where
it qualifies as expression, citing to Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control
Systems,403 and to its own decision, Atari Game Corp. v. Nintendo if America,
Inc.404 However, there is nothing in either case that suggests a rejection of Lotus
expressly or implicitly.405
To be more specific, although the point may be a subtle one, there is nothing
about accepting the copyrightability of the SSO of a computer program that
necessarily is inconsistent with the holding in Lotus regarding the
copyrightability of a command hierarchy. The decisions concern two different
types of works, granted that the works do have some potential similarities,
notably at least in part because both are hybrid or hybrid-like.406
Finally, regarding Google (2014), in its discussion of interoperability, the
Federal Circuit appropriately recites the language from Apple v. Franklin
previously discussed.407 Likewise, here, the Federal Circuit is correct that, as in
Apple, while it is true that copyright law is to strike a balance between
competition and protection, such considerations do not necessarily implicate
merger, which wholly depends on the expressions at issue. 408
On April 5, 2021, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in
Google v. Oracle.409 The Supreme Court reversed the 2018 Federal Circuit
decision finding liability, but did so on grounds other than the topic of this
article.410 The Supreme Court decided that the defense of fair use applied as a
matter of law to prevent Google from being liable for copyright infringement.411
402 Id. at 1365 n.11 (“As Oracle points out, the Ninth has cited Lotus only one time on a
procedural issue.”).
403 See Johnson Controls v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th Cir. 1989)
(“Whether the nonliteral components of a program, including the structure, sequence and
organization and user interface, are protected depends on whether, on the particular facts of
each case, the component in question qualifies as an expression of an idea, or an idea
itself.”).
404 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1365. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc.,
975 F.2d 832, 837 (Fed. Cir. 1992). This provides some irony since, the Federal Circuit, in
part, relies on its own interpretation of Ninth Circuit law in, Atari, to conclude that Ninth
Circuit law has rejected Lotus.
405 See generally Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 1173; Atari Games Corp., 975 F.2d at
832.
406 See supra notes 70–77, 208–12, 347–55 and accompanying text.
407 See supra notes 202–12 and accompanying text.
408 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1359; Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp.,
714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3rd Cir. 1983). See supra notes 202–12 and accompanying text.
409 Google LLC, v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183 (2021).
410 Id. at 1187.
411 Id. at 1209.
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Therefore, as a legal matter, the 2014 Federal Circuit decision in Google v.
Oracle stands.
In a situational analogy, the Supreme Court result in Google v. Oracle might
be compared with another Supreme Court fair use case also presenting a type of
high water mark at the time of its decision—Sony v. Betamax.412 In a 5-4
decision, the majority found fair use applicable and the dissent provided a rather
scathing treatment pointing out the inconsistencies with prior fair use law in the
majority’s pronouncement.413 Here, the same might be said of Google v. Oracle.
Likewise, here, as before, the dissent’s spot-on criticisms will not prevent the
Court’s pronouncement from becoming the law of the land.
Our interest, however, is not so much the fine contours of fair use law, which
is beyond the scope of this article, but instead, to deduce what we are able from
the Court’s opinion relevant to the topic at hand. That is, how does the Court’s
ruling and analysis impact our thesis about a hybrid protection regime for
software that differs from the traditional copyright protection regime? There
can be little doubt that this recent decision goes far toward confirming a hybrid
protection regime for software. To be more specific, the Court appears to have
carved out a special area for software at least with respect to fair use, not unlike
has been done for parody in connection with fair use.414 To quote the Court:
The fact that computer programs are primarily functional makes it
difficult to apply traditional copyright concepts in that technological
world . . . In doing so here, we have not changed the nature of those
concepts. We do not overturn or modify our earlier cases involving
fair use—cases, for example, that involve “knockoff ” products,
journalistic writings, and parodies. Rather, we here recognize that
application of a copyright doctrine such as fair use has long proved
a cooperative effort of Legislatures and courts, and that Congress, in
our view, intended that it so continue. As such, we have looked to
the principles set forth in the fair use statute, [Section]107, and set
forth in our earlier cases, and applied them to this different kind of
copyrighted work. 415
However, to start in a more analytically convenient spot, early in the opinion,
the Court states:
We shall assume, but purely for argument’s sake, that the entire Sun
Java API falls within the definition of that which can be copyrighted.
We shall ask instead whether Google’s use of part of that API was a
412 See generally Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984).
413 Id.
414 Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1208–09.
415 Id.
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“fair use.” Unlike the Federal Circuit, we conclude that it was. 416
Thus, the Supreme Court chose not to specifically address the issues of
copyrightability and scope of protection as explained by the Federal Circuit in
its 2014 decision,417 just analyzed above in detail. Despite being based on fair
use, this outcome, at least indirectly (and as shown below, arguably directly),
supports the notion of a hybrid protection regime for software that impacts scope
of protection and may “spill over” into copyright law defenses.418
At a high level, the decision represents a dramatic shift in the balance between
protection and competition for software ostensibly due to its utilitarian
aspects.419 In this regard, the decision represents yet another cut back on how
copyright law provides protection for software, a trend in the law at least since
the Altai decision, suggesting two protection regimes (one for traditional
copyrightable subject matter and one for software). 420 Here, as shall be
explained, the Court concludes that so called “reimplementing” is
transformative.421 However, reimplementing is a quite common situation in
litigation involving software. Whelan and Altai were essentially reimplementing
cases in that the facts involve moving software to other, newer technology
platforms that resulted in more overall software expression for society; however,
these situations allowed for findings of liability where copying occurred. 422
In one sense, as indicated by the Federal Circuit’s 2018 decision, this case
might be viewed as nothing more than an ordinary code copying case. 423 The
Court itself quotes the Federal Circuit as follows:
Deciding that question of law, the court held that Google’s use of the
Sun Java API was not a fair use. It wrote that “[t]here is nothing fair
about taking a copyrighted work verbatim and using it for the same
purpose and function as the original in a competing platform.”424
However, in another sense, in this case the Court comes to terms with the notion
that the fundamental nature of software may call for a different set of rules under
copyright.425 That is, a major shift in the balance between competition and
Id. at 1197.
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
418 See Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1188 (explaining that the software scope of protection
that is ultimately provided by law is affected).
419 See id. at 1197.
420 See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1176 (9th
Cir. 1980).
421 Id.
422 See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1246 (3d Cir.
1986); see also Comput. Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 720–21 (2d Cir.
1992).
423 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google LLC, 886 F.3d 1179, 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
424 Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1195 (emphasis added) .
425 Id. at 1202.
416
417
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protection is appropriate.426
To do this, the Court brilliantly uses fair use, which permits considering
factors that otherwise may be less legally appropriate for scope of protection
under a prima facie case, such as form-function issues in the context of
software.427 In general, a highly refined analysis characterizes this treatment
under fair use, particularly with respect to the second factor, the nature of the
copyrighted work.
Recall that fair use is an equitable doctrine, and each case is decided on its
own facts.428 However, here, the Court issued a decision as a matter of law,
giving the decision more significant precedential impact.429 A key element of
the analysis, of course, is the nature of the work, although the conclusion that
reimplementing is transformative is also important to the analysis. By way of
contrast, outside of fair use, recall that copyright jurisprudence suggests courts
should not inquire into levels of creativity.430 An entirely legitimate question, of
course, is for software how well a federal court may be equipped to conduct such
an analysis which involves not only questions of creativity, but also questions
regarding refined technical analysis.431
From a policy perspective, for reasons previously discussed432 and discussed
in more detail immediately below, the direction of the decision appears correct
and even consistent with Congressional intent. That is, in the Court’s view,
market forces are sufficient to incent close to the appropriate amount of software
for society. This policy shift is particularly evident in the Court’s treatment of
the fourth factor,433 the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value
of, the copyrighted work, by including the public benefits of copying in its
analysis. The amount of protection needed through legal process is not nearly
so great for software as in other areas of copyright law. In this sense, if this
supposition is correct, the Court is being true to Congressional intent even while
significantly weakening copyright protection for software.

See Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (2d Cir. 1971).
Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1195.
428 See, e.g., id. at 1197.
429 Id. at 1209.
430 See, e.g., Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884); Apple
Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1251–54 (3d Cir. 1983).
431 Cf. Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1215–16 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
432 See supra notes 4, 156–60 and accompanying text.
433 See Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1206–07 (stating regarding the fourth factor: “Further,
we must take into account the public benefits the copying will likely produce. Are those
benefits, for example, related to copyright’s concern for the creative production of new
expression? Are they comparatively important, or unimportant, when compared with dollar
amounts likely lost?”). Cf. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F. 2d 180, 183 (2d. Cir. 1981) (calling
for a balancing of public benefits and losses to the copyright owner under this factor).
426
427
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Under fair use, with this possible realization in mind, if there are doubts
regarding applicability of particular fair use factor, perhaps, for software, such
doubts are now to be resolved in favor of concluding the factor is met in favor
of finding fair use, including, how that factor may interact with the other factors
to bring about a finding of fair use, analogous to placing a finger on the scale.
One might suspect this occurs here because the Court is reinstating a jury
decision; however, because the Court resolves the issue as a matter of law, this
does not completely justify the decisional result. Instead, the result appears to
follow from the nature of the work and the policy considerations just discussed.
Rather, as stated, this is a shift in the balance of protection and competition.
Regarding the four fair use factors, in general, the Court breaks with traditional
approaches under fair use.434
If the policy justification above is accepted as true, then the road map to reach
the conclusion of the Court is reasonably straight-forward. As to the nature of
the work, the Court states that it is functional and utilitarian, making it further
from the core of copyright.435 According to the Court, the declaring code is even
further from that core than the implementing code.436 The Court apparently sees
the implementing code more like typical code.437 The Court, in contrast, sees the
declaring code as bound up with uncopyrightable ideas438 and so the Court relies
heavily on fair use cases of so called “intermediate copying.” Intermediate
copying refers to a situation where code is copied, but only to be able to discern
the underlying uncopyrightable ideas.439
In general, the Court sees less protection for software because it is functional
and utilitarian, consistent with the notion of a different protection regime being
applicable to other types of copyrightable subject matter; however, as to the
declaring code, in particular, the Court sees that code as barely more than an
434 The Court concludes the purpose and character of the use is transformative; however,
the way the Court treats transformative use is unique here because the code itself is not
changed. Rather, the copied code is integrated with other code. The Court likewise handles
the market effect differently than precedent. Oracle was licensing the software and lost
significant revenue from licenses like adobe. See Hartiens, supra note 333, at 10–
11. However, the court, unlike in other works involving fair use, does not consider the lost
licensing opportunity a significant issue under this factor. Instead, the court considers
whether Oracle sought to enter this market and whether it was successful. See also Google
LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1215–20 (the dissent’s analysis of the four factors).
435 Id. at 1201–02.
436 Id.
437 Id.
438 Id.
439 See Sony Comput. Ent., Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F. 3d 596, 603–08 (9th Cir.
2000) (applying fair use to intermediate copying necessary to reverse engineer access to
unprotected functional elements within a program); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F. 2d 1510, 1521–27 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that wholesale copying of copyrighted code as
a preliminary step to develop a competing product was a fair use).
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idea, leading it to make comparisons with Feist and intermediate copying.440
The Court, unfortunately, however, fails to clearly discern the difference
between form-function considerations and scope of protection considerations.441
This, of course, is not surprising since courts generally do not seem to appreciate
the difference explicitly, although several seem to do so implicitly. 442 Here, for
example, the dissent also seems to perceive the difference at least implicitly.443
However, the majority seems numb to this subtle point.
The Court says the declaring code is bound up with uncopyrightable ideas,444
but what is the nature of those so called “uncopyrightable ideas?” In general,
they appear to relate to use. Specifically, the Court states:
The declaring code (inseparable from the programmer’s method
calls) embodies a different kind of creativity. Sun Java’s creators, for
example, tried to find declaring code names that would prove
intuitively easy to remember . . . They wanted to attract programmers
who would learn the system, help to develop it further, and prove
reluctant to use another . . . Sun’s business strategy originally
emphasized the importance of using the API to attract programmers.
It sought to make the API “open” and “then . . . compete on
implementations.” . . . The testimony at trial was replete with
examples of witnesses drawing this critical line between the usercentered declaratory code and the innovative implementing code . . .
These features mean that, as part of a user interface, the declaring
code differs to some degree from the mine run of computer programs.
Like other computer programs, it is functional in nature. But unlike
many other programs, its use is inherently bound together with
uncopyrightable ideas (general task division and organization) and
new creative expression (Android’s implementing code). Unlike
many other programs, its value in significant part derives from the

440 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1290 (1991); see also
Sony Comput. Ent., Inc., 203 F. 3d at 603–08 (applying fair use to intermediate copying
necessary to reverse engineer access to unprotected functional elements within a program);
Sega Enter. Ltd., 977 F. 2d at 1521–27 (holding that wholesale copying of copyrighted code
as a preliminary step to develop a competing product was a fair use).
441 This distinction has been previously discussed. One (scope of protection) is a
balancing that courts perform so that, for a particular type of copyrightable subject matter,
copyright law is neither overprotective nor under protective. See supra notes 31–39 and
accompanying text. However, the form-function distinction relates to whether providing
copyright protection would result in providing use rights to the copyright holder. Google
LLC, v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1202 (2021). See supra notes 75–93 and
accompanying text.
442 See supra notes 207–12 and accompanying text.
443 Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1213–14 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
444 Id. at 1201–02.
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value that those who do not hold copyrights, namely, computer
programmers, invest of their own time and effort to learn the API’s
system. And unlike many other programs, its value lies in its efforts
to encourage programmers to learn and to use that system so that they
will use (and continue to use) Sun-related implementing programs
that Google did not copy.445
Is not this aspect simply related to use rights? Of course, the genius in the
Court’s decision as stated is the ability under the guise of fair use to bring in
considerations less legally appropriate for scope of protection.
Whether you agree with the Court’s second factor analysis, the analysis of
this factor permeates the other fair use factors. This explains the decision and
the language from decision that suggests the Court has carved out a special area
of fair use law. Treatment for software under fair use is now quite different. A
different set of underlying assumptions is applied arising out of the utilitarian
nature of software. Software, in general, is assumed to be less creative.
Likewise, the Court provides further leeway to parse creativity quite finely, as
was done for the declaring code in comparison with the implementing code. One
should ask, however: should a court now do a line-by-line analysis of code that
may be at issue? One might also ask: is a court generally capable of such a fine
technical analysis?
Putting aside this aspect of the Court’s decision, the opinion is easily
constructed from the following points:
(1)Software is functional and useful;
(2)The declaring code is barely more than an idea;
(3)Re-implementation of software is transformative; and
(4)A shift in the balance between competition and protection is
appropriate for software.
With these considerations, the first two factors, “the purpose and character of
the use,” and “the nature of the copyrighted work,” easily weigh in favor of fair
use. Furthermore, these considerations then bleed into the analysis of the third
and fourth factor, “the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation
to the copyrighted work as a whole” and “the effect of the use upon the potential
market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.”446
Id.
Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1204–05 ( “The [third factor,] ‘substantiality’ factor will
generally weigh in favor of fair use where, as here, the amount of copying was tethered to a
valid, and transformative, purpose.”); see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 586–87 (1994) (explaining that the three factor “enquiry will harken back to the first of
the statutory factors, for . . . the extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and
character of the use”); Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1206–07 (stating regarding the fourth
factor: “Further, we must take into account the public benefits the copying will likely
produce. Are those benefits, for example, related to copyright’s concern for the creative
445
446

68

THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY
JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

[Vol. 30.1

Much more could be said about the Court’s analysis of the fair use factors,
but that task is left to others.
However, before leaving discussion of this groundbreaking case, a feature is
highlighted here that also breaks from traditional treatment and might be a
hallmark for treatment of software under copyright law. The Court’s analysis is
not only quite fine, but also measured. That is, the Court does not employ an all
or nothing type approach.447 This approach tends to benefit the society because
it does not totally vitiate the incentive to produce a work.
The Lotus v. Borland case (also referred to herein as Lotus) from the First
Circuit came up in a back-handed way in some earlier discussion. It is discussed,
now, out of chronological order, primarily because it is not a software copyright
case, as a technical matter, but remains important in this area.448 The Lotus court
itself states: “In the instant appeal, we are not confronted with alleged nonliteral
copying of computer code.”449
The case is unusual in several respects. First, the question, which is
recognized as one of first impression is: “whether a computer command
hierarchy constitutes copyrightable subject matter.”450 That is, as stated by the
court, “standing on its own (i.e., without other elements of the user interface,
such as screen displays, in issue).”451 The court, therefore, recognizes that they
“are navigating in uncharted waters.”452 Furthermore, the case is exclusively
focused on the question of copyrightability. As the court states: “Borland
concedes that Lotus has a valid copyright in Lotus 1-2-3 as a whole and admits
to factual copying of the Lotus menu command hierarchy.”453 The court also
notes, regarding software copyright cases: “Because of this different posture,
most copyright-infringement cases provide only limited help to us in deciding
this appeal. This is true even with respect to those copyright-infringement cases
that deal with computers and computer software.” 454
The First Circuit goes on to acknowledge Altai, but finds it of no help:

production of new expression? Are they comparatively important, or unimportant, when
compared with dollar amounts likely lost?”); Cf. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F. 2d 180, 183
(2d Cir. 1981) (calling for a balancing of public benefits and losses to copyright owner
under this factor).
447 Google LLC, 141 S. Ct. at 1199 (“We do not believe that an approach close to ‘all or
nothing’ would be faithful to the Copyright Act’s overall design.”); see infra notes 579–82
and accompanying text.
448 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814–15 (1st Cir. 1995).
449 Id. at 814.
450 Id. at 813.
451 Id.
452 Id.
453 Id.
454 Id.
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While the Altai test may provide a useful framework for assessing
the alleged nonliteral copying of computer code, we find it to be of
little help in assessing whether the literal copying of a menu
command hierarchy constitutes copyright infringement. In fact, we
think that the Altai test in this context may actually be misleading
because, in instructing courts to abstract the various levels, it seems
to encourage them to find a base level that includes copyrightable
subject matter that, if literally copied, would make the copier liable
for copyright infringement. While that base (or literal) level would
not be at issue in a nonliteral-copying case like Altai, it is precisely
what is at issue in this appeal. We think that abstracting menu
command hierarchies down to their individual word and menu levels
and then filtering idea from expression at that stage, as both the Altai
and the district court tests require, obscures the more fundamental
question of whether a menu command hierarchy can be copyrighted
at all. The initial inquiry should not be whether
individual components of a menu command hierarchy are
expressive, but rather whether the menu command hierarchy as a
whole can be copyrighted.455
Finally, the case is unusual in light of subsequent events following this First
Circuit decision. Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court.456 After hearing
the case, the remaining justices on the Court split 4-4, which legally means that
the appellate court decision below stands as ruling precedent. 457
The First Circuit in Lotus takes a different stance regarding section 102(b)
than the court in Google (2014).458 Without providing much legal support, the
First Circuit states:
Borland argues that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is
uncopyrightable because it is a system, method of operation, process,
or procedure foreclosed from copyright protection by 17 U.S.C.
Section 102(b). Section 102(b) states: “In no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described,
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” Because we
conclude that the Lotus menu command hierarchy is a method of
Id. at 815.
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 515 U.S. 1191 (1995) (4-4 per curiam
decision) (“Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of these motions
and this petition.”)
457 Id.
458 Compare Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 816 (arguing the Lotus menu command
hierarchy is a method of operation without deciding whether it is copyrightable within the
meaning of 17 U.S.C. § 102(b)), with Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183,
1199 (2021) (arguing that the Copyright Act does not adopt an “all or nothing” approach.).
455
456
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operation, we do not consider whether it could also be a system,
process, or procedure.459
Interestingly, the Lotus court clearly appreciates the problems that utility raises
in this context. It states:
The Lotus menu command hierarchy does not merely explain and
present Lotus 1-2-3’s functional capabilities to the user; it also serves
as the method by which the program is operated and controlled . .
. The Lotus menu command hierarchy is also different from the
Lotus screen displays, for users need not “use” any expressive
aspects of the screen displays in order to operate Lotus 1-2-3;
because the way the screens look has little bearing on how users
control the program, the screen displays are not part of Lotus 1-2-3’s
“method of operation.” The Lotus menu command hierarchy is also
different from the underlying computer code, because while code is
necessary for the program to work, its precise formulation is not. In
other words, to offer the same capabilities as Lotus 1-2-3, Borland
did not have to copy Lotus’s underlying code (and indeed it did not);
to allow users to operate its programs in substantially the same way,
however, Borland had to copy the Lotus menu command hierarchy.
Thus the Lotus 1-2-3 code is not an uncopyrightable “method of
operation.”460
Even more directly, it states:
Our holding that “methods of operation” are not limited to mere
abstractions is bolstered by Baker v. Selden. In Baker, the Supreme
Court explained that “the teachings of science and the rules and
methods of useful art have their final end in application and use; and
this application and use are what the public derive from the
publication of a book which teaches them . . . The description of the
art in a book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no
foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the
one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former may be
secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be
secured at all, by letters-patent.” . . . Lotus wrote its menu command
hierarchy so that people could learn it and use it. Accordingly, it falls
squarely within the prohibition on copyright protection established
in Baker v. Selden and codified by Congress in Section 102(b).461
Likewise, the First Circuit even points to the “useful article” provisions of the

459
460
461

Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 816.
Id. at 815–16.
Id. at 816–17 (quoting Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104–05 (1878)).
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Act with reference to a VCR hypothetical.462 The reasoning employed by the
court is largely correct with the exception that it is unclear why it felt the need
to find an answer in section 102(b) rather than merely relying on Baker v. Selden.
It appears as a distinction without a difference, at least for this case.
The concurrence provides additional insight, recognizing that “[u]tility does
not bar copyright, . . . but it alters the calculus.”463 Likewise, the concurrence
incisively states:
While Congress said that computer programs might be subject to
copyright protection, it said this in very general terms; and,
especially in Section 102(b), Congress adopted a string of exclusions
that if taken literally might easily seem to exclude most computer
programs from protection. The only detailed prescriptions for
computers involve narrow issues (like back-up copies) of no
relevance here.464
Likewise, he further states:
Congress has arguably recognized the tension and left it for the courts
to resolve through the development of case law. And case law
development is adaptive: it allows new problems to be solved with
help of earlier doctrine, but it does not preclude new doctrines to
meet new situations. . . [F]or me the question is not whether Borland
should prevail but on what basis. Various avenues might be traveled,
but the main choices are between holding that the menu is not
protectable by copyright and devising a new doctrine that Borland’s
use is privileged. No solution is perfect and no intermediate appellate
court can make the final choice. 465
The concurrence makes it clear that he sees section 102(b) as merely a means to
an end, perhaps not fully appreciating that reliance on Baker should be
sufficient.466
II. RECOGNIZING AND UNDERSTANDING THE PARADIGM
SHIFT
A. Acceptance of AFC Approach
As has been recognized by courts, the center of this controversy over
'.

Id. at 817.
Id. at 819 (Boudin, J., concurring).
464 Id. at 820 (Boudin, J., concurring). The concurrence, unfortunately, per the last
statement of the paragraph above, fails to appreciate the significance of the definition of
“computer programs” in 101 in conjunction with section 117. See supra Section I.B.
465 Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 820–21 (Boudin, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
466 Id. (Boudin, J., concurring).
462
463
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computer programs derives from its hybrid nature. 467 In fact, the Altai court
stated as much:
To be frank, the exact contours of copyright protection for nonliteral program structure are not completely clear . . . . This results
from the hybrid nature of a computer program, which, while it is
literary expression, is also a highly functional, utilitarian
component in the larger process of computing. 468
It is well-recognized today that computer programs, as works, include
elements that are both useful and expressive. 469 Returning to “first
principles,” however, in other areas of copyright law, when the expressive
and useful elements of a copyrightable work are entangled in a manner in
which it is not possible to satisfactorily disentangle them, copyright
protection is generally deemed unavailable. 470 For the case of computer
programs, given the clear intent of Congress to provide protection, 471 this
previous approach does not apply. The Altai court may have stated it most
succinctly: “Thus far, many of the decisions in this area reflect the courts
attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole.” 472
In this context, then, the speed with which the abstraction-filtrationcomparison approach was adopted by other courts is worthy of comment.473 The
See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992).
Id. (emphasis added).
469 Id. at 704 (“The essentially utilitarian nature of a computer program further
complicates the task of distilling its idea from its expression.”); see A Manifesto Concerning
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, supra note 6 at 2310; see also Samuelson,
supra note 6, at 297; Menell, supra note 6, at 309; Functionality and Expression in
Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6,
at 1225; Armstrong, supra note 6, at 138; Vasilescu-Palmero, supra note 6, at 161; The
Uneasy Case for Software Copyrights Revisited, supra note 6, at 1773–74; Tailoring Legal
Protection for Computer Software, supra note 6, at 1369–70; Ginsburg, supra note at 6, at
2561; Dennis, supra note 6, at 58; An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for
Application Programs, supra note 6, at 1072–73; Miller, supra note 6, at 983–84;
Reichman, supra note 6, at 664–65; Weinreb, supra note 6 at 1150; Englund, supra note 6,
at 891–92; Nimmer, supra note 6 at 644; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F), supra note 6;
Johnathan Band & Masanobu Katoh, Interfaces on Trial: Intellectual Property and
Interoperability in the Global Software Industry, 9 HARV. J. OF L. & TECH. 585, 588 (1996);
INTERFACES ON TRIAL: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTEROPERABILITY IN THE GLOBAL
SOFTWARE INDUSTRY, supra note 6, at 39–40; INTERFACES ON TRIAL 2.0, supra note 6. See
generally Special Issue: Software Interface Copyright, supra note 6 (devoting the Harvard
Journal of Law and Technology’s Spring Issue to the topic of Copyright and Software
Interfaces with 9 articles by well-known intellectual property law experts including: Pamela
Samuelson, Peter Menell, and Mark Lemley).
470 See supra notes 31–93 and accompanying text.
471 See supra Section I.B.
472 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 712.
473 Id. at 705.
467
468
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same year that the Altai decision was handed down, the Ninth Circuit adopted
the approach.474 Likewise, it was subsequently adopted by the First, Fifth,
Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and the D.C. circuit, not to mention a host of district
courts. 475 In general, circuits that have addressed the issue since Altai appear
to agree that the Altai approach at least for software is more appropriate than
a more traditional approach, exhibited, for example, in Whelan. 476 Although
these courts may not have fully understood the intellectual difference or shift
that occurred, they do appear to understand that the complexities of software
call for an approach other than the one courts have typically applied to
literary and other similar copyrightable works.
A possible message to be gleaned from this quick embracing of a new
approach is that previously copyright law provided too much protection for
software. The abstraction-filtration-comparison (AFC) approach provides less
protection because major portions of a work may be filtered out prior to the
substantial similarity comparison.477 Thus, Altai provides a way to arguably
remain reasonably consistent with prior copyright law, while reducing the scope
of protection afforded computer software. Nonetheless, this approach makes it
that much clearer that two separate regimes exist for addressing the scope of
protection for copyrightable works.
B. Differences from Traditional Copyright Law
At a high-level, there are two major ways that analysis regarding the
non-literal scope of protection for software differs from traditional
copyright law. The first, and more significant difference, is that the 1980
amendments to the Act make it clear that even if copying is an essential
step in the use (e.g., “utilization”) of a program, that does not denigrate

See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992).
See Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 855 (6th Cir. 2003); Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland
Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d
1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992); Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, 26 F.3d
1335, 1342 (5th Cir. 1994); Autoskill v. Nat’l Educ. Support Sys., 994 F.2d 1476, 1492
(10th Cir. 1993); Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 834
(10th Cir. 1993); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1543–44 (11th Cir. 1996);
Sturdza v. U.A.E., 281 F.3d 1287, 1296–97 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Furthermore, apparently the
6th, 10th and D.C. circuits have extended the Altai approach beyond software. See GodoyDalmau, supra note 101, at 248. Note also that, as occurred in Oracle v. Google, the Federal
Circuit follows the law of the circuit in which the district court sits, but appears to approve
of the approach. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
476 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 710; Whelan Assoc. Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1243 (3d Cir. 1986).
477 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 706.
474
475
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the scope of protection afforded to software. 478 Thus, if the right to copy
and the right to use are intertwined in such a way that they are not capable
of being separated, this does not prevent computer software from being
copyrightable and does not affect its scope of protection. In this article,
we refer to this regime of protection as hybrid intellectual property rights
in that the expressive elements and the utilitarian elements are both being
protected.
A second major way the non-literal scope of protection for software
differs from traditional copyright law relates to application of the
filtration step. Under the AFC approach articulated by Altai, public
domain elements are filtered out of the protected work. What makes this
approach so different is that it, in effect, creates a type of irrebuttable
presumption that similarities between the accused work and the protected
work are not due to copying of the protected work, but rather copying
from the public domain. To the extent there may be similarities between
the protected work and works that are in the public domain, those
similarities are irrefutably assumed to either not be original to the
protected work and/or to have been copied by the accused work from the
public domain. However, in other areas of copyright, particularly literary
works, which is the analogy used most often with software, this type of
filtration does not take place and, hence, no such irrebuttable
presumption exists. 479
1.

Hybrid Nature

It a significant overstatement to suggest that AFC is entirely consistent
with traditional copyright law principles. More specifically, under Baker
v. Selden, Mazer v. Stein, and language of the Act related to useful
articles, 480 for example, if traditional copyright principles were applied,
it would follow that software is not protectible at all. 481 However, this
Cf. supra Section I.B.
See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
480 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–04 (1880); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217–19
(1954); see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (definition of pictorial, graphical and structural works’;
definition of ‘useful article’); 17 U.S.C. § 113. See supra note 126–27 and accompanying
text.
481 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“If we
were to accept the district court’s suggestion that a computer program is uncopyrightable
simply because it ‘carr[ies] out pre-assigned,’ functions no computer program is
protectable..”); cf. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 820 (1st Cir. 1995)
(“While Congress said that computer programs might be subject to copyright protection, it
said this in very general terms; and, especially in Section 102(b), Congress adopted a string
478
479
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result would be contrary to Congressional intent that computer programs
be copyrightable along with the recognition in section 117 that copying
may be an essential step in the utilization of a computer program. 482
This difference alone makes software unique as a type of copyrightable
expression and justifies use of the term hybrid intellectual property
rights. More specifically, it is logically and practically impossible to
disaggregate the expression in software from the aspects of the software
that are useful. However, in traditional copyright law, if this occurs, then
the expression is rendered unprotectible. 483 Not necessarily so for
software, however.
It is noted that this issue seems to be the one that confuses courts the
most and yet it is critical that it be understood to appropriately carry
forward Congressional intent regarding the scope of protection to be
afforded software. To be clearer, the doctrine of merger is often confused
with the notion of functionality and form. The former is a limit on the
scope of protection for software, whereas the latter is not a limit on the
scope of protection for software. 484
For example, the Altai court was confused on this point. 485 One source
of confusion may be because Baker v. Seldon is the foundational case for
both the merger doctrine and the form-function doctrine. 486 Thus, courts
may, incorrectly, treat the two concepts as interchangeable, as Altai
did. 487 They are separate doctrines, although in Baker v. Seldon, both
were implicated by the same set of facts. 488
Another source of confusion may be the First Circuit case, Lotus v.
Borland, discussed in more detail supra, where the First Circuit held that
the menu command hierarchy in Lotus 1-2-3 was uncopyrightable under

of exclusions that if taken literally might easily seem to exclude most computer programs
from protection.”) (Boudin, J., concurring).
482 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1); see Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1367 (“That result
contradicts Congress’s express intent to provide copyright protection to computer programs,
as well as binding Ninth Circuit case law find computer programs copyrightable, despite
their utilitarian or functional purpose.”). See also supra notes 50–112 and accompanying
text.
483 Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217–18.
484 Compare McKenna, supra note 64, at 531–35 (2017) (distinguishing between the
idea-expression dichotomy and the useful articles doctrine), with Hickey, supra note 81, at
696 (treating merger and functionality as essentially the same doctrine). See also supra
notes 50–112 and accompanying text.
485 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 708–09 (2d Cir. 1992).
486 Baker, 101 U.S. at 101–02.
487 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 708–09. See supra notes 330–52 and
accompanying text.
488 See supra notes 54–87 and accompanying text.
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section 102(b) as a “method of operation.” 489 The First Circuit itself
stated490 that it was not considering software in that case. 491 Thus, in that
court’s view, which appears correct, the facts of that case did not fall into
the software regime of hybrid intellectual property rights. 492 However,
because the rights at issue were software-like, other courts may be
confused and see that case as relevant. 493
For example, although the analysis and holding in the 2014 Federal
Circuit decision Google v. Oracle suggests a grasp of the difference
between the doctrines of merger and form-function, the Federal Circuit
nonetheless confusingly states in its decision: “a court must examine the
software program to determine whether it contains creative expression
that can be separated from the underlying function.” 494 However, the
expression cannot be separated from the underlying function.
Furthermore, that has no bearing on the question of copyrightability or
the scope of protection for software. This point is a dramatic and
important one, which is why it has been emphasized here.
2.

Filtration of Public Domain Elements

Another important difference between traditional copyright law and
the so-called hybrid regime for software relates to the filtration step,
which has been recognized as one of the more problematic aspects of the
AFC approach. 495 To be more specific, in some respects, filtration of
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815 (1st Cir. 1995).
See supra notes 459–67 and accompanying text.
491 Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 815.
492 Id. at 816.
493 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702–03 (2d Cir. 1992); see
Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1364–68 (Fed. Cir. 2014); compare Lotus,
Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 817 (holding on which the court recognized the difference
between software and a user interface), with Eng’g Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural
Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1351 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding in which the Fifth
Circuit appeared to apply the AFC approach to input formats, user interfaces and
output reports). However, note that some commentators do see Lotus v. Borland as
relevant to the scope of protection for software, despite that it was addressing a
menu command hierarchy rather than software. See Functionality and Expression in
Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6,
at 1228.
494 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1370 (“As previously discussed, a court must examine
the software program to determine whether it contains creative expression that can be
separated from the underlying function.” (emphasis added)).
495 See id. at 1358 (“It is the second step of this analysis where the circuits are in less
accord.”). This step as a practical matter may be viewed as the most important step in terms
of determining the scope of protection. See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 707
489
490
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public domain elements is at odds with traditional copyright law
principles, particularly for literary works, for example.
Accepting that, to determine scope of protection for a software
copyright, filtration via the doctrines of merger and scène à faire is
legitimate during an analysis of non-literal scope, and recognizing this
has occurred in traditional copyright law cases as well 496, it is not typical
in copyright law to assume that elements of a work that may be
substantially similar to public domain elements necessarily originated
from the public domain, particularly for a literary work, which is the
category most frequently analogized to computer software. This
fundamental point has been well-stated by the esteemed Judge Learned
Hand, who observed in the 1936 case, Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Corp.:
We are to remember that it makes no difference how far the play was
anticipated by works in the public demesne which the plaintiffs did
not use. The defendants appear not to recognize this, for they have
filled the record with earlier instances of the same dramatic incidents
and devices, as though, like a patent, a copyrighted work must be not
only original, but new . . . . Borrowed the work must indeed not be,
for a plagiarist is not himself pro tanto an “author”; but if by some
magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s
Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an “author,” and, if he
copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might
of course copy Keats’s . . . . 497
To understand a logical basis for filtering public domain elements, here,
despite not doing so for literary works, consider, rather than literary works,
perhaps, how courts handle works with pre-existing material, such as
compilations and derivative works. In particular, for computer programs, some
courts have spoken in terms of the structure, sequence, and organization (“SSO”)
of software, which appears to be analogous to the selection, coordination and
arrangement of a compilation (i.e., the expression of a compilation subject to
protection). 498 For example, for a compilation, the unprotected elements of the
(“Strictly speaking, this filtration serves ‘the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiff’s
copyright.’”); see also Hebl, supra note 292, at 142–46; Ocasio, supra note 97, at 314–17.
496 See, e.g., Ferman v. Jenlis, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 791, 803–06 (S.D. Iowa 2016)
(applying merger); Walker v. Time Life Books, 784 F.2d 44, 50–51 (2d Cir. 1986)
(applying scène à faire).
497 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53–54 (2d Cir. 1936)
(emphasis added).
498 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1359–62; Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1245 (3d Cir. 1986); Jon Wilkins, Protecting Computer Programs
as Compilations under Computer Associates v. Altai, 104 YALE L.J. 435, 456–57 (1994).
The compilation analogy has also been applied to architectural works. See Oravec v. Sunny
Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1230 (11th Cir. 2008); Intervest Constr., Inc.,
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compilation, which are pre-existing, are omitted or filtered in connection with a
substantial similarity analysis.499
As another example, this filtering might be considered not unlike, the
approach the Ninth Circuit employed in Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp.500
(hereinafter, Apple v. Microsoft) In that case, Microsoft had licensed some
aspects of its GUI from Apple, but Apple believed that Microsoft’s product
exceeded the scope of the license. Because of the existing license agreement, to
find infringement the appellate court required “virtual identity” to prove
copyright infringement, a more restrictive test than the usual substantial
similarity approach.501 In other words, the existence of the license resulted in a
recognition that certain aspects of similarity between features of the copyrighted
work and features of the accused work would not be probative of copyright
infringement.
However, a difference for a compilation, a derivative work or in the Apple v.
Microsoft case, is that the elements were specifically known to not be probative
of copyright infringement.502 In such situations, it is factually clear that the preexisting expression, if not omitted, would incorrectly contribute to a conclusion
of substantially similarity between the two works, despite the pre-existing
material having no bearing on whether copyright infringement actually took
place.503 One clear example, as suggested, is the pre-existing material of a
derivative work.504
v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 919 (11th Cir. 2008). Architectural works
are similar to software in that functionality may intersect with copyrightable expression. See
Jonathan Seil Kim, note, “Filtering” Copyright Infringement Analysis in Architectural
Works, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 281, 295–96 (2018); Lauren Jean Bradberry, Putting the House
Back Together Again: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Architectural Works, 76 LA. L.
REV. 268, 294–98 (2015).
499 See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (“The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102
includes compilations and derivative works, but protection for a work employing preexisting
material in which copyright subsists does not extend to any part of the work in which such
material has been used unlawfully . . . . The copyright in a compilation or derivative work
extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from
the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not affect or
enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright protection in the
preexisting material.”). See, e.g., Beryl R. Jones, Copyright: Factual Compilations and the
Second Circuit, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 679, 682–84, 700–01 (1986); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
CIRCULAR NO. 14: COPYRIGHT IN DERIVATIVE WORKS AND COMPILATIONS (July 2020).
500 Apple Comput., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1447 (9th Cir. 1995).
501 Id. at 1439.
502 Id. at 1447.
503 Id. at 1439.
504 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.05(A)(2)(b), supra note 94 (“Originality operates
as a threshold requirement for copyrightability and thus may, on occasion, deny protection
to the work in question altogether; yet, in addition, the same doctrine also enters the picture
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Here, however, it appears that this analytical step may be akin to creating an
irrebuttable presumption that such elements of the protected work were copied
from the public domain.505 It is assumed because there may be similar elements
in the public domain that those parts of the work are not original and, thus, are
not available for copyright protection (and/or it is assumed that the accused work
copied from the public domain rather than from the protected work). 506 This
approach logically treats the software as if it were a type of compilation of wellknown programming approaches. 507 However, an important question is whether
such an approach is necessarily justified, in general, for software.
The question should be, as discussed by Learned Hand, how probative is the
similarity that exists between the accused work and the protected work? As
stated by Judge Hand in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,: “If the
defendant has had access to other material which would have served him as well,
his disclaimer becomes more plausible.”508 However, as a factual matter, in any
given situation involving software, we do not know for sure whether the
plaintiff’s expression is original or if the defendant actually did have access to
public domain materials that it copied. Perhaps, rather than creating an
irrebuttable presumption, a burden shifting mechanism should be employed.
It is, of course, true that in the software field, certain well-known
programming techniques may be proliferated throughout the community of

during the infringement analysis as part of the substantial similarity requirement, to
eliminate non-original parts of a work from the comparison, when the work in question,
considered as a whole, is deemed entitled to at least some protection.”).
505 See id.
506 See id. (“Originality operates as a threshold requirement for copyrightability and thus
may, on occasion, deny protection to the work in question altogether; yet, in addition, the
same doctrine also enters the picture during the infringement analysis as part of the
substantial similarity requirement, to eliminate non-original parts of a work from the
comparison, when the work in question, considered as a whole, is deemed entitled to at least
some protection.”).
507 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Whelan
Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1239 (3d Cir. 1986); Wilkins,
supra note 499. The compilation analogy has also been applied to architectural works. See
Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1230 (11th Cir. 2008);
Intervest Constr., Inc. v. Canterbury Estate Homes, Inc., 554 F.3d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 2008).
Architectural works are similar to software in that functionality may intersect with
copyrightable expression. See Kim, supra note 499, at 286–87; Bradberry, supra note 499,
at 268–69 (2015).
508 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936); see also
Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1232 n.23 (“Although not an issue in this case . . . it is
important to note that even the showing of substantial similarity is not dispositive, for it is
still open to the alleged infringer to prove that his work is an original creation . . . or that the
similarities between the works was not on account of copying but because both parties drew
from common sources that were part of the public domain. The cause of the substantial
similarity—legitimate or not is a question of fact.”).
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software programmers.509 But, in any given situation, it amounts to speculation
whether this explains similarity between the works at issue. Perhaps, therefore,
the burden should be placed on the defendant to demonstrate through proof that
this explains the similarity and/or the burden should be placed on the plaintiff to
show, for expression which may be similar to public domain expression, such
expression is original to the plaintiff. In this way, rather than having an
irrebuttable presumption that has the potential to significantly weaken a
plaintiff’s copyright in its software, it would, instead, be treated as a point
subject to dispute and evidence between the parties via burden shifting. 510
To take this point just a bit further, creating a type of irrebuttable presumption
might logically be viewed as moving the originality requirement of copyright
law closer to a novelty requirement (of the type that exists in patent law, for
example). To illustrate this point, assume, for the sake of argument, that any
time the public domain contains expression similar to expression in a
copyrightable work, it is treated as if that expression is not original. In the
logical extreme then, to be copyrightable, the work at issue would need to
contain only novel expression. Such an approach, however, does not seem like
an appropriate one, at least within the domain of copyright law.511
509 Various observers have noted that good programmers are “lazy” in that they do not
recreate what already exists. See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 75 (2004)
(“A good programmer is ‘lazy like a fox.’ Because it is so hard and time consuming to write
good code, the lazy fox is always searching for efficiencies. . . . The last thing a
programmer, particularly a volunteer programmer, wants to do is build from scratch a
solution to a problem that someone else has already solved or come close to solving.”); ERIC
RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR 24 (1999); LARRY WALL & RANDAL SCHWARZ,
PROGRAMMING PERL (Tim O’Reilly ed., O’Reilly and Associates 1991).
510 For example, initially, the defendant could have the burden to show that some of the
expression is present in the public domain. If the defendant met that burden, then the
burden could shift to the plaintiff to show that those features are original to the plaintiff
despite any similar public domain features. Likewise, if the plaintiff successfully meets its
burden, then the burden could shift back to the defendant to show that the similarity in its
accused work came from copying the public domain rather than copying from the plaintiff.
511 Some commentators have taken note about the potential overlap between protection
provided via a software copyright and protection afforded through patent protection. See
Samuelson, supra note 6 at 243; Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs:
Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6, at 1215; NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT§ 2A.07, supra note 16. Many key differences, however, exist between the scope
of protection provided by a patent versus a copyright, which, of course, necessarily includes
software. For a patent – the scope of protection is defined by the claims, which are
prepared by the applicant. See, e.g., Vitronics v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1281–82
(Fed. Cir. 1996). For a copyright, the scope of protection is determined by substantial
similarity of the expression of a copyrightable work to an accused work. See, e.g., Bateman
v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1544–45 (11th Cir., 1995). It would be extremely
difficult for the scope of protection available for a computer program via copyright,
including with respect to non-literal protection, to approach the scope of protection able to
be garnered via patent protection. Thus, it is believed that concerns about overlap may be
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Thus, in this regard, it may be that the Altai court, and the courts that have
followed it, have gone just a little too far in limiting the scope of protection for
software.512 Instead, a potentially workable approach would permit a burden
shifting mechanism to identify expression that might be original despite similar
expression available from the public domain so that proof, rather than an
assumption, ultimately resolves this issue in a case.
3.

Merger and Scène à Faire

Likewise, while accepting that merger and scène à faire have been applied in
traditional copyright law case; how those doctrines have been applied to
software is appropriate for discussion here. As a first legal point, there is some
disagreement among courts about whether those doctrines should be employed
in connection with a copyrightability analysis or an infringement analysis.513
overstated and/or misplaced. A patent typically covers making, using, selling, offering for
sale or importing tangible apparatuses (or processes), for example, that fall within the scope
of the patent claims. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). A copyright covers copying (used in the
broad, non-literal sense) – albeit, even considering non-literal scope, this at most relates to
‘use’ only to the extent that copying of a program indirectly includes use – and this applies
only where there are a myriad of ways to accomplish the same task (e.g., absent merger).
See, e.g., supra notes 50–87 and accompanying text. We also observe that the intellectual
property clause of the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, Clause 8, gives Congress the power
“to promote the Progress of Science and Useful arts, by securing, for limited Times, to
Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,”
and on its face has few clear limits imposed regarding this particular Congressional power
other than that the protection be “for limited times” and be with respect to “writings” and
“discoveries.” Several Supreme Court cases have sought to construe various terms of this
provision, such as the term “writings.” U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8; See, e.g., Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 208–12 (1954); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., 499 U.S.
340, 363–64 (1991). Granting that there may be limits on the exercise of this Congressional
power, either by logical construction and/or court decisions, it should be noted that what
Congress may be unable to do under one of its powers, it may still be able to do under
another power, such as under the interstate commerce power, for example. Cf. Trade-Mark
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879). In this latter case, the Supreme Court held a federal
trademark statute unconstitutional; however, afterwards, Congress re-enacted another
federal trademark statute and made it clear it was relying on the interstate commerce power
and the statute since then appears to have been accepted as constitutional. See Mazer, 347
U.S. at 206 n.5.
512 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 721 (2d Cir. 1992).
513 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.05(A)(2)(b), supra note 94 (“This approach treats
the merger principle as one relating to the boundaries of permissible copying, rather than
solely as a rule of copyrightability”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.10(B)(4), supra note 93
(describing the view that merger is a defense to infringement as “[t]he better view.”); Oracle
Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (stating that in the 9th
Circuit, “[w]hile questions regarding originality are considered questions of
copyrightability, concepts of merger and scène à faire are affirmative defenses to claims of
infringement.”). But see Ocasio, supra note 97, at 311–12; The Story of Baker v. Selden:
Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention, supra note 97. See also
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However, the better view seems to be that the appropriate place for these
doctrines relates to analysis of substantial similarity, at least in connection with
software.514 Thus, the question of protectability is a separate question from
scope of protection.
One source of confusion may relate to some courts’ treatment of copyright
law doctrines, such as the merger doctrine and the doctrine known as scène à
faire, in connection with copyrightability. 515 That is, merger might apply to
an entire work in question, such as a short phrase or title,516 for example, which
in some instances may be held to be uncopyrightable because the idea and the
expression merge, so to speak. In contrast, for a piece of software, unless it is
unusually short and compact, at best, some elements of the code might be subject
to merger, such as a simple sorting routine, which may be sufficiently short that
the expression and the idea merge. However, typically, one would expect this
expression to constitute a feature or element of a much larger and complex set
of expressions. Rather than rendering the overall work uncopyrightable, it may
simply be one expressive element to omit in the analysis of substantial similarity
that takes place for purposes of making an infringement determination.517
Likewise, the merger doctrine typically does not have the broad sweep
suggested in Altai.518 Rather, although the Altai court talks about efficiency
regarding code or software, all of the court’s merger examples dealt with screen
displays519 rather than software. This is especially interesting since the court
supra notes 31–86 and accompanying text.
514 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2A.05(A)(2)(b), supra note 94 (“This approach treats the
merger principle as one relating to the boundaries of permissible copying, rather than solely
as a rule of copyrightability.”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2A.10(B)(4), supra note 93
(describing the view that merger is a defense to infringement as “[t]he better view.”); Oracle
Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1358 (stating that in the 9th Circuit, “[w]hile questions regarding
originality are considered questions of copyrightability, concepts of merger and scène à faire
are affirmative defenses to claims of infringement.”). But see Ocasio, supra note 97, at 321;
The Story of Baker v. Selden: Sharpening the Distinction Between Authorship and Invention,
supra note 97. See also supra notes 31–87 and accompanying text.
515 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 703, 706.
516 See, e.g., CIRCULAR 33, supra note 91; Ferman v. Jenlis, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 791,
807 (S.D. Iowa 2016) (stating there is no protection for “No Trespassing” sign showing
surveillance camera).
517 See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2A.10(B)(2), supra note 93 (Stating, in connection with
merger, that “a given routine or component of the software may properly fall within the
scope of merger”); NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F)(2)(b), supra note 6 (discussing
computer searching and sorting algorithms as potentially good examples of merger).
518 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 708 (“Efficiency is an industry-wide goal.
Since, as we have already noted, there may be only a limited number of efficient
implementations for any given program task, it is quite possible that multiple programmers,
working independently, will design the identical method employed in the allegedly infringed
work. Of course, if this is the case, there is no copyright infringement.”).
519 See id. at 708–09.
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itself goes out of its way to distinguish screen displays from software. The court
states early:
As a caveat, we note that our decision here does not control
infringement actions regarding categorically distinct works, such as
certain types of screen displays. These items represent products of
computer program, rather than the programs themselves, and fall
under the copyright rubric of audiovisual works.520
Thus, the Altai court offers no real examples from prior decisions of situations
in which merger has been applied to software.521 One may also be inclined to
criticize the Altai approach as encouraging the creation of less efficient,
proprietary software except that it seems that merger should not typically arise
much in connection with software, if properly applied.
Again, these doctrines relate to the scope of protection to be afforded the work
in question. In other words, with merger, for example, was the author faced with
a situation where there were only a limited number of ways of expressing an
idea, at least as a practical matter? Perhaps, so. This seems to be the point made
by the Altai court regarding efficiency.522 That is, the court specifically explains
that while there may be other ways to perform the task, but if a few ways are
much more efficient than the others, then as a practical matter, there are only a
limited number of ways, such as an extremely compact sorting process
(mentioned above as a possible illustration) to perform the task.523 If so, then
merger applies, because to do otherwise would permit an author greater
protection than copyright intends an author to have with respect to the expression
at issue. Furthermore, if most programmers ultimately gravitate, so to speak, to
these more efficient expressions, then similarity of such expressions may not be
probative to show that the accused code had been copied from protected code.
However, in general, it is expected that this will not be a frequent occurrence
since there are more often many ways to code a particular task and it is expected
that merger may be applicable to only one or a small set of expressive features
to be filtered out of a larger and more complex overall expressive program.
Perhaps, with respect to merger and software, courts need to engage in a special
inquiry and make particularized findings. 524

Id. at 703.
Id. at 708.
522 Id.
523 See id.
524 It is noted that although the text speaks as if this is straight-forward, in actual practice
making this determination, especially for a court, may be quite a challenge. A court would
need to be able to separate situations in which many alternate ways exist to accomplish a
task, where those alternate ways are essentially interchangeable, from situations in which,
though there may be many ways to accomplish a task, a small number of those ways are
necessarily preferred as being more efficient. See supra notes 353–57 and accompanying
520
521
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As a further illustration, consider Google’s position regarding merger as to
the declaring code in Oracle v. Google in comparison with the following
hypothetical from Nimmer:
As an illustration, consider an art textbook that seeks to teach its
readers the methods of sketching flowers; it contains detailed
pictorial illustrations and examples of the techniques to be employed
in drawing and sketching objects. Assume that the techniques
described in the book are such that the drawings and illustrations are
essential to working them, but that the book as a whole contains
sufficient original expression (e.g., description of the techniques
illustrated) so that denying it protection as a whole would be
inappropriate. If someone were to purchase the book and copy its
illustrations and examples—without any modification whatsoever—
in her own sketching of flowers, the means/ends distinction tells us
that this copying ought to be classified as non-infringing.525
Nimmer, referring to Baker v. Seldon, makes a distinction between copying
for explanation versus copying for use.526 Google, in effect, desires the Federal
Circuit to see copying the declaring code as copying for use and, thus,
immunized. In this hypothetical from Nimmer, it would be unlikely that one
could argue that merger had taken place as to the drawings and illustrations since
they most likely may be expressed in various ways. Likewise, in Google (2014),
there are various ways to express the declaring code, but Google would like its
copying to be immunized, arguing that the merger doctrine applies by analogy
with Baker v. Selden.527 However, Nimmer states regarding his hypothetical,
“This example serves as an illustration of how the distinction no longer should
be deemed applicable under governing law.”528 To state this another way, due
to how the law has evolved since Baker v. Seldon, the form-function doctrine
does not apply to the hypothetical; likewise, it does not apply to software.
Engaging in a similar analysis with scène à faire, one should ask whether
there were considerations that the author faced, such as a technical need or desire
to interoperate with other known programs?529 The point being, that if the author
text.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.06(B)(1)(a), supra note 115.
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.03, supra note 1; see NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.04,
supra note 81; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.06, supra note 115.
527 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1213–14 (2020).
528 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §2A.06(B)(1)(b), supra note 115.
529 It is important to realize this is quite different from a desire for interoperability with
the author’s work by a copyist. See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Because copyrightability is focused on the choices available to the
plaintiff at the time the computer program was created, the relevant compatibility inquiry
asks whether the plaintiff’s choices were dictated by a need to ensure that its program
525
526
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did face those concerns, then perhaps those aspects of the work, to the extent
there is similarity with the accused work, are not probative of copying. That is,
for scène à faire expression, though expression as opposed to simply an idea,
such expression is so widely available that perhaps it did not originate, so to
speak, from the protected work. Thus, the similarity that is attributed to a
scène à faire expression may not be probative of copying and may be omitted in
an analysis of substantial similarity. However, this point, of course, is subject
to proof.530
When properly applied, the case for use of the scène à faire doctrine to limit
the scope of protection for software may be more likely to occur than merger.531
That is, external factors seem to have greater potential than merger to explain
similarity between a protected work and an accused work at a non-literal level.532
For example, in Altai, the suggestion was made that external factors, such as
compatibility with certain hardware or even widely adopted industry custom,
might justify application of this doctrine.533
In this respect, by way of comparison, the 2014 Federal Circuit decision in
Oracle v. Google may seem confusing regarding how it treated
interoperability.534 The Federal Circuit was correct because, at trial, the scène à
faire doctrine was not sufficiently developed.535 In that case, Google must not
have had a strong basis to suggest that external factors did affect the accused
product. So scène à faire was not fully addressed on appeal. 536 Consequently,
worked with existing third-party programs.”).
530 See id. at 1363 (“The trial court rejected Google’s reliance on the scène à faire
doctrine. It did so in a footnote, finding that Google had failed to present evidence to
support the claim that either the grouping of methods within the classes or the code chosen
for them ‘would be so expected and customary as to be permissible under the scène à faire
doctrine.’”). See also NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F)(3), supra note 6. (“The further
question arises as to who bears the burden of proof: Does it lie on plaintiff to prove as part
of its prima facie case that the elements which it claims to be original fall outside the merger
and scène à faire doctrine? Or, conversely, must defendant demonstrate the applicability of
those doctrines as affirmative defenses? Although plaintiff’s failure to present proof about
those issues could defeat a plaintiff’s application for a preliminary injunction, it would seem
that defendant must go forward at trial with appropriate evidence as to those doctrines.”).
531 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F. 2d 693, 709–10 (2d Cir. 1992).
532 Id. at 710.
533 Id. at 709–10 (“[A] programmer’s freedom of design choice is often circumscribed by
extrinsic considerations such as (1) the mechanical specifications of the computer on which
a particular program is intended to run; (2) compatibility requirements of other programs
with which a program is designed to operate in conjunction; (3) computer manufacturers’
design standards; (4) demands of the industry being serviced; and (5) widely accepted
programming practices within the computer industry.”).
534 Compare Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1363, 1370, with Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc.,
982 F.2d at 710.
535 Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1363–64.
536 See id. at 1363 (“The trial court rejected Google’s reliance on the scène à faire
doctrine. It did so in a footnote, finding that Google had failed to present evidence to
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when addressing interoperability, the Federal Circuit in Google (2014) was
relatively dismissive, suggesting that interoperability was an issue more
properly relegated to a fair use analysis.537 However, in what situation, if any,
should interoperability be a factor affecting scope of protection?
Google was arguing that copying by it was appropriate in order for its product
to be interoperable with Java.538 However, the appellate court in Google (2014)
was correct in concluding that desire by Google should not be a consideration
in connection with scope of protection.539 However, if, instead, Google had
argued that some similarity between Google and Oracle’s programs derived
from the fact that the Google’s software was interoperable with the same other
software that was interoperable with Oracle’s software, that, for example, could
be relevant to the scope of protection to be afforded to Oracle’s software. In that
situation, Google’s position would be that the similarity between Google’s code
and Oracle’s code at a non-literal level is not due to copying from Oracle (again,
the similarity in this instance would not be probative of copying), but rather
simply because both programs were interoperable with some other code. Thus,
in the appropriate case, interoperability could be a consideration to potentially
limit the scope of protection under an analysis of substantial similarity.
Consider, for example, a typical API call of the form NAME
(PARAMETER1, PARAMETER2 . . .), one example, being, as mentioned by
the Federal Circuit in Google (2014), “max(x,y).”540 Of course, one position,
which may be correct, is that merger applies. However, since merger and scène
à faire are relatively close cousins, it might also be the case that scène à faire
may be applicable. For example, consider a sufficiently complex code statement
or set of statements that have the potential to be expressed a variety of enough
possible ways so that merger would not apply. For example, suppose the API
calls are a set of statements to well-known databases for converting GPS
coordinates to other three-dimensional coordinates used with particular
support the claim that either the grouping of methods within the classes or the code chosen
for them ‘would be so expected and customary as to be permissible under the scène à faire
doctrine.’”).
537 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1371–72 (“Google maintains on appeal that its use
of the ‘Java class and method names and declarations was “the only and essential means” of
achieving a degree of interoperability with existing programs written in the [Java
language].’ . . . Although this competitive objective might be relevant to the fair use inquiry,
we conclude that it is irrelevant to the copyrightability of Oracle’s declaring code and
organization of the API packages.”).
538 Id. at 1353.
539 See id. at 1370 (“Because copyrightability is focused on the choices available to the
plaintiff at the time the computer program was created, the relevant compatibility inquiry
asks whether the plaintiff’s choices were dictated by a need to ensure that its program
worked with existing third-party programs.”).
540 Id. at 1349.
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cellphone functions that have become commonly used and expected in the
industry. In this instance, the presence of such calls in some code, including
perhaps, the organization and structure of the code around those calls may
otherwise appear similar, but may not be probative of copying. It may be the
case, for example, that such calls have been relatively standard for compatibility
across devices that execute code, perhaps through licensing across the industry,
through open source made freely available, through a standards body making its
specification freely available, etc.
However, such interoperability
considerations should have by necessity limited the creativity of the author of
the code that is alleged to have been infringed as well as the creativity of the
author of the code that is alleged to have infringed. Whereas, if those calls were,
instead, taken from the code alleged to have been infringed due to its popularity,
for example, so that the code that is alleged to infringe achieves interoperability,
but the author of the infringed code was not otherwise constrained in this
manner, that is an entirely different matter. 541 Below, the terminology
“interoperable after the fact,” is meant to capture this notion that, at the time of
its creation, the need to achieve interoperability was not a limit on the creativity
of the work that is alleged to have been copied.
Is it correct that interoperability after the fact would never be a consideration
for scope of protection? Although an unlikely scenario, to say never may be a
bit extreme. The 2014 Google court may have been overly dismissive on the
topic of interoperability “by not considering that the merger doctrine coupled
with the idea/expression dichotomy as well as considerations about the balance
between protection and competition might, in a particular situation, may work
together to limit the scope of protection in connection with “interoperability after
the fact.”542
To make this more concrete, consider a situation in which one or a few simple
API calls may be used to achieve interoperability. That is, suppose a party is
writing code and desires to write the code to operate on multiple platforms.
Suppose one platform is, like Java, a popular platform and, in particular, the
popular platform has a few simple known API calls to perform some known
functions, but the source code implemented by those calls is not known. 543 So,
imagine a few simple API calls having a specific, well-defined structure (e.g.,
name, list of parameters, and function to be performed). Suppose the author of
code desires to use these small number of APIs so that the code will operate on

541 See id. at 1372 (“Finally, to the extent Google suggests that it was entitled to copy the
Java API packages because they had become the effective industry standard, we are
unpersuaded.”).
542 Id. at 1368.
543 But see id. at 1351 (distinguishing from the 37 API packages at issue in Google
(2014), in which the declaring code was copied verbatim).
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the popular platform as well as on a separate platform being created. The author
of the code has no rights with respect to the popular platform in this hypothetical.
However, code being written by the author that is intended to be executable on
both platforms may include the same names for the calls as well as the same
parameters and, when executed, those calls may perform the same functions.
This is to achieve interoperability for the source code, meaning here that the
code with those API calls will execute on both platforms flawlessly – the popular
platform and the new platform.544 In this case, however, the so-called declaring
and the implementing code for the APIs on the new platform are written from
scratch. Only specific API calls, that respectively comprise for each common
call, a name, parameters, and a particular function, which are limited in number,
in this example, are copied.
As this hypothetical demonstrates, regarding scope of protection the devil is
truly in the details. That is, given the right set of facts and circumstances, it might
be imaginable that the scope of protection for popular API code might not extend
so far so that merely using a set of API calls having the same call name and
parameter names to provide the same function in a limited number of instances,
and nothing else, amounts to copyright infringement.545
III. HYBRID IP RIGHTS FOR SOFTWARE (AND OTHER EXPRESSIVE
WORKS?)
A. Relating Source Code, APIs, and GUIs
In this section we explore the nature of hybrid IP rights with respect to three
related examples: software, APIs, and GUIs. We will attempt to clarify the legal
distinctions, developed in the prior sections of this article, and discuss how they
seem to differ for related, but different types, of expressive content. Then, having
drawn appropriate distinctions based on legal analysis, we will consider how
policy considerations might suggest a departure from the present legal approach
that is employed in light of statutory pronouncements and case law.
An important conclusion from the previous sections of this article is that the
Federal Circuit in Google (2014) correctly recognized that software
functionality (e.g., form-function) does not generally limit the scope of nonliteral copyright protection for software;546 however, other traditional copyright
544 We assume, other than these calls, the rest of the code is just generic code, such as
C++, for example.
545 See Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1363 (using a fair use argument may also be
available in light of the Supreme Court decision).
546 See supra notes 330–72 and accompanying text.
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law doctrines, such as merger or scène à faire, may, without reference to
functionality, limit such scope.547 This ruling is left undisturbed by the Supreme
Court, which reversed on other grounds (i.e., fair use).548
Some commentators or copyright law theorists, however, appear to
disagree.549 It may be that these commentators would prefer not to have a tworegime approach to protection; however, that approach goes a long way towards
reconciling points that have confused courts. More important than the prior
consideration, however, the will of Congress is clear that computer programs are
to be copyrightable. Likewise, the fundamental nature of software is utilitarian.
These two principles together, it is believed, lead to the legal structure explored
in this article described as the hybrid protection regime.
A second important conclusion from the previous sections is that by and large
the Lotus court also reached the correct outcome.550 It is this juxtaposition,
however, that in large part, it is believed, has some courts confused. That is,
confusion has resulted from not distinguishing types of copyrightable works and,
consequently, not distinguishing the appropriate legal doctrines that
respectively govern.
With that said, we are reluctant to be too harsh in this observation because
courts are exercising an intuition that, were this not a statutory area of law, and,
instead, governed by common law considerations, might be entirely appropriate.
Along these lines, it may be appropriate to view an API or a GUI, for example,
as hybrid or hybrid-like.551
To explore this notion in more depth, consider the situation in Lotus.552 As
explained, that decision dealt with the copyrightability of a menu command
hierarchy. We know already that a menu command hierarchy is not software,
that is, it is not source code to be executed by a computer. However, is it an API?
Is it a GUI? It appears to be neither. Not being software, the reasoning of the
Lotus court appears correct as to copyrightability, whether viewed under the
See id.
See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1186 (2021).
549 See Menell, supra note 6 at 309; see also Functionality and Expression in Computer
Programs: Refining the Tests for Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6, at 1296.
550 See supra notes 459–67 and accompanying text.
551 The term “hybrid-like” is meant to suggest forms of expression that may not be
“hybrid” per se, but which do share similarities. For example, whereas with software, it is
necessary to copy it to use it, this may not necessarily apply to some of these examples of
expression, such as a GUI. Likewise, although some of these examples may be both
expressive and useful, it may be that in some cases at least, some expressive elements might
be separable from some useful elements, again, such as a GUI, for example. However, some
works may be hybrid-like because they have elements that are expressive and useful that
cannot be separated and that they are computer generated in some way, such as an API, a
GUI, a file structure, a menu command hierarchy, etc. See supra notes 11–22 and
accompanying text; see supra Section II.B.1.
552 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 809–10 (1st Cir. 1995).
547
548
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form-function doctrine or under section 102(b) interpreted to be a statutory
codification of that doctrine.553 That is, the aspects of the menu command
hierarchy that appear to be expressive are necessarily incidental to its use.554
However, the next point is tricky, important, and potentiality also somewhat
controversial. While the menu command hierarchy is neither code nor
necessarily a UI or GUI, it may, depending on the underlying software, relate to
the SSO of that code, not unlike had been successfully argued in Google (2014)
to the Federal Circuit. While the distinction between source code and a UI or
GUI has at times been confusing for courts, an important and subtle point is that
the non-literal scope of some source code may very well, in some factual
situations, include some expressive aspects that relate to an interface, an API, a
file structure or a hierarchical organization of commands, for example.555
On appeal, in Lotus, there was no question that the issue raised related to the
menu command hierarchy; however, one might ask the question, had Lotus,
instead, argued that the menu command hierarchy reflected the SSO of its source
code,556 might the legal result be like the result in Google (2014) or at least a
much more difficult question for the First Circuit to resolve?557 That is, the formfunction doctrine is not applicable to software, and the SSO of the source code
is within the non-literal scope of the source code.558 Perhaps, arguably, copying
the menu command hierarchy amounted to non-literal infringement of the source
code. This, of course, is both a factual and a legal question that could only be
answered with appropriate investigation. Nonetheless, just considering the
possibility raises the point that this area raises subtle factual and legal questions
that have the potential to lead to decisions that may superficially seem too not
be fully consistent, but ultimately are consistent legally.
More specifically, this hypothetical causes us to consider whether the notion
of hybrid rights should, on a policy basis, be extended beyond simply source
Id. at 812.
See supra notes 461–68 and accompanying text.
555 See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1244 (3d Cir.
1986) (“Insofar as everything that a computer does, including its screen outputs, is related to
the program that operates it, there is necessarily a causal relationship between the program
and the screen outputs. The screen outputs must bear some relation to the underlying
programs, and therefore they have some probative value. The evidence about the screen
outputs therefore passes the low admissibility threshold of Fed. R. Evid. 401.” (emphasis in
original)).
556 Recognizing, here, that this is a supposition for the purposes of discussion and may
not be factually accurate.
557 See Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for
Software Copyright Infringement, supra note 6, at 1252–53 (stating that the Lotus and
Google cases raise remarkably similar questions). This statement is a supposition for the
purposes of discussion and may not be factually accurate.
558 See supra notes 64–114 and accompanying text.
553
554
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code to other forms of expression that are similar to software, such as command
structures, APIs and/or GUIs, while at the same time recognizing that this is
ultimately an issue that should be decided by Congress, rather than courts.
In contrast to levels of abstraction, for example, but at least as theoretical, one
way to think of the relationship among these works is in terms of the content, so
to speak, forming a corpus or body of possibilities of realizable expression. 559
At one extreme might be expression comprising the source code, which, in terms
of realizable expression constitutes a code implementation realization. At
another extreme might be expression comprising the GUI, which is what is
produced by executing the source code and which constitutes an audiovisual
realization. Between these two extremes, depending on the content itself, one
may consider there to be various other potential realizable expressions. Courts
have observed that these realizations are related, which may have added to the
confusion. For example, in the case of Lotus 1-2-3, an example of realizable
content is the menu command hierarchy, which is neither the source code
implementation realization nor the GUI audiovisual realization, but is related to
both, almost as an intersection or type of combination of sorts and can be thought
of as at a place or location somewhere between the two extremes. Likewise, at
another place or location between these two extremes, depending on the content,
may be an API structure, which may be another example of a realization of
expression included within this body of content. At still another place or
location between these two extremes, closer in a sense, to the source code, may
be the SSO of the source code. Likewise, depending on the content, it may be,
for example, that the SSO and the API structure are close expressive realizations
or it may be, for example, that a menu command hierarchy and the SSO are close
expressive realizations.
In a given case, if, for example, an API and source code are sufficiently close,
as in substantially similar, then perhaps, copying the API may also amount to a
non-literal infringement of the source code, as took place in Google (2014).560
Similarly, perhaps, in Lotus, it might potentially have been asserted that copying
the menu command hierarchy amounted to non-literal infringement of the source
code.561
Thought of in this manner, this may assist to articulate an intuition that seems
implicit in some court rulings that relate decisions like Lotus to decisions
regarding non-literal infringement of software.562 While the intuition has merit,
the legal considerations dictate that these be treated as separate copyrightable
559 It is recognized this model is highly abstract, and not perfect; nonetheless, it may help
to capture a relationship that is otherwise difficult to precisely pin down.
560 See Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
561 Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 814–15 (1st Cir. 1995).
562 Id. at 819.
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works, which may also lead to different outcomes, in light of a controlling
statute, as opposed to being guided by common law decision making.
Decisions that attempt to follow Lotus, but concern software, may, therefore,
be mistaken, because software is treated differently than a menu command
hierarchy; likewise, however, courts that reject Lotus, in the manner that Google
(2014) stated, for example, may also be mistaken, because as to a GUI, an API,
or a menu command hierarchy, for example, there is no need to reject Lotus.
The Lotus ruling is not fundamentally inconsistent with the ruling in Google
(2014) based on the statutorily mandated principles involved. 563
B. Policy Considerations
One point that should be clear from the preceding sections is that analyzing
software and the non-literal scope of protection is a complex endeavor. For
example, consider that in a given case, a court must (1) consider multiple levels
of abstraction; (2) at each level, identify elements to be filtered out on multiple
technical bases; and (3) compare what remains with the accused work to make
a determination regarding substantial similarity.
Do the hybrid considerations make these questions more problematic?
Potentially so since the utilitarian nature of software ultimately means that the
content at issue is technical in nature. Legal issues, such as merger, scène à faire,
etc., may be much more challenging questions, particularly when the parties
present conflicting positions with conflicting evidence. Is it relatively easy for
a court otherwise having little expertise with respect to the technology at issue
to successfully identify multiple levels of abstraction with respect to the
expression contained within source code, in general? Is it relatively easy for a
court otherwise having little expertise with respect to the technology at issue to
successfully evaluate whether expressive examples within some source code
may be coded in multiple other ways?564 Similarly, in the same situation, how
easy is it for a court to determine that external considerations necessarily led to
expressive features of the source code? How easy is it for a court to separate
expressive features that are able to be coded only a few ways from other
expressive features that should receive protection from copying, or how easy is
Id.; see also Oracle Am., Inc., 750 F.3d at 1381.
See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03(F)(1)(a), supra note 6 (“Unfortunately, because
computer programs tend to be incomprehensible to a lay judge or jury, evaluating the
similarity between two computer programs is often exceedingly difficult. Such difficulties
are particularly applicable when the allegations of infringement go beyond mere literal
copying of the program code to claims that the organization and structure of plaintiff’s
program have been copied, thereby forcing the trier of fact to understand the design,
structure, and function of both programs.”). See also supra note 326 and accompanying text.
563
564
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it for a court to separate expressive features that are necessarily coded in a
particular manner as a result of external considerations from other expressive
features that should receive protection from copying?
For example, it was previously noted by the Second Circuit, in the Altai case,
that the lower court had inadvertently filtered the wrong work. 565 It is fair to
litigants to have such complex technical and legal questions put before a court
of general federal law? Instead, perhaps, as in patents, a special federal appellate
court should hear such cases. A related question, for similar reasons, however,
is: how easy is it for an appellate court to review such complex determinations
that are to be made by a lower court? Perhaps even a special appellate court
might not be sufficient. For example, despite the ruling in patent law that claim
construction is relegated to the judge, not the jury, the reversal rate on appeal of
claim construction determinations remains quite high.566 This, of course, does
not promote certainty in the law.
Another important question is whether and/or to what extent should
economics factor into the question of non-literal scope of protection? For
example, how clear it is that protection is needed for software through copyright
law? To have this question resolved becomes that much more important in light
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Google v. Oracle, which suggests a different
balance between protection and competition for software content.567 Perhaps, at
the extreme, the market functions sufficiently well that the desired amount of
software would be generated without protection under copyright law. If so, what
of Congressional intent regarding the 1980 amendments? As noted, many times,
supra., courts do consider the balance between competition and protection;
however, after Feist, protecting investment to produce the software, which
sounds like protecting effort, is probably not an appropriate consideration, in

565 See supra note 165 and accompanying text. It was noted by the appellate court in
Altai that the district court filtered out unprotectable elements from OSCAR 3.5, rather than
from ADAPTER. This may show the challenge presented to courts by the complexity of
this type of analysis in that the lower court got confused as to which program is to be
filtered.
566 See, e.g., Gretchen Ann Bender, Uncertainty and Unpredictability in Patent
Litigation: The Lime is Ripe for a Consistent Claim Construction Methodology, 8 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 175, 194 (2001); Christian A. Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit’s
Claim Construction Trends, 16 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 1075, 1075 (2001); Kimberly A.
Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases? 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 2 (2001); Kimberley A. Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim
Construction More Predictable? 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 231, 232 (2005); Michael
Saunders, A Survey of Post-Phillips Claim Construction Cases, 22 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 215,
215–18 (2007); Andrew Zidel, Patent Claim Construction in the Trial Courts: A Study
Showing the Need for Clear Guidance from the Federal Circuit, 33 SETON HALL L. REV.
711, 713, 727, 737, 739 (2003).
567 Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1194 (2021).
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comparison with protecting creativity.568 Feist appears to alter the calculus that
courts should use when balancing competition and protection. In this article, we
have spoken a lot about incentives for generating copyrightable works.
However, have those considerations changed? Should a court only focus on
incentives related to creativity rather than market incentives?
For example, compare the approach of the Altai court, which came after Feist,
with the Apple court and the Whelan court, both of which preceded Feist.569 The
Apple court stated: “The CONTU Final Report recognized that ‘the cost of
developing computer programs is far greater than the cost of their duplication.’
. . . Apple introduced substantial evidence of the considerable time and money
it had invested in the development of the computer programs in suit.”570
Along similar lines, the Whelan court stated:
As we stated above, . . . among the more significant costs in computer
programming are those attributable to developing the structure and
logic of the program. The rule proposed here, which allows copyright
protection beyond the literal computer code, would provide the
proper incentive for programmers by protecting their most valuable
efforts, while not giving them a stranglehold over the development
of new computer devices that accomplish the same end.571
Yet, the Altai court stated:
The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return
for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good
. . . When technological change has rendered its literal terms
ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic
purpose.572
The Altai court raises a subtle distinction compared with the Whelan and Apple
courts.573 While copyright law may help an author to secure a fair return, the
ultimate aim is to stimulate artistic creativity, arguably a different consideration
than simply protecting investment. However, software is at root utilitarian. Is
it being intellectually honest to consider copyright law as stimulating artistic
creativity when it comes to software? Consider, for example, the battle between

Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991).
Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247 (3d Cir. 1983);
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., 499 U.S. at 340–41; Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc.,
797 F.2d 1222, 1237 (3d Cir. 1986); Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693,
711 (2d 1992).
570 Apple Comput., Inc., 714 F.2d at 1254 (emphasis added).
571 Whelan Assocs., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1237 (emphasis added).
572 Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 982 F.2d at 711 (emphasis added).
573 Id. at 693.
568
569
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Oracle and Google. Is that battle about artistic creativity or it is about technology
and markets?
Furthermore, the non-literal protection regime for software, although
primarily employing analytic legal tools consonant with copyright law doctrines,
nonetheless, may have aspects that appear similar to patent law considerations.
For example, copyright protection for software may at least indirectly
encompass use of the software, since you must copy software in order to use it.
Use is usually governed by patent rights and generally considered excluded from
copyright law. Hence, in patent law, any overlap between form and function is
really not an important an issue for patentable subject matter. For other areas of
copyright law other than software, this overlap typically does affect
copyrightability and/or scope of protection. Likewise, as mentioned previously,
filtering out the public domain elements of a software work in the logical
extreme leads to novelty.574 However, novelty is a concept that applies in patent
law, not in copyright law. The term hybrid may be appropriate here, in addition
to the reason provided in the introduction, because the rights involved are
potentially a type of hybrid of patent considerations and copyright
considerations.575
See supra note 317 and accompanying text.
Some commentators have taken note about the potential overlap between protection
provided via a software copyright and protection afforded through patent protection. See
Staking the Boundaries of Software Copyrights in the Shadow of Patents, supra note 6, at
286; Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs: Refining the Tests for Software
Copyright Infringement, supra note 6, at 1284; NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.07, supra note
16. Many key differences, however, exist between the scope of protection provided by a
patent versus a copyright, which, of course, necessarily includes software. For a patent –
the scope of protection is defined by the claims, which are prepared by the applicant. See,
e.g., Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). For a
copyright, the scope of protection is determined by substantial similarity of the expression of
a copyrightable work to an accused work. See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d
1532, 1545 (11th Cir. 1996). It would be extremely difficult for the scope of protection
available for a computer program via copyright, including with respect to non-literal
protection, to approach the scope of protection able to be garnered via patent protection.
Thus, it is believed that concerns about overlap may be overstated and/or misplaced. A
patent typically covers making, using, selling, offering for sale or importing tangible
apparatuses (or processes), for example, that fall within the scope of the patent claims. See
35 U.S.C.§ 271(a) (2012). A copyright covers copying (used in the broad, non-literal sense)
– albeit, even considering non-literal scope, this at most relates to ‘use’ only to the extent
that copying of a program indirectly includes use – and this applies only where there are a
myriad of ways to accomplish the same task (e.g., absent merger). See, e.g., supra note 50–
86 and accompanying text. We also observe that the Constitution’s Intellectual Property
Clause gives Congress the power “to promote the Progress of Science and Useful arts, by
securing, for limited Times, to Authors and Inventors, the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries,” and on its face has few clear limits imposed regarding this
particular Congressional power other than that the protection be “for limited times” and be
with respect to “writings” and “discoveries.” Several Supreme Court cases have sought to
construe various terms of this provision, such as the term “writings.” U.S CONST. art. I, § 8,
574
575
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Answers to the questions above are beyond the scope of this article; however,
a different question, more legal in nature, is to what extent should the hybrid
approach for software also apply to expression that, while technically not
software, might be related to software and may potentially be hybrid-like in
nature, such as GUIs, APIs, file structures, command structures, or the like? For
example, should a court, at the beginning of a case, consider whether the case
involves hybrid rights to determine what set of substantive legal considerations
should govern? As a practical matter, to treat GUIs, APIs, etc., like software,
requires Congressional action. In this regard, there have been several calls for a
CONTU II.576
Nonetheless, it might be interesting to consider, how the Lotus case might
have been decided if it had been treated as hybrid-like IP. Under current law for
a copyrightable work, like a book or a movie, for example, if the work is original,
fixed in a tangible medium and creative, then it is subject to protection. In that
instance, the scope of protection is largely governed by the standard of
substantial similarity.577 This amounts to a full scope of protection. On the other
hand, as in Lotus, which involved a menu command hierarchy, despite
potentially being original and creative, no protection was ultimately provided.
Outside of the unique situation carved out for software, other potentially hybridlike situations based on statutory considerations should generally receive no
copyright protection.578 This may be viewed as an “all or nothing” approach.
In the unique case of software, which we have called hybrid IP, however, an
AFC analysis governs. Such an approach is not full protection, because some
expression is filtered from the copyrightable work. However, likewise, it
provides at least some protection because there is literal protection and
potentially some non-literal protection. The protection may be thinner, so to
speak, than full protection, due to the hybrid nature that we have explored, but
it provides an alternative to the “all or nothing” approach. 579 From a policy
cl. 8. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 207 (1954); Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel.
Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346–47 (1991). Granting that there may be limits on the exercise of
this Congressional power, either by logical construction and/or court decisions, it should be
noted that what Congress may be unable to do under one of its powers, it may still be able to
do under another power, such as under the interstate commerce power, for example. Cf.
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 97 (1879). In this latter case, the Supreme Court held a
federal trademark statute unconstitutional; however, afterwards, Congress re-enacted
another federal trademark statute and made it clear it was relying on the interstate commerce
power and the statute since then appears to have been accepted as constitutional. See Mazer,
347 U.S. at 206 n.5.
576 See Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d at 712; Armstrong, supra note
6, at 135.
577 See supra notes 63–86 and accompanying text.
578 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 (1st Cir. 1995).
579 Cf. 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 3.04 (2021)
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perspective, then, in a system in which encouraging more creative works is the
goal, perhaps a thinner approach is preferable to an “all or nothing” approach.580
So, consider, what would have happened using such an approach with Lotus.
Well, of course, as we know, the copying was literal and conceded to have been
done, so there would have been infringement. 581 However, if protection had
been provided, would it have prevented developments like Excel from coming
into existence? Probably not because the menu command hierarchy of Excel is
considerably different from Lotus 1-2-3. Furthermore, it may be that the scope
of protection with appropriate filtering would not provide protection much
beyond literal copying of the exact menu command hierarchy. Finally, again,
now, there is also a credible possibility of fair use. Consistent with what appears
to be the direction of the Court, perhaps given the objective of copyright law to
encourage the creation of more works for the benefit of everyone, this would be
a workable approach with better results for software and for those areas outside
of software that share some of its hybrid-like characteristics.
IV. CONCLUSION
As has been discussed in some detail, copyright law employs two regimes of
protection, one referred to here as a traditional approach and one referred to here
as a hybrid approach. The hybrid approach governs protection of software
because software is hybrid, being both expressive and useful.
As a result of its hybrid nature, the scope of protection that courts provide
software is different, particularly the scope of non-literal protection. Regarding
both literal and non-literal protection, the form-function doctrine of copyright
law does not apply. This is primarily an interpretation that follows from
Congressional intent and the fact that to use software, it must be copied. Another
difference regarding the scope of protection for software is that public domain
elements are filtered out. This approach does not generally apply in traditional
areas where copyright protection is provided.
Unfortunately, due to the complexities in this area, courts sometimes confuse
a number of concepts. The issues confused most often include distinguishing
between types of works, such as distinguishing software from related expression,
such as a GUI, an API, or a menu command hierarchy. Courts also confuse the
merger doctrine with the form-function doctrine. Thus, as a result of these last
two points, courts sometimes confuse the legal considerations that govern these
(discussing “thin” copyrights in connection with compilations and derivative works).
580 See Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1183, 1199 (2021) (stating “We do
not believe that an approach close to ‘all or nothing’ would be faithful to the Copyright
Act’s overall design.”).
581 See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 814.
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